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Abstract
This dissertation compares the handling of scientific
disagreement in consensus-based, supplementary procedures to
conventional decision making. Consensual procedures alter
the role of scientific analysis and, by doing so, modify the
use of scientific argument by policy advocates.
Consequently, the application of consensus-based procedures
induces a subtle shift of political power within the
decision making process.
The alternative roles for scientific analysis and
argument I have reviewed can transform decision making in
three ways. It can (1) open up decision making to groups
not otherwise able to take advantage of scientific
expertise, (2) increase the credibility of technical data
and analysis submitted by all participating parties, and (3)
empower technically untrained persons. Debates can be
extended beyond the consideration of technical factors to
address the political conflicts that motivate parties to
become involved in public policy making. Decision makers
are more likely to make decisions that reflect a broader
understanding of both the interests at stake as well as the
scientific and technical aspects of a decision.
Case studies illustrate three different ways in which
consensus-based procedures address scientific disagreement.
A facilitated policy dialogue concerning the health risks of
a mass-burn, municipal incinerator proposed in New York City
shows how consensus-based procedures can help to clarify the
basis of scientific disagreement. A regulatory negotiation
conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency to set
federal emission standards for wood burning stoves
demonstrates a procedure for building a consensus on the
technical factors underlying a policy decision. Finally, a
pre-trial mediated negotiation in a legal suit over the
allocation of fishing rights in the Great Lakes shows how a
consensus-based procedure can be used to help a group
2
proceed in negotiations despite scientific uncertainty on
pertinent technical issues.
My findings suggest that consensus-based supplements to
conventional decision making processes offer distinct
advantages and disadvantages to policy making participants.
A decision about whether or not to utilize such procedures
ought to be contingent on contextual factors such as the
party's relative level of technical expertise, access to
technical data, time constraints, political objectives, and
perceptions of the outcome under conventional decision
making.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Preface
This dissertation is about the role of science in
public decision making. I examine how scientific
information is dealt with in public decision making
institutions in the United States and the relationship
between the management of scientific information and
political power. Specifically, I compare the handling of
scientific disagreement in supplementary, consensus-based
procedures to that in conventional decision making
situations.
In the 1970s and 1980s in the United States,
controversies over public regulation concerning the
environment, food and drugs, consumer products, public
health, workers' safety, and new technologies generally
frequently included disputes between experts on relevant
scientific and technical points. Part of the reason why
scientific and technical factors have become salient is due
to requisites of public decision making (described in
Chapter 1) that formally or informally ascribe importance to
the scientific and technical premises of decisions.
Requirements for integrating science into public
decision making written in legislation are intended by pace
setting policy makers to serve at least two purposes.
First, policy makers want to help ensure that decisions are
consistent with existing scientific knowledge. In this
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case, the issue is simply one of preferring information over
ignorance. They assume that decision makers who consider
scientific and technical factors will be less likely to make
decisions that result in undesired consequences. Secondly,
requiring that decisions be consistent with existing
scientific knowledge is also a means of guarding against
choices made purely in response to pressure from groups best
equipped by virtue of their economic resources to exert
political influence over decision makers. Science is put up
as a counterforce to balance economic power in a political
system that holds up "one man, one vote" as one of its
mottos.
As the 1990s approach, it is quite apparent that
neither of these two purposes is particularly well-served by
conventional decision making procedures. A number of public
decisions are notorious for their blatant lack of
consistency with current scientific knowledge. For example,
although the artificial sweetener, cyclamates, is generally
believed by scientists to pose a lower health risk than
saccharin, the former is banned while the latter is allowed
to be used extensively in the food and drug industry. As a
second example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were
based on an assumption that there exists a threshold level
below which air pollution does not endanger public health,
although at the time, a number of leading congressional
actors were aware that most of the scientific community no
11
longer accepted the threshold view. These two instances
show that a consideration of scientific information alone
does not always produce scientifically sound decisions.
Neither does the consideration of scientific components
in public decision making necessarily prevent domination by
economically powerful groups. Often, the distribution of
access to scientific information and expertise among policy
actors in a given case replicates the distribution of
economic strength. An industry actor, for example, may have
a staff of scientists ready to assemble information and
perform analysis in support of policy alternatives preferred
by that party, while locally-based, public interest groups
may have only a staff of volunteers and poorly paid
generalists, and little access to individuals with
appropriate scientific expertise. In these cases, industry
actors holds an obvious advantage in the scramble to develop
supportive scientific and technical arguments for preferred
policy alternatives.
In some cases, especially in instances in which a
government regulatory agency is confronted by an
uncooperative industry, scientific arguments do, in fact,
provide a counterforce to economic strength. As explained
further in Chapter 2, in judicial challenges to agency
decision making, the court will defer to the agency as long
as the scientific rationale for its decision appears
reasonable. In effect, the ability of the agency to avail
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of scientific knowledge increases its capacity to withstand
challenges from groups economically more resourceful.
In either case, scientific knowledge is used to justify
and defend a particular decision alternative. Consideration
of scientific arguments by decision makers does not ensure,
however, that the decision is consistent with a
comprehensive understanding of the situation given the
existing state of scientific knowledge. Something has gone
awry in efforts to weave science into public decision
making. Rather than a politically neutral authority,
science is summoned forth by policy advocates looking out
for their own interests. It is used as a weapon to win
political ground.
While few would doubt the benefits of integrating
scientific and technical advice into decision making,
scientific disagreement brings to the surface serious
concerns about precisely what purpose scientific advice
serves in the context of intense competition in public
decision making. If scientific arguments are used by
contending stakeholders to further political objectives,
decision makers and others searching for politically
acceptable, socially just, and scientifically sound
decisions must devise ways of eliciting comment on
scientific and technical factors that will transform
"advocacy science" into knowledge that can be used to assist
decision makers to reach their own decision making
13
objectives.
Current methods for handling scientific information and
disagreement appear seriously deficient. The application of
alternative methods for dealing with scientific disagreement
in public disputes raises several critical questions,
however. While scientific information and expertise put
into service by advocates of policy alternatives battling in
the adversarial context of conventional decision making
procedures may not be the most appropriate and desired role
for science, does altering decision making procedures change
the uses of scientific analysis? If the role of science is
changed, how will the distribution of political power in
specific instances of public decision making be affected?
Finally, will "neutralizing" the persuasive power of
scientific arguments result in a reversion to prior
distributions of decision making power, which are patterned
on the distribution of economic resources?
This dissertation was undertaken to address these
questions. This work is exploratory. I have chosen to
examine three cases in which government decision making
diverged from the conventional path. Initially, I hoped
these cases would constitute "new and better" ways of
integrating scientific knowledge into public decision
making. On the basis of a "fit" between my' conception of
the nature of science and my understanding of the general
dynamics of an increasingly popular group of procedures
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based on a consensual approach to decision making, I
selected cases in which "consensus-based"' procedures, in
particular, were used.
My three cases span a range of decision making
situations. One involves decision making by a local elected
body; another concerns federal rulemaking; and a third
involves litigation. I purposely selected cases in three
different decision making forums to highlight the general
applicability of consensus-based procedures. Accounts of
what transpired in these cases were constructed from agency
records, legal documents, relevant scientific and technical
reports, newspaper accounts, written accounts by observers,
and interviews with both observers and major participants.
My presentation is organized into five chapters.
Chapter One examines the political uses of science in public
decision making, the purposes scientific analysis was
intended to serve, and those which have become commonplace
in the 1980s. I close Chapter One with brief introductions
to the three cases, providing background information,
descriptions of the major actors, and short summaries of the
reasons each actor became involved in the decision process.
Chapter Two provides a description of conventional
decision making procedures in the United States. I pay
particular attention to the methods for handling scientific
and technical information, especially when disagreements
between experts arise. To illustrate conventional decision
15
making procedures, I have tried to imagine how each of my
three cases might have fared under conventional proceedings.
The purpose of this chapter is to ask and answer the
question, "How do conventional methods of public policy
making deal with scientific and technical disagreement, and
with what political result?" I used hypothetical scenarios
in order to avoid the methodological difficulty of
identifying and comparing "matched pairs" 2 and persuasively
attributing causal links between process and outcome.
Chapter Three presents an alternative approach to
handling these same disagreements. Actual consensual
decision making procedures are examined in each of the three
cases. The overriding question is, of course, "Do
consensus-based methods alter the way science is used and,
if so, to what end?"
The fourth chapter deals with the question of political
power. If, as I have argued, science is used as a weapon to
direct public decisions and if the use of science and the
role of experts is transformed by consensus-based processes,
then how is the distribution of political power among the
stakeholders in a decision affected by consensus-based
methods? Do prior patterns of political influence (as
determined by the distribution of economic resources)
dominate once again?
In Chapter Five, I reflect on my findings and attempt
to summarize the prospects for using consensus-based
16
procedures in public decision making. I offer prescriptive
advice to decision makers and different categories of
stakeholders regarding the benefits and costs of agreeing to
participate in a consensual effort to incorporate scientific
and technical information into public decisions.
17
Notes
1. "Consensus-based" is defined in Chapter Three.
2. "Matched pairs".are two cases that have been handled in
two different ways, in which the issues, political contests,
policy actors, distribution of political power, and other
factors are sufficiently similar to enable one to draw
compelling conclusions about the effect of different
processes on differential outcomes.
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Chapter One
POLITICAL USES OF SCIENCE IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
Introduction
Science in Public Debates
When public health advocates brought their indictment
against cigarettes to the steps of Capitol Hill in the
1960s, they faced a formidable opponent. The economically
wealthy, well-organized, and extensive tobacco defense
network included paid representatives of tobacco growers,
cigarette manufacturers, and marketing organizations;
congresspersons from tobacco growing regions; prominent
members of four congressional subcommittees that handle
tobacco legislation and appropriations; and officials at the
Department of Agriculture involved with tobacco programs.
Although many health professionals believed that cigarette
smoking causes ill-health as early as the turn of the
century, it was not until the early 1950s that public health
advocates had in hand results from large-scale
epidemiological studies indicating a strong association
between smoking and lung cancer. Recognizing the potential
potency of research findings linking cigarette smoking and
disease, the tobacco industry quickly responded by
establishing the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (now
called the Council for Tobacco Research--U.S.A.)
19
(Fritschler).
What ensued was a lengthy debate over the scientific
evidence proving a causal link between cigarette smoking and
disease. The tobacco industry continually attacked the use
of statistical evidence by anti-smoking advocates. The
epidemiological studies showed correlations between
cigarette smoking and the incidence of ill-health, but could
not prove causality. The industry argued, for example, that
variables uncontrolled in the study, such as lifestyle
patterns, genetic traits, and environmental factors might
have a stronger causal relationship with disease than
cigarette smoking. In fact, two contrasting theories to
explain the association between cigarette smoking and lung
cancer were promoted: one assumed a causal link and the
other attributed both the behavior and disease to the
genetic composition of individuals (in other words, that a
genetic factor is responsible for an individual's
predisposition to smoking and susceptibility to develop
cancer). The genetic theory proved to be less persuasive,
and public officials elected to take regulatory action.
Congressional action requiring a health warning on each
package of cigarettes was only one victory in a continuing
war between public health advocates and pro-smoking
interests. From 1954-1980, the Council for Tobacco Research
awarded 744 grants totalling $64 million to 413 scientists
at 258 hospitals, laboratories, research institutions, and
20
medical schools. An additional $15 million was contributed
by the six major cigarette producers to support research on
tobacco and health between 1964-1973, to the American
Medical Association Education and Research Foundation, which
then did not actively support the anti-smoking campaign
(Fritchler).1
The 1987 congressional debate over banning cigarette
smoking on all air flights of 2 hours or less duration has
revived familiar arguments about the scientific basis of
public policy to curtail tobacco use. A spokesperson for
the Tobacco Institute, Inc.,2 argued on national television
that the three existing studies conducted on airlines in-
flight do not show that the level of exposure to cigarette
smoke experienced by non-smokers is hazardous to their
health (Merryman).
When the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) proposed regulations in early 1972 to reduce the
amount of lead additives in gasoline, the Ethyl Corporation
began a vigorous and persistent attack on the factual basis
of EPA's decision. The Ethyl Corporation challenged whether
reducing the amount of lead in gasoline would eliminate the
health hazard of airborne lead to the extent suggested by
one of the major EPA source documents (Collingridge). Ethyl
also contested EPA's assertion that the catalytic converter,
a technology that required lead-free fuel, was the only
automobile air pollution control system that would be
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operational by 1975. Later rounds of the debate focussed
more precisely on specific claims made by EPA in regard to
identifying susceptible populations, the relative
contributions of other sources of lead in blood, assessment
of "acceptable" blood lead levels, and the correlation
between air lead concentrations and blood lead levels. Each
claim made by EPA to substantiate a phased-down reduction of
lead in gasoline was countered by the Ethyl Corporation.
The record of the lawsuit alone numbered more than
10,000 pages (Ethyl Corporation v. EPA). Much of the
argumentation revolved on the scientific and technical
premises of the Agency's decision to regulate lead additives
in gasoline. As the presiding District Court noted, "[Sci-
entific] evidence may be isolated that supports virtually
any inference one might care to draw" (Ethyl Corporation v.
EPA). Again, the scientific basis of the decision was an
integral part of the public debate, and each side of the
eventual lawsuit invested considerable resources in
substantiating its position with appropriate scientific and
technical evidence.
When the state of New York and the City of New York
jointly proposed to reconstruct the West Side Highway in
lower Manhattan in what proponents described as a "mechanism
for stimulating jobs, investment; an innovative urban design
that will revitalize Manhattan's West Side," project
opponents quickly organized to block it (Wanderstock: 77).
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Although opponents mobilized around a list of issues
including the project's ability to address its primary
objective, transportation, they pegged their first courtroom
attack on the adequacy of the draft Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) rendered in 1974 in accordance with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Subsequent
lawsuits contested the final EIS claim concerning an area of
the Hudson River targeted for landfill. The EIS, issued in
January 1977, stated that this "interpier area" was
incapable of supporting significant aquatic life. After
prodding by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Westway Project conducted a 13-month study
that revealed this water area supported 22 species of fish.
The eventual demise of the Westway Project can be attributed
in large part to the project's delay, but the final death
blow was struck by the evidence indicating the extent of the
project's likely environmental impacts, particularly with
regard to the aquatic ecosystem.
As these three examples show, public actions in the
United States ranging from congressional law making and
federal administrative rulemaking to local, site-specific
construction projects frequently involve consideration of
scientific and technical information. In the legislature,
scientific evidence is often cited as a compelling reason
for formulation of public policy. Indeed, congressional
actions that ultimately resulted in the requirement for a
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health warning on cigarette packaging were a response,
albeit indirect, to a 1964 report by the Surgeon General,
that, in turn, was a reaction to surmounting evidence on
both sides of the Atlantic linking cigarette smoking to ill-
health (Fritschler.) The EPA's action to reduce airborne
lead was directed by the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments
that explicitly instructed a consideration of scientific
information. Under Section 108, the EPA was required to
prepare a criteria document for each pollutant that
"endangers the public health" and, under Section 109, the
Agency was required to establish ambient air quality
standards for such pollutants necessary to protect the
public health and welfare, while allowing for an "adequate
margin of safety." In the Westside Highway controversy, the
technical assessment of predicted environmental damage
proved pivotal in the decision to abandon the project.
Science as a Mechanism of Accountability
Science explicitly contributed to public decision
making in the United States only sporadically (and then
mostly during wartime) prior to the Roosevelt Administration
(Lakoff; Mullins; West). The creation of the New Deal
agencies, however, signalled the beginning of an era of
delegated decision making, with important consequences for
the use of science and technical expertise in public
decisions (Lowi; West). Indeed, part of the rationale for
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the establishment of independent government regulatory
agencies was the more specialized knowledge in public
decision making that agency personnel were expected to
contribute.
Almost as soon as the agencies were established,
Congress acted to ensure a method of accountability. The
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946 was the
congressional response to concern about discretionary
decision making by administrative agencies and independent
commissions, which were insulated from the electorate.
Formal rulemaking procedures prescribed by the APA require
that administrative decisions be based on the record (West).
The "record" includes transcripts of testimony and exhibits,
all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, proposed
findings and conclusions, exceptions to the decision, and
supporting reasons for the exceptions or proposed findings
or conclusions (Barry and Whitcomb). On issues concerning
the public health, new technology, and the environment, this
prescription required decision makers to demonstrate that
their actions were consistent with pertinent scientific and
technical knowledge. In addition to formal rulemaking,
"hybrid" rulemaking procedures, which are contained in more
recent statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the
Consumer Protection and Safety Act (CPSA), require "informal
rulemaking" similarly to be based on the record. These
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procedural impositions on administrative decision making
laid the groundwork for the development, popularization, and
refinement of a host of technical methods of decision
analysis including cost-benefit analysis and its more recent
derivative, risk-benefit analysis. (These technical
decision making aids often come under scrutiny in public
disputes.)
In more recent regulatory legislation, especially in
areas pertaining to the environment, health and safety, food
and drugs, and new technologies, directives for scientific
analysis is often explicitly mandated. The Clean Air Act,
for example, instructs EPA to issue air quality criteria for
air pollutants that "accurately reflect the latest
scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and
extent of all identifiable effects on public health or
welfare" (Clean Air Act). The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 and the Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976 similarly require in regulatory actions a consideration
of scientific data and the best available scientific
evidence on health risks (Crandall and Lave: vii).
Finally, legislation, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, has brought the
importance of scientific and technical issues into the
forefront of a wider array of issues. NEPA, which has been
duplicated in modified form in many state governments,
mandates that all decisions concerning actions requiring
26
federal funds consider adverse environmental consequences of
the proposed actions. Projects ranging from the
construction of a backyard toolshed to off-shore oil leasing
now may require an appraisal of possible environmental
impact. In short, although administrators, unlike elected
decision makers, are not answerable to a voting
constituency, a requirement to base decisions on the record
suggests a different sort of accountability, and one that
entails extensive use of scientific and technical
documentation and analysis.
Politically astute elected officials have taken the
cues concerning the importance of scientific and technical
analysis and have followed suit by establishing their own
channels for receiving scientific and technical information.
For example, as early as 1957, the President's Science
Advisory Committee was established to counsel the Executive
Officer on the technical merits and consequences of specific
programs (Fischer). The U.S. Congress established the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972 to provide
legislators advice on technical and scientific aspects of
important issues, as well as to study the social, economic,
and political impacts of new technological developments.
The institutional infrastructure encouraging the use of what
is broadly referred to as "science," (technical as well as
more theory-oriented scientific work) in public decision
making is now in place.
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Accountability, Authority and the Nature of Science
Efforts to ensure the accountability of decision
makers, especially in the administrative branches of
government, have yielded prescriptions for decision making.
Importantly, these prescriptions have carved a special niche
for scientific and technical analysis. They presuppose a
particular ideal of science. Presumptions about the
rationality of decision making are central. Decisions are
expected to follow directly from the evidence submitted.
The scientific ideal presumed by the current
institutional framework in the United States mistakenly
confuses characteristics about the objectives of science as
a process and the products we think of as scientific
knowledge. This false ideal implies that scientific
endeavors are objective and neutral, and yield a single,
coherent understanding of reality.3 This, however, is
probably an impossible goal.
It is consistent, however, with the popularly accepted
mission of science as the acquisition of knowledge, or truth
(Hiskes and Hiskes). According to the dominant philosophy
of science through the 1970s, known as logical empiricism,
the primary test of truth is the replicability of
experimental findings. Hiskes and Hiskes write that logical
empiricism assumes that
(1) Data obtained through careful experiment
and observation are objective;
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(2) there is one universally valid logic for
science; and
(3) through rigorous application of logic to
data, science gradually makes progress
toward the ancient Greek ideal of
theoria (Hiskes and Hiskes: 10-11).
According to the logical empiricist view, data are
incontrovertible and unchanging. Any rational person
observing the same event would report identical
observations. The recording of data eventually leads to the
development of theory that integrates abstract concepts and
generalizable principles to explain diverse phenomena.
Logic is linear and one-directional. In short, this view
implies, that the results of the scientific method are
absolute and without ambiguity.
This characterization of science as a dispassionate
activity, (that is, one that does not depend on the views of
the individual scientist), has deep roots. Sir Francis
Bacon was instrumental in crystallizing this view as far
back as the 1500s (Lakoff). As the formal architect of the
modern method of scientific inquiry, (which prescribes the
setting and testing of hypotheses as the means of
establishing fact), he sought to outline a way of
accumulating knowledge about the physical world that was
free of theologically-based distortion and founded on the
observation of reality rather than imagination. Moreover,
to depict science in a manner that would be palatable to the
then powerful religious establishment, Bacon carefully
29
delineated the territory of science and claimed that the
science of nature "is studiously indifferent to good and
evil" (Lakoff: 9).
Bacon (and others) advocated this image of science
during a period in which intense disputes over critical
theological and philosophical issues were disrupting English
society as well as life on the European continent
(Ben-David). The growing popularity of the Baconian view at
that time is attributable to the widely shared belief that a
consensus on procedures is neutral with respect to religion
or politics. What later became known as "the scientific
method" represented a way for intellectual thought to
progress in England amidst the country's civil revolution.
Most scientists concurred with this apolitical image of
science. One historian writes,
One of the often-mentioned features of
the prehistory of the Royal Society [an
organization of scientists in Britain]
is that the participants at the informal
meetings of the circle from which the
society emerged agreed not to discuss
matters of religion or politics but to
restrict themselves dispassionately to
the neutral field of science. (Ben-
David: 72)
Science then competed with religion and the monarchy as a
way of understanding the world and making decisions about
future actions. Success was eventually achieved when
"instead of needing justification from other more
fundamental values, science became a source and a standard
of legitimacy" (Greenfield: 122).
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This image of science as politically neutral has
endured. Scientists in more recent years have continued to
reaffirm it. Proponents of financial support for scientific
research by the federal government have argued that the
scientific community is and ought to be allowed to remain
autonomous. The scientific community has been called a
"priesthood" (Lapp), an "estate" (Price), and a "republic"
(Polanyi) and scientists, accordingly, have been described
as "objective," "disinterested," "uncorruptible," and
"impartial" (Wood). Uniform standards of validating fact
and the self-imposed discipline of the scientific method are
offered as guarantees of a depersonalized and selfless quest
for truth on behalf of the "common good".
This portrayal of the scientist as neutral has been
underscored in discussions about the role of science in
government decision making. Scientists and others have
frequently and openly defended the advisory role they
believe scientists ought to play in policy making (Burger;
Crandall and Lave). They lament that scientific advice is
often ignored or sacrificed for the sake of "democratic
decision making" and that the public is not interested in
advice that is objective and analytical (Burger).
Contemporary scientists, wittingly or not, often
reinforce this image when in testifying on specific public
policy issues they claim to distinguish between their
"professional" and their "personal" views. In the debate
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over the regulation of chlorofluoromethanes (CFMs), for
example, one scientist appearing before a Senate committee
in 1975 stated,
I should point out that the measurements
that I am involved in are crucial to the
question [of banning aerosol sprays] and
I would like to remain neutral on such a
question as you ask until I satisfy
myself of the results of those
measurements. That is from a scientific
point of view. From the personal point
of view, I feel very strongly about the
issue of protecting the very delicate
ozone photochemistry, and from that
point of view I would urge on the basis
of the data and calculations already
available that action be taken (Brooks:
207).
The presumption underlying a separation of a "scientific
point of view" and a "personal point of view" is that one is
devoid of values while the other is not.
Science as a Weapon: Legitimation and Persuasion
Widespread acceptance of the logical empiricist view of
science and the institutional frameworks that require
reference to scientific knowledge in public decision making
combine to create a powerful context wherein the uses of
science are prescribed. As many writers have observed,
science is a source of authority for justifying decisions
and persuading competing elements of the polity of the
legitimacy of one alternative (Dickson; Majone; Nelkin and
Pollack). Like religion and the rule of the monarchy prior
to the Age of Enlightenment, science is invoked in twentieth
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century decision making as a primary source of legitimacy:
By invoking the authoritative canons of
scientific reasoning and method, public
authorities and others having a stake in
technical issues seek to demonstrate the
rationality of their position and
thereby gain political support and
acceptance (Brickman: 108).
Decision makers fearful of the consequences of
politically unpopular decisions seek refuge in scientific
and technical arguments indicating the "soundness" of their
decisions. As one writer has noted with regard to policies
for protecting health and the environment, "turning the job
of defining adequate standards over to 'experts' relieves
congressmen of the burden of resolving difficult
controversies" (Melnick: 251). Administrative agencies
aware of the possibility of lawsuits challenging their
decisions and the scope of judicial review fortify their
decisions with appropriate scientific or technical support.
On the other hand, scientific or technical advice that
is not compatible with preferred policy alternatives can be
disregarded (Mullins). For example, Senator Edmund S.
Muskie stated in 1977 that
[s]cientists and doctors have told us
that there is no threshold, that any air
pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act
is based on the assumption, although we
knew at the time it was inaccurate, that
there is a threshold (Melnick: 239).
Such confessions reaffirm that decision makers consult
scientists but ignore their advice when it is politically
expedient to do so. Rather than relying on scientific
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knowledge to guide their decisions, in such cases it appears
that science is integrated post facto.
The same laws that require decision makers to account
for the scientific and technical legitimacy of their
decisions, in many cases, also provide a foothold for groups
to challenge those decisions. Although the NEPA
environmental impact assessment requirement is loosely
advisory (and a decision maker may still approve a proposal
despite the probability of substantial environmental harm--
presumably because positive gains are invaluable), other
legislation is more restrictive. The 1958 Delaney amendment
to the Pure Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Amendments, for
instance, forbids the approval of food additives that have
been shown to cause cancer in humans or animals (Rushefsky).
The wording and judicial interpretation of such legislation
or agency rules dictate whether specific groups have a legal
basis for contesting decisions they do not like. In many
cases, because of a deep-rooted belief in the authority of
science, decision makers find it hard to ignore strong
objections to proposals that include criticisms of their
scientific or technical premises.
Thus, the power of scientific argument to legitimize
decisions is also a means for challenging a decision.
Nelkin has written that "access to knowledge and the
resulting ability to question the data used to legitimize
decisions is an essential basis of power and influence"
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(Nelkin, 1980: 16). Groups unhappy with a decision amass
scientific evidence in an attempt to undermine the
legitimacy of a decision, as did the Ethyl Corporation in
the airborne lead case. Groups anticipating decisions
mobilize resources to produce contending scientific claims
in support of a more favorable policy alternative. This is
how the Tobacco Institute reacted to anti-smoking
legislation. In short, decision makers and stakeholding
groups on different sides of a public debate acknowledge and
cite portions of all available scientific and technical
evidence to bolster a preferred alternative or to discredit
competing alternatives in a battle to win political support
(Nelkin, 1975).
As a result, debates before legislators,
administrators, judges, and the public at large focus on
technical premises that underlie decision alternatives.
Science has become a major weapon of persuasion in public
debates about the environment, health and safety, and new
technologies. Indeed, preoccupation with the scientific and
technical underpinnings of decision making can skew policy
debates in several important ways.
Factors Behind the Partisan Use of Science
Why has scientific and technical expertise been awarded
such a prominent status in political and legal institutions
and, consequently, in debates over public decisions? A
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number of speculations come to mind.4 On one dimension,
advances in technology have had the dual effect of enhancing
the ability to detect smaller and smaller increments of
change and at the same time creating new sources of
potential offenders. That is, instruments and testing
procedures now allow researchers to detect contamination of
air or water at concentrations of "parts per billion," or
even "parts per trillion," in some cases, whereas earlier,
"parts per million" was the limit. On the other hand, one
writer argued that
pollution is a direct consequence of the anti-
ecological nature of a laissez-faire technology
not properly assessed and controlled, and designed
only to reinforce existing political and economic
structures (Knelman: 48).
Finally, it can be argued that the cumulative nature of
environmental and health impacts required the passage of a
certain period of time before change could be observed.
Commoner has argued that pollution first widely observed in
the 1970s was the result of technological changes that had
been occurring since the 1940s (Commoner, 1972). In short,
the subject of public decisions is now more technical and
scientific in nature than in previous times.
More compelling than the shaping of public issues by
technological change, however, are factors that concern the
individuals and groups behind contests over the shaping of
public policy and decision making. The liberal social and
political climate of the 1960s planted an expectation of
36
"rights" among proliferating organized interest groups in
the United States (Cigler and Loomis; O'Connor). The
population and its elected leaders felt entitled to a
certain standard of living. "Clean air" and "navigable,
swimmable, and drinkable waters" were viewed as a right, not
a privilege. This attitude was reflected in federal
legislation that conferred legal standing on the general
citizenry to enable "any person" to file a "citizen suit"
against pollution sources to enforce emission standards or
against the EPA administrator for failure to carry out
provisions of federal environmental legislation (Stewart and
Krier: 642).5 Moreover, the notion of public decision
making changed. Participatory decision making, "maximum
feasible participation" of those affected by decisions, has
become the norm since the 1960s (Freedman: 47).
Along with an expanded enfranchisement, environmental,
community, and consumer groups have also gained in
sophistication. The organization of environmental,
community, and consumer groups in the 1960s provided an
alternative ideological home for scientists, engineers,
lawyers, and other highly trained professionals. Up until
then, professionals either aligned with industry or
government for research funding. The degree to which
university researchers were independent of industry or
government agenda is debatable, but certainly the
development of environmental, community, and consumer groups
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provided an outlet for university researchers to enter
public debates in a new way (Primack and Von Hippel). While
the potential for general societal conflict increased on
several fronts (additional sources of infractions of rights,
enhanced means for measuring infractions of rights, a
broadening definition of defensible rights, growing
opportunities for individuals to express perceptions of
violations, and others), scientific and technical expertise
in service to ideologically organized interests expanded.
"The battle of the print-out" has become more common,
then, not merely because of the growth in legal and
institutional structures that encourage it, but because of
an increasing ability of contending groups to avail
themselves of the persuasive power of scientific and
technical argumentation. This raises a fundamental point.
Disputes over scientific or technical elements of public
decisions emerge not from computer print-outs or purely
scholarly disagreement, but from perceptions of the
political, economic, and social consequences of those
decisions. As Wilson's conflict model of policy making
suggests, stakeholding groups perceive a peculiar
distribution of costs and benefits resulting from a public
decision (Wilson). These costs and benefits may be measured
in individual, material or psychological gains or losses,
the precedent-setting value of legal interpretations or
interpretations of a particular agency's mandate and
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philosophy, or public statements on morality. For example,
although an investigation would probably also show that even
the earliest studies on the relationship of cigarette
smoking to human disease arose from a concern for protecting
public health, the motivation of the tobacco industry for
funding research on smoking and cancer was clear. They
acted out of a perception of a threat to their economic
interest (should the health warning dissuade people from
smoking) and, perhaps, to avert the moral condemnation of
the tobacco industry conveyed by a public statement
acknowledging the detrimental effect of smoking on public
health. The Ethyl Corporation challenged EPA's scientific
analyses for similar reasons. Challenges to the scientific
and technical basis of public decisions and policy
alternatives arise not from the spontaneous emergence of
contradictory scientific evidence but from the mobilization
of interests that have a stake in those decisions.
The capacity of a broader range of groups to utilize
scientific and technical argumentation has caused a
dispersion of access to the authoritative power of science.
That scientific and technical analysis have become central
pillars in challenges to the formulation and determination
of controversial decisions in the legislatures and courts as
well as in administrative agencies (at the federal, state,
and municipal levels) signals a qualitative change in the
distribution of influence over those decisions. How
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scientific and technical information, especially conflicting
evidence, is managed in public forums holds tremendous
implications for government decisions regarding public
resource allocations and the prospects for social justice.
Three Case Studies: Background and Stakeholders
The following sections of this study are structured
around three illustrative case studies. I turn now to an
introduction of these three cases of public decision making,
each of which appeared initially to turn on scientific and
technical issues. I present brief histories about how the
disputes arose, identify the major actors involved in the
cases, and sketch the primary reasons for each group's
involvement.
Solid Waste Disposal in New York City
An estimated 26,000 tons of municipal solid wastes
(MSW) were generated daily by New York City's 10 million
residents in 1984 (New York City Department of Sanitation,
1984b). As the first step of a comprehensive waste
management plan for the City, the Department of Sanitation
(DOS) put before the governing Board of Estimate a proposal
to build one of eight mass-burn incinerators at the site of
the former Brooklyn Navy Yard. The DOS proposal touted the
mass burn technology as "one of the most successful and
highly used [designs] in the world" (NYC DOS, 1984b: 1-1).
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Predictably, opposition to the project emerged from many
corners of the City. Paramount among the concerns raised
was the fact that, unfortunately, this technology is also
known to emit a class of highly toxic chemicals known as
dioxins.6 Dioxin gained popular attention in the United
States as a result of controversy over the Vietnam war
sprayings of "Agent Orange," (a defoliant containing dioxins
as a contaminant), and the Times Beach tragedy, (in which
soil contaminated with dioxins resulted in the relocation of
an entire Missouri town). The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) once called dioxins "one of the most perplexing
and potentially dangerous chemicals ever to pollute the
environment" (Raloff: 26).7 Dioxins have been associated
with cancer, birth defects, immune system disorders, and a
host of other abnormalities in laboratory animals.
The project sponsor was the Department of Sanitation
(DOS), the City agency charged with disposing of solid
wastes. To generate support for the proposal to build the
mass-burn incinerator (that was billed by the DOS as a
"resource recovery facility" because it is designed to
produce electricity from the steam produced during the
combustion process), DOS staff invested considerable effort
in building up a sense of crisis around the garbage disposal
situation in New York City. In the introduction to the
project's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) and
cover letter to the city's governing Board of Estimate, the
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impending closure of the City's second largest landfill site
and the imminent loss of out-of-state options were
juxtaposed to daily tonnage estimates of municipal solid
wastes. Sanitation Commissioner Steisel predicted that the
one remaining landfill would be exhausted in 13 years (New
York Times, December 7, 1984), in a city in which publicly
acceptable projects, such as schools and firehouses,
commonly take six to eight years to implement.
The City's concern over the waste disposal issue can be
traced to the first Lindsay administration, when the DOS
began to anticipate the depletion of landfill sites.
Proposals were drawn up, but no action was taken. Then,
under the Beame administration in 1977, a "blue ribbon" task
force produced a report entitled "Comprehensive Solid Waste
Management Plan for Refuse Disposal and Recovery of Material
and Energy Resources." Although this report was not itself
considered a "master plan," its overview and evaluation of
alternatives for waste disposal provided the basis for the
City's comprehensive plan and facility site-selection.
After being given the green light from the state legislature
and approval by the City's Board of Estimate (BOE), the City
had in hand by 1981 a proposal for the design, construction,
and operation of the first of eight proposed so-called
resource recovery plants, a 3,000 tons per day capacity
facility at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The City's investment
in the mass-burn incinerator thus was not trivial and was
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performed with sanctions and support from state as well as
city government.
A vocal supporter of the mass-burn incinerator was
Mayor Koch. Having endorsed the recently defeated,
monumental "Westway" project, the $3 billion waste disposal
plan may have represented more than simply a way of removing
garbage from the streets (New York Times, December 7, 1984).
In any case, Mayor Koch had made public his support of the
proposal, and he was reportedly energetically lobbying BOE
members for their votes.8
The Brooklyn Navy Yard site covers 13 acres in the
northeastern corner of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, bordering the
East River (NYC DOS. 1984b). The site is industrial in
character, used for the storage of road salt, sanitation
trucks, and retired City vehicles. It is surrounded by
other industrial lands and by active residential
neighborhoods to the east (Williamsburg) and south (Fort
Green). The MSW incinerator design proposed for the
Brooklyn Navy Yard plant consists of four units, each
capable of burning 750 tons per day and comprising an
individual combustion chamber (furnace), boiler, air
pollution control device (a fabric filter, or baghouse), and
ash handling equipment. The four units would share one,
500-foot-high emission stack. Wastes would be loaded into
the facility from barges, and fed onto a system of moving
grates contained in the furnace. Steam generated from the
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combustion process would furnish energy to operate the plant
and excess steam (77% if operated at full capacity) would
be sold and exported off-site (to a nearby utility).
The DOS fully expected that construction and operation
of the DOS high technology waste disposal proposal would
arouse local protests. Accordingly, the comprehensive,
long-term plan put forth by the DOS strategically dispersed
the eight proposed facilities throughout the City's boroughs
in order to promote a sense of fairness among the residents.
Anticipating opposition specifically in regard to
intensified traffic congestion caused by the movement of
garbage overland to the Brooklyn Navy Yard site, the DOS
proposal intentionally exploited the riverside location and
made provisions for barge transport of wastes. The draft
environmental impact statement prepared for the Brooklyn
Navy Yard project consequently identified no significant,
adverse environmental impacts.
In fact, traffic congestion, noise levels,
unsightliness, and other conventional air and water
pollution concerns caused little apprehension among the
vocal public. The issue that did generate considerable
controversy was the predicted level of toxic emissions and
predictions of consequent increases in the City's cancer
rates.
Standing against the proposal was an amalgamation of
community and environmental groups. Foremost was an ethnic
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community adjacent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. This
community of Hassidic Jews had been relocated from another
part of the city several years earlier and was sensitive
about its minority status. The tight, religion-based
organization of this community enabled leaders to respond
quickly to the DOS action. Although these residents were
concerned about aesthetic as well as other not-in-my-
backyard factors (traffic, noise, odors, etc.), they
focussed on the health threat posed by dioxin emissions
after soliciting and receiving technical advice from the
Center on the Biology of Natural Systems at Queens College.
The leading spokesperson for the Center for the Biology
of Natural Systems in this dispute was Professor Barry
Commoner, a scientist and political activist, whose
extensive writing on technology and the environment promoted
him to the status of a one-time, third party presidential
candidate.9 A group of biologists at the Center had been
involved in research on the emissions of mass-burn
incinerators. They promptly produced a harsh, written
critique of the DOS's DEIS, faulting, in particular, its
alleged underestimation of projected increases in cancers
due to emissions of carcinogens. Dr. Commoner and his
associates also presented their critique at public meetings.
Other groups that opposed the proposal included
advocates of recycling, such as Environmental Action and the
Environmental Defense Fund, and state-wide environmental
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groups, such as the New York Public Interest Research Group,
whose representative was quoted in a news article as saying,
"What the city is proposing to do is take 26,000 tons per
day of recyclable garbage and convert it into toxic
emissions." (New York Times, November 26, 1984) While the
Natural Resources Defense Council, a national environmental
group that has a New York City office, was also concerned
with the issue of dioxin emissions from waste-to-energy
plants, they typically avoid involvement in specific
projects. (Interestingly, the NRDC was involved at that
time in negotiating a settlement to a lawsuit against the
Environmental Protection Agency that eventually would
require the EPA to reexamine its regulatory activities in
this area.)o
Wood burning Stove Emission Standards1l
On August 2, 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency
issued an "advanced notice of proposed rulemaking" for
performance standards for new stationary sources of
particulate emissions from residential wood combustion (RWC)
units. EPA estimated that as of the end of 1983, 10.6
million RWC, defined as freestanding woodstoves and
fireplace inserts, were putting out 2.7 million tons of
particulate matter (PM), including 20,000 tons of polycyclic
organic matter (POM), 7.4 million tons of carbon monoxide
(CO), and 62,000 tons of hydrocarbon (HC) emissions annually
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(Federal Register, 1985). The annual sales of new RWC units
was projected to continue at 1 million units per year.
In addition to the deterioration of air quality noted
in several locales where a high number of wood burning
devices and geographic conditions were believed to aggravate
air pollution, the EPA recognized the adverse health impact
caused by particulate emissions. According to studies of
ambient total suspended particulate (TSP) levels, RWC units
were estimated to account for from 66 to 84 percent of the
smaller respirable particulates. The catalyst for EPA
action, however, was a legal suit filed by the State of New
York and the Natural Resources Defense Council following the
Agency's decision not to list POM as a hazardous air
pollutant under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Since RWC
is believed to account for nearly half of total nationwide
POM, the litigants included the promulgation of new source
performance standards (NSPS) for particulate matter for RWC
units in an out-of-court settlement to the lawsuit. Under
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, the standard would be
based on "best demonstrated technology" (BDT) for
controlling particulate emissions from all new woodstoves
and fireplace inserts.
Regulating emissions from RWC units posed a myriad of
difficult policy issues for EPA that were complicated by a
perceived lack of technical data (EPA, ca. July 3, 1985).
Because of the Agency's perception of the inadequacy of
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available data, a shortage of resources to conduct
additional research in order to generate necessary data,
time constraints imposed by the Agency's desire to
promulgate rules as an alternative to the lawsuit filed by
the State of New York and the NRDC, and recent favorable
Agency experimentation with negotiated rulemaking and the
Agency's "desire for maximum involvement of the affected
parties" (EPA, August 16, 1985), Agency personnel decided to
explore the possibility of using a mediated negotiation to
develop the emission standards for RWC units.
In early 1986, the Standards Development Branch of EPA
sent letters to 20 or so prospective participants announcing
the Agency's intention to undertake a regulatory negotiation
process. The Agency also issued a notice in the February 7,
1986 Federal Register that it was considering establishing a
new Advisory Committee, in accordance with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), whose purpose would be to
negotiate issues leading to the development of proposed
rules for NSPS for RWC units. Included in this public
notice was a description of the procedure for identifying
participants in the regulatory negotiation. EPA states,
We do not believe that each potentially affected
organizational [sic] or individual must
necessarily have its own representative. However,
we firmly believe that each interest must be
adequately represented. Moreover, we must be
satisfied that the group as a whole reflects a
proper balance and mix of interests (Federal
Register, 1986).
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In addition, the EPA published a list of potential interests
and parties.
The participants in the EPA regulatory negotiation to
set emission standards for wood burning stoves largely
replicated the EPA's original list of potential
participants. Two additional members were accepted at the
first organizational meeting and admitted by consensus of
the original group. The fifteen negotiators plus the EPA
negotiator included representatives from the industry
organization, the Wood Heating Alliance (WHA), manufacturers
of wood stoves (both member and non-members of the WHA),
environmental groups such as the Natural Resources Defense
(NRDC) Council and the Oregon Environmental Council, state
air quality agencies, and independent testing laboratories.
(See list in Appendix 2.)
The RWC case illustrates the wide variety of parties
who may become active in a public debate, especially in the
regulatory arena, and their varying interests, resources,
and relative abilities to marshall credible technical
arguments to their benefit. Setting particulate emission
levels on RWC units would potentially affect consumers,
manufacturers, government bodies responsible for
enforcement, and the beneficiaries of cleaner air. Less
visibly but also potentially affected are the manufacturers
of pollution control technology, the independent testing
laboratories, RWC unit importers, and the manufacturers of
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competing residential heating technologies. Probably a
number of less directly affected groups also arguably could
be included in a list of affected parties, such as resort
developers who peddle woodstoves as a critical feature of
the charm of their product.
The most conspicuous stakeholder in the wood stoves
regulatory action is the soon-to-be regulated industry. The
RWC industry is fairly small by the standards of American
corporations. The majority of sales is dominated by five or
six manufacturers; the market is filled out by a number of
much smaller, regional firms. In addition, there are a
handful of RWC unit importers. Part of the industry is
politically organized under the umbrella trade organization
called the Wood Heating Alliance. The more than 800-member
WHA performs conventional lobbying activities for the
industry in the nation's capital (and in state capitals as
needed).
The RWC manufacturing community had an obvious interest
in the development of regulations. Of course, the industry
would prefer no regulations at all, since government
standards implicitly mean some preemption of design and
management control and frequently incur additional costs to
the industry or the ultimate market price of the product,
making it less competitive with alternative heating devices.
In the spring of 1986, however, the RWC industry was facing
enforceable state-level regulations on wood burning stoves
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in Oregon and Colorado, and legislative activity in several
other states. Federal level regulations, if acceptable to
the air quality community, would take the wind out of state-
level activity and avert a potential nightmare of 50
different regulatory requirements. With the resources of
its 800-member organization, propriety information on stove
emissions, and the expertise of the industry, one would
expect the WHA to make a considerable attempt to help shape
the rules.
Not all RWC manufacturers belong to WHA. Certain RWC
manufacturers believe WHA is too diverse to be adequately
responsive to and representative of their interests. The
WHA represents a broad spectrum of the wood heating
industry, including the manufacturers of glass doors on
fireplaces and fireplace tools. Among the RWC
manufacturers, some were more accomplished than others in
making design alterations to reduce particulate emission
levels, at least during the initial testing of their stoves.
Whereas the role of WHA in setting the federal regulations
would be to fight to protect all RWC manufacturers, the
interests of so-called "clean stove" manufacturers would be
at odds with those of manufacturers currently unable to meet
even Oregon standards. Consequently, in the RWC rulemaking,
one non-WHA manufacturer perceiving separate and distinct
interests from the trade organization sought and won
independent representation.
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Another segment of the RWC manufacturing industry with
interests significantly different from WHA is the catalyst
manufacturers. In 1986, two basic wood stove technologies
were in competition: catalyst and non-catalyst designs.
Manufacturers of catalysts believed that their technology
significantly reduces particulate emission levels by
increasing the completeness of the combustion process.
Accordingly, they wanted regulations to acknowledge the
superiority of catalyst stoves, which, they contended, would
improve the environmental quality of the nation (and,
coincidentally, their own sales). Also, catalysts
manufacturers then had exclusive access to the limited data
available on the durability and effectiveness of their
catalyst technologies.
On the other side of the table were groups concerned
generally with air quality. Even within the "environmental"
coalition, however, significant political differences
existed. Countering the strength of commitment of WHA in
this debate was the National Resources Defense Council.
NRDC has been called "the most effective lobbying and
litigating group on U.S. environmental issues" and "some
kind of shadow EPA" (The Wall Street Journal). In regard to
the interests he believed the Council represents David
Doniger, an attorney at the Natural Resources Defense
Council stated, "We take the view that there are rights
involved here, rights to be protected from threats to your
52
health, regardless of the costs involved" (The Wall Street
Journal).12 Among environmental groups, the NRDC is the
recognized leader on air quality issues (Doniger). It is
networked with other national environmental groups through
the National Clean Air Coalition.
As co-plaintiff in the legal suit spurring EPA action,
the NRDC held a special place in ensuring that wood stove
regulations would aim at achieving acceptable reductions in
air pollution. The NRDC representative in the RWC case was
David Doniger, who has been involved in Clean Air Act issues
for many years and has developed a considerable amount of
general technical knowledge about air quality issues and
regulatory action as well as personal familiarity with many
EPA staff. Although the NRDC is staffed both with persons
trained in law and engineering sciences, the highly
specialized nature of the wood stoves regulations and the
heavy work load of NRDC scientists normally preclude ongoing
consultation between attorneys and technical experts in non-
litigated cases. The NRDC also does not have resources to
undertake out-of-house technical research.
State governments also had an interest in setting
emission standards for RWC units. The states of Oregon and
Colorado, which already had working regulations on wood
stoves, were looking for federal regulations that were
compatible with their own rules, that would plug loopholes
in their programs, and perhaps take over some of the
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administrative tasks of their programs (such as the
certification of testing laboratories). These states were
also concerned about "dirty stoves" operating just across
their borders. States without wood stoves regulations were
seeking standards to improve air quality in their "non-
attainment" areas. In some cases, these states feared the
threat of a cut-off of federal highway funds as a result of
their failure to meet national ambient air quality
standards.
The single consumers advocacy group represented, the
Consumer Federation of America (CFA), and a state energy
office shared a concern about the cost of regulatory actions
that would be passed on to consumers and the cost-
competitiveness of wood stoves compared with alternative
heating sources. Air quality was not an area in which these
groups specialized. Accordingly, neither negotiator from
these groups possessed a high level of competency in
pertinent scientific fields.
Finally, in addition to the interests of EPA described
earlier, it appeared that EPA harbored concerns that were
less explicit in its public statements. Several
participants commented during interviews that EPA, perhaps
under pressure from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), seemed adamant throughout the proceedings about
protecting the smallest stove manufacturers from instant
extinction as a result of regulatory actions.
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Fishing in the Great Lakes"3
The highly emotional "Michigan fishing rights dispute"
has a long history, formalized in 1973 when the first legal
suit was filed. The United States government on behalf of
the Bay Mills Indian Communityl4 (and later joined as
intervenors by the tribe itself and by the Sault St. Marie
Tribe and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa
Indiansl 5) sued the State of Michigan over its
jurisdictional authority to regulate tribal fishers in the
Great Lakes of Michigan, Huron and Superior.
In response to grave concern over the lake ecology and
the extermination of the indigenous lake trout first noted
in the 1940s, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and the state of Michigan Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) embarked on aggressive fishery management
programs beginning in the 1960s. The primary objective of
both agencies was the rehabilitation of the lake trout, and
a cooperative arrangement was worked out in which the FWS
provided DNR with fish for annual planting. Although lake
trout were found to thrive in many parts of the lake, it was
widely believed that reproduction was not occurring.
DNR-s management approach grew increasingly aggressive.
According to one legal counsel, DNR management practice was
"regulating commercial fishing out of business." Among the
most controversial and provocative restrictions imposed by
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the DNR was the banning of large mesh gill nets, which was
intended to reduce the incidental catch of lake trout in
areas fished commercially for white fish. Gill net gear was
used by all small boat commercial fishers, but it was an
integral part of tribal fishing culture. Moreover, the
alternative trap net gear requiring large boats is beyond
the reach of poorly capitalized tribal fishers. From the
tribes' perspective the ban constituted a direct threat on
their lifestyle and livelihood. (In fact, many non-tribal
small boat commercial fishers were put out of business by
the gill net ban.) It was the enforcement of this ban
against tribal fishers that triggered a 1973 lawsuit. The
subsequent trial in 1978 resulted in a ruling, which was
upheld at the appellate level, that decreed that an 1836
treaty protected the non-exclusive fishing rights of the
tribes and that the tribes held the right to fish free of
regulations imposed by the State of Michigan, unless the
State could prove that tribal fishing was endangering the
resource (United States v. Michigan, 1980).
About the time of the court ruling, an informal
cooperative effort began among the biologists concerned
about the status of the Great Lakes fishery. A team of
biologists representing the DNR, the FWS, and the tribes
began meeting annually to develop "total allowable catch"
(TAC) figures by species in various zones (established on
the basis of discrete fish stocks) of the lake. TAC is
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based on estimates of a number of factors including fish
population size, age structure, growth rate, mortality rate,
and others. Many of these estimates were based on data
contributed by the members of this "tripartite technical
working group" (TTWG). Catch data for past years were
provided by FWS to whom both the state and tribal fishers
reported. A relative dearth of resources had led to a
coordination of research efforts and duplication of data
rarely occurred. Thus, the biologists from the various
agencies infrequently presented conflicting data. The annual
status report represented a compilation of data from the
various groups and a consensus opinion on the levels of
catch any particular population could sustain. Implicit in
the agreement on TAC was also an agreement on the desired
growth rate of that population.
Subsequent to the 1979 court ruling, with a grant from
the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, the three tribal
communities cooperatively set up their own fishery
regulatory program called the Chippewa-Ottawa Fishery
Management Authority. Subsumed under the Authority was a
staff of biologists charged with monitoring tribal fishing
activities and its impact on the fishery and advising the
tribal leaders on management issues. The tribal management
program served a dual purpose. It started the tribes on a
path toward regulating tribal fishing activities consistent
with the fishery resource and it brought the tribes closer
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to dealing with the federal and state governments on more
equal footing by enabling them to speak in the "language" of
fish biologists and resource managers.
During the early years of the 1980s fishing on the
Great Lakes intensified. In response to an aggressive state
tourism promotion effort, sports fishing flourished. The
tribal fishing industry rebounded from past lows in part as
a result of the favorable court ruling on treaty rights.
Predictably, as fishing by all parties increased, fishery
managers noted the approach and passing of TACs at earlier
and earlier points in the season between 1980 and 1984.
The surpassing of TACs fixed by the Tripartite Working
Group set off tensions between the DNR and the tribes and
tribal and non-tribal fishers anew. On a few occasions the
tribe closed their fisheries, forcing the migration of
tribal fishers to more distant or less familiar waters. The
presence of tribal fishers in areas popular among
recreational fishers sparked personal hostilities and acts
of violence. The predominantly small boat tribal fishers
moved into direct competition with nontribal fishers,
especially sports fishers who shared an affinity for
sheltered bays and shore areas of the vast lakes. Although
tribal fishers, like non-tribal commercial fishers,
primarily sought whitefish, their large mesh gill nets
indiscriminately killed the sports fishers' preferred lake
trout. Gill nets also can snag the sports fishers' angler
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gear, undoubtedly contributing to the frustration that led
to incidences of vandalism against gill nets set out in the
waters. Tribal members on land suffered a backlash of
hostile reactions.
On other occasions the tribes asked the court to order
the closing of fishing waters to state-licensed, commercial
fishers, agreeing to prohibit tribal fishing in those same
waters concurrently with the court order. Such actions
reportedly incited tribal and non-tribal fishers alike to
fish as intensively as possible before the fishery was
closed, creating what has been called a "racehorse fishery."
Why did the DNR not close the state fishery when TACs
were reached? While acknowledging on one hand the value of
setting TACs, the DNR did not believe that managing by TACs
was effective, efficient, or desirable. DNR preferred to
manage according to "total allowable effort," (TAE) meaning
to regulate the number of fishing licenses, not the number
of fish caught. The state argued that fishers routinely
underreport their catch to officials. Therefore, catch
reports are less accurate than expected. Since fishery
personnel have a fairly clear idea of how many fish can be
caught over a given period of time using a given type of
gear, DNR resource managers argued that a more accurate
approach is to divide TACs by the average catch by gear type
and limit the number of licenses per zone accordingly.
Theoretically, TAE and TAC are equivalent measures.
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From a management perspective, they differ substantially.
Under the TAE management approach, licenses are assigned to
specific zones. The closing of certain lake zones could put
state-licensed fishers out of work for the season.
Consequently, even if TACs are overshot before the end of
the season, the state was reluctant to close the fishery.
By choosing to manage by TAE, the state faced the
possibility of trading-off an incremental depletion of the
fishery resource for the economic stability of state-
licensed fishers.
A second, more legalistic reason for the DNR's inaction
was the state's interpretation of its administrative code,
which would require a public hearing and a 90-day waiting
period before a fishery could be closed. Under this
interpretation, a federal court order was the only route
sufficiently expedient to avert overfishing.
By 1984, it became apparent to the tribal fishers that
additional court intervention was necessary in the
management of the fishing resource."6 The tribes filed a
motion for the court to allocate the fish catch. Although
the optimum division from the perspective of the tribes was
humorously described as allowing "non-Indians to get the
heads and the tails," when they filed for the motion, they
were actually hoping for a 50-50 split across the board (all
lake areas and all fish species). In contrast, the DNR was
concerned that a 50-50 split of all fish ignored their own
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efforts at restoring fish populations, particularly in
respect to the lake trout "put-grow-take" fishery. DNR
staff also suspected serious underreporting of incidental
lake trout catches by tribal gill net fishers.
Although the disputants were divided into two camps for
the purposes of litigation, each of the parties had a unique
set of concerns. The plaintiff group comprised the U.S.
Department of Interior and three Indian tribes. According
to Francis McGovern, who as the Special Master in the
litigation proceedings had met privately with tribal members
and other participants to ascertain their specific
interests, the interests of the three tribes were distinct.
The Bay Mills Indian Community, located along White Fish Bay
in eastern Lake Superior in what one person described as a
"classic fishing village," is by far the most traditional of
the three tribal groups. McGovern described the
approximately 750 members as "fiercely individualistic." 7
Decision making is by consensus. The community comprises
50-75 commercial, small boat fishers, but almost all
families fish for their own consumption, and much of the
community's economy is linked in some way to fishing.
Moreover, fishing with traditional gear is a centerpiece of
the culture: a young male symbolically becomes a "man" by
fishing. In addition to the economic necessity of relying
on traditional gill net gear for the fishers, for the Bay
Mills Community, gill nets represented an integral component
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of their cultural make-up.
The Sault Ste. Marie Band of Chippewa Indians, the
largest of the three tribes, is geographically dispersed
over Michigan's upper and lower peninsulas. With a
relatively powerful, centralized government system, the
tribal leadership was concerned with maximizing the tribe's
overall economic benefit, rather than with fishing per se
(McGovern, 1986). The membership consisted of small boat
gill net fishers, but was not wedded to traditional
technology for its cultural value.
Finally, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa
Indians is situated near Grand Traverse Bay along Michigan's
famed "Gold Coast," a highly prized tourism and sports
fishing area. Grand Traverse Band members had little to do
with fishing, in contrast to the other two Indian groups,
although they were interested in preserving their right to
fish in waters close to home. Ironically, however, the
members of this Band were the ones to bear the brunt of the
hostile feelings directed from the non-tribal community
against tribal fishers moving down from northern waters.
Even the children of the Grand Traverse Band were taunted in
the local schools. Consequently, the Grand Traverse Band
leaders were interested in a settlement that emphasized
accommodation consistent with limited tribal fishing in
those parts of Lake Michigan close to their residences.
The U.S. Department of Interior represented both the
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Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
The Interior Department thus held the dual responsibility to
ensure the preservation of treaty rights and to protect the
natural resources of the Great Lakes. According to
McGovern, the Fish and Wildlife Service held a more specific
commitment of restoring the Great Lakes to their earlier
economic prosperity. They were particularly intent on
rehabilitation of the indigenous lake trout population. 18
Exactly how the Interior Department promotes these two
competing, but not necessarily conflicting, interests at any
given time is subject to changing political pressures from
the particular political context (Doherty). The fact that
the Department did file suit against the State of Michigan
on behalf of the tribes suggests, however, that the
Department would not ignore the treaty.
On the defendant's bench sat the State of Michigan's
Department of Natural Resources. As a public agency, the
DNR presumably represented a number of different
stakeholding groups and different interests. Managing the
conservation of the natural resource (the fishery) and
maintaining the public peace were interests on behalf of all
the state's residents. More specifically, the DNR was
concerned with ensuring a viable fishing industry.
The fishing industry comprised both commercial and
recreational fishers, however, and their individual
interests were distinct. The DNR at least gave lip service
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to the non-tribal commercial fishers, but one observer has
argued that the DNR gave priority to the sports fishing
industry, citing statements by DNR personnel about the
economic benefits to the state of a vibrant (sports fishing
dependent) tourism industry (Doherty). While the commercial
fishers competed with tribal commercial fishers primarily
for whitefish, the better-capitalized large boat fishers
with trap net gear were able to fish in deeper areas not
safely navigable by small boats. The sports fishers,
however, preferred coastal waters like the small boat tribal
fishers. Primary sports fish were lake trout and salmon,
two species that were planted annually by the DNR
(comprising "put-grow-take" fisheries).
Thus even while acting as the sole defendant in the
case, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources at least
ostensibly represented a number of distinct and not always
complementary interests. In addition to the litigants, the
court recognized "litigating amici" (representing the sports
and commercial fishers), and awarded two groups official
status enabling them to participate in discovery and
settlement negotiations.
The situation in 1984 was highly complex. Issues
concerning interpretation of the 1836 treaty were
intertwined with issues about individual and collective
economic survival and development, racial violence, and lake
ecology.
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These introductory descriptions of my three cases will
provide background information for the remainder of this
study. We move on now to examine how conventional decision
making institutions incorporate scientific information and
deal with scientific disagreement. In the following
chapter, I use these three cases to project hypothetical
scenarios to depict the unfolding of conventional decision
making under typical conditions. While each major case in
public decision making may be unique, these scenarios are
intended to capture the main features of conventional
decision making procedures. The main question Chapter Two
entertains is, "How do conventional procedures deal with
scientific disagreement and with what result?"
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Notes
1. The American Medical Association adopted a resolution
acknowledging an association between the incidence of lung
cancer and cigarette smoking on June 24, 1965.
2. The Tobacco Institute, Inc., is a lobbying, public
relations organization formed in 1958 by 14 major tobacco
producers. The company presidents of these firms sit on the
Institute's board of directors.
3. In fact, while science as a process strives to develop
an understanding of an objective reality, at any given point
in time, the state of scientific knowledge is incomplete.
As a result, multiple interpretations or "models" of reality
are possible. Adherence or promotion of one interpretation
over another is a social act conditioned partially by social
context. This notion of "multiple representations of
reality" will be expounded upon in Chapter Three.
4. For a discussion about the factors that have led to
greater interest in the social control of technology, see
Harvey Brooks, "Controlling Technology: Risks, Costs, and
Benefits," unpublished manuscript, (November 7, 1986.)
5. See, for example, Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act.
Other Federal statutes with similar provisions include the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Noise Control Act
of 1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, and the Marine
Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972.
6. The term "dioxin" is used to refer to two groups of
closely related chemical compounds called polychlorinated
dibenzo-p-dioxin (PCDD) and polychlorinated dibenzofuran
(PCDF). The attack on mass-burn incinerators concerns the
health risk posed by the two compounds combined.
7. The Environmental Protection Agency has since lowered
its estimate of the toxicity of dioxin.
8. Suggested by Dr. Barry Commoner during a personal
interview, Flushing, New York, October 1986.
9. Commoner ran as the "Citizen's Party" candidate in the
1980 U.S. presidential elections.
10. Explained during a telephone interview with David
Doniger, attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council,
May 1987.
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11. Unless specifically noted, descriptive information on
the wood stoves case and opinions and perceptions of
individual negotiators were obtained through telephone
interviews listed in Appendix 1.
12. The "rights" approach to environmental quality is a
fairly typical approach to environmental issues among
lawyers.
13. Unless otherwise noted, descriptive information and
information on the opinions and interests of the
stakeholding parties were obtained through telephone
interviews listed in Appendix A.
14. Hereforth referred to as the "Bays Mills tribe."
15. Hereforth referred to as "the Grand Traverse Band."
16. Stated by Special Master Francis McGovern during a
telephone interview, August 1987.
17. Conveyed by Special Master McGovern during a telephone
interview in August 1987.
18. Explained by McGovern during a telephone interview,
August 1987.
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Chapter Two
THE DYNAMICS OF ADVOCACY SCIENCE
Public Decision Making Institutions
In the United States, public decisions fall into three
categories: decision making by elected officials
(executives, legislatures, city councils, etc.);
administrative decision making; and judicial decision
making. Decision making in all three arenas at all levels
of government (federal, regional, state, or local) commonly
involve the consideration of scientific or technical
information and analysis. Elected officials often refer to
scientific and technical evidence when setting general
policy on environmental, health, and safety issues (as in
the cigarette smoking policy debates), deciding whether to
appropriate funds for public projects (as in the New York
City waste-to-energy controversy), and granting development
permits for site-specific projects at the local level (as in
the Westside Highway project). As the previous chapter
noted, agencies with delegated authority to implement broad
policy objectives are often legislatively required to
demonstrate that their decisions are supported by
appropriate technical documentation. The courts are the
forum for determining liability in science-intensive "toxic
tort" cases as well as providing the ultimate recourse for
challenges to administrative decision making. In
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substantive judicial review, courts have inspected the
record to determine whether or not decisions are
substantiated by available evidence.
As described in Chapter One, when the perception of
stakes is high among groups sufficiently organized,
competent, and resourceful, the scientific information on
which decisions ostensibly are based often becomes the focus
of the public debate over a particular decision. That is,
groups able to gain access to appropriate expertise and
resources understand the strategic value of bolstering
favored policy positions with supportive scientific
arguments, and challenging the scientific or technical
premises of competing decision alternatives. The strong
sense of authority invested in scientific analysis through
governing legislation and diffused more generally throughout
the polity by its mythical formulation means that decisions
that appear to lack scientific support lose political
legitimacy. Undermining the technical basis of a decision
alternative thus serves to delay, sometimes permanently,
approval and implementation of the questioned alternative.
General recognition of the cost of delay in public
decision making (economic as well as human costs incurred
when decisions regarding protective actions are delayed or
implementation postponed by challenges to the scientific
premises of decisions) has spurred interest, investment, and
experimentation in ways to integrate scientific and
69
technical information into public decision making. In many
cases, the costs of delaying a decision fall asymmetrically
on different parties. Delaying a permit decision on a
nuclear power plant, for example, imposes substantial
financial expenses on a utility company, but little costs on
project opponents. Conversely, postponing the enforcement
of regulations to abate pollution saves polluters the
monetary burden of pollution control while incrementally
degrading air or water quality and public health. In such
instances, one or more parties will benefit from postponing
a decision, and has little incentive to bring the issue to a
close. Occasionally, however, the costs of delaying a
decision fall more symmetrically on several major parties,
as in cases concerning a decision about a project in the
very early stages of development. In these instances, both
project proponents and opponents bear the costs of
uncertainty, and may therefore see advantages in a speedy
resolution of the dispute. Consequently, a number of
procedures in various forums of public decision making now
are directed specifically toward facilitating the collection
of scientific or technical information or resolving
scientific disagreement.
In the following sections, I present three hypothetical
decision making scenarios built around my case studies.
There are several purposes served by these scenarios. One
purpose is to provide a common conception of the mechanics
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of legislative, administrative, and judicial decision
making. Since actual public decision making varies
considerably from case-to-case and according to the
particular institution involved, it is helpful to root a
discussion of the integration of scientific and technical
information into public decision making in a common model,
or set of models. Second, and more specifically, these
scenarios are drawn here to depict how conventional methods
and procedures are employed in attempts to fold scientific
or technical information into public decisions, especially
when that information is disputed. I find that the role of
the scientist as arbiter and the procedures developed to
handle scientific and technical disagreement that are based
on a logical empiricist view of science give rise to a new
set of dilemmas for public decision making without
necessarily resolving disagreement on any components of a
public dispute.
In the final section, I examine these dilemmas more
closely. A discussion of an alternative philosophy of
science that suggests a different approach for dealing with
contested scientific and technical premises of public
decisions is presented in Chapter Three.
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Decision Making by Elected Officials:
Local Decision Making on Appropriations for A Public Project
The first hypothetical decision making scenario
describes decision making by elected officials. In this
case, the body of elected officials is New York City's Board
of Estimate (BOE), which is a council consisting of the five
elected borough presidents, the city comptroller, and the
mayor. Other bodies of elected decision makers include the
United States Congress, state legislatures, and city
councils selected through citywide elections.
We might imagine that traditionally, local decision
making by elected officials occurs much as it did in the New
York City case up to the point of a "policy dialogue" that
was sponsored by the New York Academy of Sciences (NYAS).
The initial proposal for the Brooklyn Navy Yard waste-to-
energy plant was put together by the New York City
Department of Sanitation (New York City Department of
Sanitation, 1984b). This proposal not only justified the
project on technical grounds, (capacity of plant, site
suitability, economic feasibility), but perhaps more
importantly created a context and a climate for the Board of
Estimate members to hear the request. The proposal, as
presented to the BOE and the accompanying letter from the
DOS director, prefaced the project description with dire
projections of increasing daily tonnage of solid wastes,
diminishing landfills, and vanishing waste disposal
alternatives, painting the possibility of an impending
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crisis (New York City Department of Sanitation, 1984b). It
is reasonable that an agency that has invested time,
resources, and reputation in developing a proposal for
public action will try to make the strongest case for the
proposal before the decision makers. Creating a favorable
drama around the issue is fair play.
Proposing agencies, especially at the local level, also
now routinely attempt to generate public support and
anticipate and, if possible, dissipate opposition before
presenting proposals to decision makers. Public information
meetings and citizen advisory committees are two common
methods of attempting to achieve these aims. Through public
and citizen advisory committee meetings, proposing agencies
present their proposals and receive comments back from "the
public." The degree to which these comments result in
alterations of the original proposal varies. The key point
is that "the public" (at least some part of it) speaks and
the agency listens. The DOS both convened periodic public
information meetings as well as assembled prominent
community leaders to form a citizens advisory committee in
1981.
Public comments in local decision making for public
projects are also solicited through the environmental impact
review process. The federal National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) requires the preparation of an environmental
impact statement (EIS) for any "major" federal action
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"significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment" (National Environmental Policy Act, Section
4331). Many states, including New York, followed the
enactment of NEPA with state legislation that more broadly
requires environmental impact assessments for a wider
variety of project actions. A public works proposal would
virtually always require an assessment. In many cases, the
document that identifies and evaluates likely environmental
impact, the environmental impact statement (EIS), becomes
the basis of public debate.' Because impact statements
largely consist of a collection of predictions about
probable effects, and because predictions are, by nature,
probabilistic and uncertain, they are wide open for dispute
(Bacow).
The New York City case was no different. The DOS-
commissioned draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) was
promptly criticized sharply for failing to address
adequately the human health risk posed by dioxin emissions
from the proposed Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator.
Interestingly, the challenge did not come from the DOS-
initiated Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC), which had been
given $85,000 by the DOS to hire a technical consultant to
review the document (Steisel). Up to this point, most of
the CAC's concerns had centered on typical not-in-my-
backyard ("NIMBY") concerns: bad odors, noise, traffic
congestion, and so on. Instead, the objections to the DEIS
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stemmed largely from reports prepared by the Center for the
Biology of Natural Systems (CBNS), Queens College, whose
assistance had been requested by the Williamsburg community
adjacent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard site.
The BOE's reaction to the strong criticism differed
little from the conventional response of elected decision
makers. They simply requested further examination of the
issue. In this case, the proposal was sent back to the DOS
(Commoner, 1985). Accordingly, the DOS contracted with an
outside consultant to undertake a new study to address
specifically the health risks.
The heat of the controversy encouraged BOE members to
delay their decision for several months. Meanwhile, other
minor policy actors entered the fray. The New York Times
printed editorials urging BOE members to approve the project
(New York Times, October 15, 1984; December 20, 1984; July
8, 1985; August 15, 1985). Environmental groups expressed
reservations about the project at public forums and in
letters and comments in local papers (New York Times,
November 17, 1984; August 4, 1985; August 15, 1985).
Opponents advocated greater investment by the City in
alternatives such as recycling and source reduction
approaches to waste management. The headline story on the
proposal, however, from the issuance of the CBNS report,
focussed on the health risks of dioxin emissions.
We can also assume during this interval that BOE
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members were approached by their constituency including
special interest groups and the voters in their district.
The Brooklyn Navy Yard waste-to-energy incinerator was one
of eight similar facilities identified in the DOS's
comprehensive solid waste management plan for sites
strategically dispersed throughout the City in order to
avert community opposition. As such, it represented the
first leg of a huge capital expenditure project estimated to
cost $3 billion (New York Times, December 7, 1984). The
construction industry would be hungry for the lucrative
project. Mayor Koch had also voiced solid support for the
project, after having recently lost a long battle for the
highly capital-intensive "Westway" project. It is fair to
expect, as one participant claimed, that the Mayor's office
was vigorously lobbying individual BOE members, especially
political allies who courted the Mayor's endorsement in
their reelection campaigns.2
In September 1984, the DOS-commissioned report,
performed by Fred C. Hart & Associates (and hereinafter
referred to as "the Hart report") was issued. Although
projecting a higher risk than the original DEIS, the risk
estimates of the Hart report were still much closer to those
in the initial DEIS than to the CBNS predictions.
Objections were not put to rest, however. Thus, after a
series of conventionally convened public hearings, the
formation of a citizen's advisory committee, and an effort
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to quell public controversy through an "authoritative"
expert report, the elected decision makers continued to face
an angry, confused, and suspicious public.
Administrative Decision Making:
Traditional Rulemaking
Many state and federal agencies routinely engage in
science-intensive decision making on issues inherently
linked to science, such as health, safety, and environmental
regulation. Although the details of decision making may
vary according to an agency's internal operating procedures
and specific legislative statutes, there are similarities in
the ways they handle scientific or technical disagreement.
To broadly illustrate this decision making pathway, consider
how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have
gone about setting New Source Performance emission standards
for wood stoves.
EPA's traditional procedure for promulgating new source
performance standards (NSPS) under the Clean Air Act relies
heavily on staff in the technical branch of the Standards
and Development Branch.3 An imaginary scenario for
developing emission standards for wood stoves under the
traditional procedure would begin with Branch staff
initiating a search of relevant technical information,
beginning with a survey of the published literature, and
reaching out to segments of the industry for opportunities
to familiarize themselves with wood stoves production,
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sales, and use. On-site visits of production facilities
nearby is also an option. The identification of firms
solicited for input would be biased according to physical
proximity and the personal familiarity of Branch staff with
individual firm names or personnel.
EPA is required to publish its intention to promulgate
new rules. Informal lobbying from many groups begins soon
after the public announcement. Typically, as the soon-to-be
regulated industry gets wind of EPA intentions, either
individual companies or trade groups attempt to influence
the shaping of the EPA document by (selectively)
contributing information and otherwise volunteering opinions
and ideas. Major environmental groups that specialize in
clean air issues, like the Natural Resources Defence Council
(NRDC), would also try to keep their finger on the pulse of
EPA efforts. Compared with industry efforts, however,
environmental group lobbying efforts could be expected to
center on influencing the intention of the regulatory effort
according to their interpretation of relevant legislation,
rather than contributing additional technical information.
During the pre-proposal stage, lobbying activity is
dominated disproportionately by certain groups. Interest
groups with Washington D.C. offices and staff who personally
interact with EPA on a regular basis appear' to have greater
access to EPA decision making than more distant, potentially
affected interests. Also, public interest groups with
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organizational support and experience with air pollution
issues are more likely to become involved at early stages
than public interest groups with lesser resources or other
specialties (like consumer's rights). In the wood stoves
case, the NRDC had agreed in an out-of-court settlement with
EPA to drop litigation proceedings if (among other
conditions), EPA regulated particulate emissions from
residential wood stoves. NRDC staff thus knew early on
about the agency's rulemaking intentions and, presumably,
could begin informal lobbying with EPA staff ahead of other
interest groups. Also, representatives from the NRDC and
the industry's Wood Heating Alliance (WHA), both with
offices located within blocks of one another and not far
from EPA headquarter offices in Washington, D.C., discussed
the rulemaking procedures with one another and independently
with EPA before the public announcement of the agency's
intention to promulgate rules was issued.
On the other hand, groups that hold relevant technical
information and expertise may be insufficiently motivated to
lobby at the preproposal stage. In the wood stoves case,
for example, the independent testing laboratories had unique
experience and expertise in testing emissions from wood
stoves as a result of business generated by the Oregon and
Colorado state regulations. For the individual testing
firms, however, the wood stoves tests probably produced only
a small percentage of total revenues. There would exist
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little incentive for these firms to allocate staff time and
resources toward developing EPA regulations. Thus, a
potential gold mine of experience, expertise, and data would
be left untapped. Similarly, the states of Oregon and
Colorado had a wealth of knowledge gained through their
regulatory actions. Representatives from both states,
however, expressed doubt that (their own) agency budgets
would have allowed involvement beyond simply sending in
written comments to EPA's proposed rules.'
Before the proposed rules are published in the Federal
Register, staff in various branches of the agency review the
proposal for aspects of the rules which pertain especially
to their branch. For example, staff in the Enforcement and
Compliance Division would review the proposed rules for
language clarity, consistency, and general enforceability.
This circuitous review route undergoes at least three
cycles. Syntheses of the various comments is largely the
responsibility of the Standards and Development Branch.
Once the agency stamp of approval is given, the rules
are made available for public review and comment. The
public is given 60 days to read the proposed rules published
in the Federal Register, to submit written comments, and to
request a public hearing. At the end of the 60-day period,
written comments are distributed to relevant branches in the
agency for review and comment. A public hearing, if
requested by a member of the public, allows individuals to
80
express their concerns and argue their positions in person
before EPA staff. Again, it is the responsibility and
choice of the Standards and Development Branch to evaluate
the significance of all public and in-house comments and to
integrate them into the final rules. The promulgation of
rules in this manner takes from three to five years. It is
interesting to note that administrative rulemaking is
subject to judicial challenge (after formal promulgation).
In 1984, four out of five regulations proposed by EPA were
contested in court (Susskind and McMahon).
Judicial Decision Making
Litigation in the fields of environmental protection,
resource management, occupational health and safety, and
consumer product safety often turns on particular scientific
or technical assessments. In judicial decision making, the
decision maker may be either a jury of citizens, one judge,
or a panel of judges. For example, personal injury lawsuits
are judged by juries, while "mass toxic torts" cases such as
the suits against the Mansville Corporation by asbestos
workers and lawsuits against the actions of administrative
agencies are handled largely by courts without juries.
Since a large proportion of the science-intensive lawsuits
involve regulatory disputes, I will concentrate this
discussion on administrative law.
In the United States, the courts may review challenged
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federal administrative, rulemaking decisions for three
points: (1) to ensure that the agency acted within its
mandated authority; (2) to ensure the agency's actions were
procedurally consistent with relevant laws; and (3) to
ascertain whether the agency's action was arbitrary and
capricious. One legal scholar describes the role of the
judiciary as follows:
.the court has a supervisory function of
review of agency decisions. This begins with
enforcing the requirement of reasonable procedure,
fair notice, and opportunity for the parties to
present their case, and it includes examining the
evidence and fact findings to see both that the
evidentiary fact findings are supported by the
record and that they provide a rational basis for
inferences of ultimate fact (Levanthal: 511).
The precise basis for a court's review is dependent on
the lawsuit itself. A judicial review on the basis of the
first two points is clearly within the court's area of
expertise; the third point is more problematic. Judges in
the U.S. are largely trained as generalists. Their lack of
specialized knowledge and training necessary for
understanding complex technical arguments is aggravated by
the time pressure on court decisions imposed by the long
list of cases waiting to be heard, as well as the scarcity
of resources allocated to the court for technical
consultancy. As a result of the court's awareness of its
limited technical capabilities, a court ruling on the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard commonly restricts its
examination only to determine whether the agency decision
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was based on "sufficient" scientific data and reasoning.5
In one suit by chemical and gasoline manufacturers
challenging EPA's regulations requiring the phased reduction
of lead in gasoline, the opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia, expressed outright that the
proper function of the court is to examine the technical
evidence "solely to enable the court to determine whether
the agency decision was rational and based on consideration
of relevant factors" (Ethyl Corporation v. EPA); [emphasis
in original]. In other words, that two or more equally
"rational" technical arguments may justify contradictory
policy prescriptions is inconsequential to the judicial
reviewer. The court explained that
evidence may be isolated that supports virtually
any inference one might care to draw. Thus we
might well have sustained a determination by the
Administrator not to regulate lead additives on
health grounds. That does not mean, however, that
we cannot sustain his determination to so regulate
(Ethyl v. EPA); [emphasis in original].
As long as the court can find no fault with the agency's
line of reasoning, the court will affirm the agency's
decision.
Similarly, in a suit against the EPA in which the
plaintiff contested the scientific basis for EPA regulatory
standards, the U.S. First Circuit Court concluded that
petitioner's contention that contrary conclusions
can be drawn from the data does not lead us to
suspect that EPA committed clear error. To the
extent [that] different conclusions could be
drawn, the Agency was entitled to draw its own
(South Terminal Corporation v. EPA).
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The reluctance of the court to extend beyond its scope of
expertise is understandable, but it does not promise
scientifically sound resolutions to technically complex
litigation.
In the Michigan fishing dispute, the three tribes and
the federal government filed a motion asking the court to
allocate fishing in portions of Lakes Michigan, Huron, and
Superior falling under the jurisdiction of the State of
Michigan. The presiding judge, Judge Enslen, ultimately
ordered the parties to negotiate a settlement, hoping to
avoid a resource allocation decision himself. If the
parties had not been asked to negotiate an agreement,
however, and the judge was required to rule on the issue,
what would have been the basis of his ruling?
It is likely that Judge Enslen would have looked first
to history for legal precedents. As reported in an article
in Legal Times, "previous judicial resolutions of such
disputes have generally divided the resource 'down the
middle,' making no one happy and usually prolonging the
battle."6 If Judge Enslen had decided to resolve the case
by ordering a percentage division of the resource, the
critical issue would be how the judge defined the resource.
Would he define it as the lakes' fishing areas or as total
fish stock? Discussions among the parties prior to the 1984
litigation had mentioned both a "zone concept" for assigning
exclusive fishing areas according to "historically
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established, discrete fish populations," and a straight 50-
50 split of fish according to species and zones. Would the
judge's definition of the resource include only naturally
reproducing fish populations, or would planted fish also be
counted?
Whatever the principle Judge Enslen selected for
deriving his allocation scheme and however he ultimately
defined the resource, eventually he would need to rely on a
set of data to describe the fishery (population sizes, age
structures, migration patterns, mortality, etc.). Here
again his decision process would grow murky, since his
reliance on one set of data over another would have no
objective basis. Each litigating party would have submitted
data on the fishery. In many cases the data would be
incomplete. In some cases the data would be conflicting.
For example, one sensitive issue was the extent to
which large mesh gill net fishing depleted the lake trout
populations. Assumptions about gill net-induced mortality
affect the estimation of catch levels. The defendant, the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR), claimed that
the catch reports submitted by the tribal fishers seriously
understated actual catches. Undoubtedly, the state's
attorney would submit testimony by DNR fisheries division
biologists attesting to the high probability that these
reports were inaccurate, making various technical arguments
why higher catch levels should be expected (including,
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perhaps, results from location specific assessment studies).
Lacking the resources to go out and repeat similar
assessment studies, or the time and resources to monitor the
actual fish catch of tribal fishers, the judge would have no
scientific basis for accepting one catch level figure over
the other. Yet, in order for him to issue a finding and
order, he would be forced to assume the accuracy of one set
of data over the other, or to simply "split the difference"
between the two catch level estimates.
Methods for Handling Scientific Information
As these brief decision making scenarios illustrate,
conventional decision making patterns incorporate the use of
several methods to facilitate the exchange of information on
public policy. Methods for gathering information in public
decision making and, more pointedly, for resolving
disagreement on scientific components of public issues are
highly similar across the three, different institutional
settings. Moreover, these methods rest on the same,
extremely narrow, theoretical basis. These methods, by
technique, create barriers to a full airing and
reconciliation of disputed scientific and technical points
and contested political claims and, in fact, encourage a
distortion of the issues and debate. In the following
sections, I examine key similarities among methods commonly
used to handle scientific disagreement in conventional
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decision making.
Limited Repertoire of Methods
The methods for handling scientific and technical
information applied in various forums of public decision
making can be divided roughly into two categories: those
designed to elicit information and those designed to settle
explicit disagreement. Public information meetings, public
hearings (and court hearings), and written comments (and
legal briefs, including those submitted by amici curiae),
are common methods of eliciting comments on relevant
scientific and technical components of public issues, as
well as on more general aspects. Newspaper editorials and
letters-to-the-editor are additional mechanisms by which
interested parties can express their positions and concerns
to the decision maker. These methods share a common model
of dynamics and relationships. In this model, the decision
maker receives comments from stakeholders. The comments
consist of arguments in favor of or in opposition to a
particular policy position or decision alternative. Often,
these "position" comments will be accompanied by scientific
or technical arguments that show that the advocated position
is consistent with scientific knowledge (although sometimes
the advocated position may be no more than a refutation of a
proposed decision alternative without supportive technical
arguments.) This model is schematically presented in
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Figure 1.
Decision Maker
Policy Position "A" Policy Position "B"
Policy Position "A" Policy Position "B"
T
Supporting Science "A"
Stakeholder "A"
T
Supporting Science "B"
Stakeholder "B"
Figure 1
Communication Flows in Conventional
Information-Eliciting Procedures
In the New York City case, the Board of Estimate is the
decision maker who receives arguments supporting and
opposing the Brooklyn Navy Yard plant. In this case, the
DOS is considered a stakeholder, as are the CAC, the CBNS,
and individuals and groups expressing their viewpoints
through the media. In the wood stoves case, the EPA as a
whole is the decision maker; WHA, the NRDC, and other groups
who submit written comments or speak at public hearings are
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stakeholders. Finally, in litigation like the Michigan
case, the judge is the decision maker, and the litigants and
amici curiae are the stakeholders.
Sometimes the scientific or technical support for an
undesired decision or decision alternative is targeted for
attack by competing stakeholders. In this case, the
scientific disagreement becomes the major focus of the
challenge. In the New York City case, for example, the risk
posed by dioxin emissions became the primary issue.
Questions pertaining to the level of expected dioxin
emissions, (a "scientific" question), became salient.
When parties introduce scientific and technical
analysis that is at odds with those that support competing
decision alternatives, decision makers sometimes respond by
employing a second tier of methods. This group of methods
relies on consultation with experts, either individuals or
panels, either verbally or through more formal, written
reports, or some mixture of the two. This approach is
presented schematically in Figure 2.
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Decision Maker
A
I
Expert \
Supporting Science "A"
A
Policy Position "A"
Stakeholder "A"
Supporting Science "B"
Policy Position "B"
Stakeholder "B"
Figure 2
Communication Flows in Conventional
Dispute Resolution Procedures
In this case, the "expert" examines the scientific and
technical evidence presented by the stakeholders, as well as
additional information identified independently, and issues
a report to the decision maker. Presumably, the report
focusses primarily on disputed scientific and technical
components of the policy issue. In the New York City case,
the Hart report represented an attempt to consult an
"expert" who would be authoritative. In a conventional EPA
90
-- 7
rulemaking process, a committee on the Science Advisory
Board might serve as an internal "expert" review panel.
The popularity of this approach is indicated by the
routinized character of expert review committees.
Organizations such as the National Academy of Science (NAS)
are ready to assemble special task forces to review existing
scientific information on important issues of policy
significance and to issue reports on their findings when
asked. The NAS has convened task forces to arbitrate
technical disagreements on issues relating to policy to
reduce airborne lead, to protect the ozone layer, and the
biological effects of low-level ionizing radiation, to name
just a few. Administrative agencies, such as EPA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), are
permitted by law to create "permanent," "quasi-permanent,"
and "ad hoc" advisory committees to provide expert advice on
general and specific policy issues.
In the courtroom, a parallel method is represented by
the practice of appointing a "special master." Judges faced
with technically complex litigation sometimes enlist the aid
of a "special master" who has training in a pertinent
technical field. In most cases, the special master is asked
simply to review technical documents submitted by the
litigants and amici curiae, although he is free to
supplement the information with additional research of his
own, thus broadening the scope of information that
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ultimately provides the basis for his opinion on important
technical issues. The use of special masters also enhances
the court's ability to deal with science-intensive disputes
by bringing down conventional barriers such as limitations
on ex parte communication (Little). In any case, the
special master ultimately serves as yet another interpreter
of disputed scientific and technical facts, advising the
judge accordingly. His "break-the-tie" opinion, like the
expert panel or neutral report, often then becomes the
authority on which the court bases its broader, legal
decision.
Finally, public agencies anticipating citizen
opposition to an action or project commonly employ a third
method which is procedurally more flexible than other
methods and which, therefore, does not fall neatly into
either of the two general approaches outlined above. This
method is the formation of a citizen advisory committee.
The citizen advisory committee differs from expert task
forces or review panels because persons without particularly
relevant technical expertise may participate. Rather than
relevant technical expertise constituting the overriding
criterion for appointment, political credentials guide the
selection of the membership of citizen advisory committees.7
The DOS exercised this strategy as the sponsor of the
controversial waste disposal plan. The DOS's citizen
advisory committee accordingly comprised two borough
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presidents and other respected community spokepersons.
In instances in which disagreement on scientific or
technical components intensifies debate over a policy issue,
the citizen advisory committee often conducts a review of
the disputed points. In the New York City case, the
citizen's advisory committee hired a consultant (with DOS
funds) to review the DOS proposal, including the DEIS, and
eventually concurred with the project proposal. The gamble
taken by the decision maker or, in the New York City case,
the sponsoring agency, is that the committee may end up
opposing the preferred decision alternative. A skeptical
view of the intent behind establishing citizen advisory
committees suggests that such cases would be rare, however,
because such citizen advisory committees often adopt the
values and objectives of the sponsoring agency through the
mechanism of "cooptation" (Selznick).
Common Roots: Implications of Logical Empiricism
These methods for managing scientific and technical
information in public decision making, especially ones that
attempt to "resolve" challenges to scientific premises,
share a common theoretical lineage. The underlying
assumption of these methods is a logical empiricist view of
science. The politically neutral and objective status
claimed for scientific knowledge by logical positivists has
important implications for the design of methods for
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resolving disagreement on scientific issues.
The logical empiricist view suggests that any
disagreement between scientists is due to error. For
example, discrepancies between data are presumed
attributable to error in experimental procedure. On a
grander scale, the development of two contradictory or
competing theories is presumed due to one theoretician's
incomplete review of available data. And, disagreement on
the meaning of research findings is attributed to faulty
logic. Short of these sources of error, disagreement is
explained by error due to the personal bias of one (or more)
scientist who has allowed personal objectives to
inappropriately enter and distort his analysis.
In this framework, disputed scientific points that
arise in the context of public decision making can be
resolved by uncovering error. Since error can be detected
and corrected by a careful review of competing scientific
arguments (to verify data and retrace the logic leading to
the two [or more] incompatible conclusions) a reasonable
approach to handling disagreement on scientific aspects of a
decision is to conduct an additional review of the
contradictory scientific arguments. In theory, the review
should reveal error and determine which analysis is
scientifically invalid, and which is not.
The practice of conducting additional research, the
"expert panel," and the citizens committee's consultant's
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review are examples of procedures that can result from this
line of thinking. The science court is another example. As
initially proposed, a "science court" would consist of a
judge or panel of judges to adjudicate scientific "right and
wrong" after advocates of competing scientific views present
their strongest arguments (Kantrowitz). Again, these
procedures build on the fundamental presumption that
properly undertaken scientific experimentation and analysis
will yield a single, unambiguous set of data and findings.
Structuring the Use of Science and Its Consequences
As the New York City case shows, these methods for
integrating public comment, including scientific and
technical information, into politically acceptable and
scientifically sound decisions can miss the mark. Despite
the project sponsor's use of public hearings, public
meetings, the EIS process to solicit written comments, and a
citizen advisory committee, challenges to the project's
scientific and technical premises were not disspelled. The
decision making Board of Estimate's final attempt to quiet
health risk concerns was to order the Department of
Sanitation to commission a new study by independent
consultants whose report they hoped the public would view as
neutral. They were wrong, and the controversy continued.
These methods fail on two counts. First, they provide
a context and structure neither for generating scientific
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and technical information in a comprehensive manner nor for
settling disagreements on scientific or technical points
that arise. Secondly, and more fundamentally, they do not
address the political conflict that stands behind
contentious political debates. At best, these methods fail
to provide opportunities for clarifying either scientific or
political views. At worst, these methods encourage an
adversarial use of science that serves to obfuscate the
political nature of public conflict.
The failure of these methods can be accounted for
largely by three factors. First, the technical basis of
scientific disagreement remain hidden, from both the
decision maker and, possibly, the competing stakeholders.
Second, by failing to integrate the consideration of
scientific and political aspects of a policy issue, the
political interests that drive participation by stakeholding
groups are left unaddressed. Finally, the role cast for the
scientist raises concerns about credibility that cannot be
adequately put to rest. In the following sections, I
elaborate these points more fully.
Basis of Scientific Disagreement Remains Hidden
Methods that are commonly used in conventional decision
making institutions, namely public comment,'public hearings,
court hearings and the submission of legal briefs, provide
opportunities for stakeholding groups to bring to the
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attention of decision makers scientific or technical
evidence that might induce the decision maker (and others)
to support or oppose a particular decision alternative. The
anatomy of these methods, however, shows that incentives or
mechanisms for uncovering the basis of contending scientific
or technical evidence are lacking. The primary function of
these methods is to provide opportunities for the
stakeholders to present scientific arguments that appear to
support policy alternatives they prefer, not to establish a
common understanding of important elements of the decision
(McCarthy). This narrow objective has a number of
consequences.
In winner-takes-all situations, such as judicial
rulings, it is to the advantage of the parties to disclose
only supportive technical information (Abrams and Berry).
When cross-examination of technical witnesses is allowed in
the courtroom or at public hearings, the adversarial nature
of the forum means that effort is directed toward
discrediting opposing analyses or bolstering one's own
analyses, rather than attempting to establish any kind of
consensus. As Nyhart and Carrow have written, adversarial
proceedings are characterized by, "one party with witnesses
striving to prove facts essential to her or his case and the
other party striving to disprove those facts" (Nyhart and
Carrow: 3). Scientific studies whose findings may bridge
the gap between disparate technical arguments remain
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excluded from the record, since neither party has a clear
incentive to introduce them.
These methods also share serious constraints on
communication that impede revelation of the technical basis
for disagreement on scientific or technical components. To
varying degrees, they offer only limited communications
between the decision maker and stakeholders, and among
stakeholders. Hearings and written comments submitted to
decision makers are one-way channels of communication.
Although a series of public hearings may be held on any
given issue, normally the sequential arrangement is intended
either to address geographically distinct constituencies or
to consider different aspects of the controversy. Rarely
are consecutive hearings held to accommodate give-and-take
discussion, with intervals between meetings to allow, if
necessary, for additional research or data collection aimed
at narrowing or resolving scientific disagreements. In
administrative decision making, legislation intended to
prevent agency "capture" prescribes strict limitations on
communications between the rulemaking agency and affected
parties (Susskind and Cruikshank: 35).
From the perspective of stakeholders, such one-way
communication breeds discontent. Participants in the wood
stoves case consistently expressed considerable dismay with
the traditional rulemaking procedure and some described the
practice of submitting written comments to EPA on proposed
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rules as throwing their comments into EPA's "black hole" or
"black box." There is a general frustration with a feeling
of insignificance in public comment and public hearing
formats: one may yell and scream and make a highly rational
and well-documented case, but one may never know who, if
anyone, is listening.
While the formal procedure suggests that two-way
communication does not occur at all, in fairness to EPA
staff, discussions with persons involved with federal agency
rulemaking confirm that commenters are sometimes engaged
informally in more in-depth, two-way communication after the
public hearing or submission of written comment by agency
staff committed to understanding the meaning and
implications of comments.8 The appointment of special
masters endows the court with more flexibility with regard
to communications with parties over submissions of a
scientific or technical nature. Whether or not two-way
communication occurs, however, in both instances, is
idiosyncratic and depends largely on the personalities, work
load, and other factors concerning the individuals and the
agency or the court.
Privately initiated communication that occurs
subsequent to the "one-shot" largely "one-way" public
hearing is not witnessed by other stakeholders. Thus, in
addition to concerns about collusion and "back room deal
making," communication conducted outside of public forums
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forgoes the likelihood that supplementary data,
interpretations, or objections held by other parties would
be discovered. Opportunities for the cross-pollenization of
information that might yield new insights is lost.
Public and judicial hearings provide stakeholders a
chance to argue their position (and favored policy
alternatives) before the decision maker(s). The purpose of
communication in such a context is explicitly to persuade,
not to inform. Scientists and others citing scientific work
adeptly manipulate language, including the language of
science. The repertoire of tactics employed by stakeholders
and their expert collaborators begins with the drama
constructed around the presentation of scientific
information and moves on to the selection of words spoken or
written in testimony (Brooks; Gusfield; Mazur).
For example, the DOS's preference for the term
"resource recovery facility" to describe the proposed
disposal option purposefully evokes a benign, even
environmentally positive image, whereas "mass-burn
incinerator," in contrast, does not. Stakeholders
presenting expert witnesses recruit not simply persons with
relevant technical training, but individuals with degrees
(such-as "Ph.D's") and titles. The list of witnesses
comprising the New York City DOS's testimony before the BOE,
for example, included the first Administrator of the New
York City Environmental Protection Administration, a former
100
chief engineer of the Sanitation Department, and others.
These degrees and titles are intended as evidence of the
witness's expertise and credibility. The implication is
that scientific disagreement among witnesses should be
judged on the basis of personal reputations, rather than the
technical merits of contending arguments. Such a standard
for evaluating competing technical arguments does little to
advance the collective understanding of technical factors,
or to ensure decisions are scientifically sound.
Other examples of manipulative communication tactics
that are tolerated, if not encouraged, in existing decision
making include the use of rhetorical devices, deceptive
labelling, and the strategic "packaging" of technical
information. One writer has suggested that rhetorical
devices are the major source of public confusion on the
technical merits of decision alternatives (Mazur). Hence,
when Tobacco Institute, Inc. spokespersons allege that "no
scientific evidence exists to prove that cigarette smoking
causes lung cancer in humans," they are technically correct,
since human epidemiological studies are impossible to
conduct due to the difficulties of controlling for
intervening variables. This statement does not address what
is indicated from findings of other types of studies, such
as laboratory animal experiments or statistical studies.
Statements like these are intended to confuse decision
makers and other non-expertly trained persons by appearing
to refute contending scientific arguments without actually
addressing their substance.
The "packaging" of technical information also sometimes
has emotive significance. For example, the additional
increase in the risk of developing cancer over a 70-year
lifetime to an individual may appear small, and could be
expected to stir little response among the public. The same
increase applied to an entire population would yield an
aggregate number of cancers that could appear quite
worrisome. Stakeholders and experts can avail of different
ways of expressing essentially the same risk estimates
according to the response they desire.
The consequence of these communication constraints is a
potentially critical flaw, namely that even a well-
intentioned recipient of stakeholder comments has no
mechanism for reconciling two contradictory sets of
technical analyses outside of her own ability to dissect the
arguments. Agency staff assigned the task of explaining
discrepancies may spend days laboriously walking through the
methodology and analysis of various submissions.
Stakeholders may consciously obfuscate or misrepresent
scientific documentation. Since the format of the
scientific and technical information is fixed and largely
the choosing of the contributor, the analyst may spend hours
simply converting measurements presented in different units
in competing analyses into comparable form. The quality and
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character of the scientific evidence presented by the
disputants may be inconsistent. Stakeholders may focus on
entirely different points in their technical argumentation.
Yet, it is the responsibility of the reviewer to judge the
relative merits of all submissions.
Failure to Address Political Concerns
Other serious concerns are also raised by approaches
that focus narrowly on scientific disagreement. As a look
back at Figure 2 will confirm, while contending groups wrap
their preferred policy option with supportive scientific or
technical documentation, the appeal to a "tie-breaking
expert" presumes that contrary scientific and technical
arguments can be extracted from these packages and examined
in isolation. If the "expert" finds one or more arguments
to be invalid, much of the persuasive power of the
corresponding policy alternative is lost. In fact, it is
unlikely that the decision maker will select that option.
In a sense, disregarding a policy alternative because the
scientific or technical argument is weak is like throwing
the baby out with the bath water.
As noted earlier, public issues become disputes when
two or more parties are dissatisfied with their assessments
of expected changes in their respective well-being resulting
from certain policy decisions. In other words, groups
mobilize for or against public decisions in accordance with
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their political interests; the demands they view as
rightfully theirs. The policy option that a group advocates
represents a position considered to meet these political
interests. Politically astute and resourceful groups are
careful to develop options that are consistent with some
body of scientific or technical information. Although a
group may err in selecting a policy alternative that is
based on inaccurate analysis, incomplete data, or some other
flaw in the supportive scientific arguments, their political
interests are nonetheless real. A decision making method
that fails to acknowledge the political interests that lie
beneath the policy alternatives advocated by different
groups is shortchanging the political process.
Alternatively, groups may adhere to certain policy
positions for strategic reasons. Their deeper political
interest may be broader. For example, in the New York City
case, it is conceivable that the CBNS researchers opposed
the waste-to-energy plant not because of the health risk
posed by plant emissions per se, but because of their
opposition to a waste management program that accepts
uncritically the dominant concept of "waste." While
actually working toward a public program aimed at solid
waste reduction at the source rather than through "disposal"
technology, CBNS researchers might use the health risk
argument to thwart the DOS proposal as a mobilizing strategy
because the argument is more popularly embraced and has
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greater appeal to the general citizenry (Schattschneider).
Thus, although their opposition to the plant is articulated
as contesting the imposition of an additional health risk on
the population, their underlying political interest is to
force a reevaluation of what they consider to be
ecologically arrogant assumptions of the current system of
industrial technology by eliminating options for waste
disposal.
Decision making methods that place an overemphasis on
scientific and technical arguments further distort public
debate by restricting consideration only to policy
alternatives that can be substantiated by scientific and
technical evidence. A preoccupation with identifying
"scientific fact" blocks out arguments not couched in
technical phraseology. Simply because a group is unable to
formulate a scientific rationale for a preferred policy
outcome does not signify that that policy alternative is
technically unfeasible or based on an understanding that is
scientifically invalid. Groups may simply lack resources
for analysis or access to expertise to enable them to "fully
package" their positions. Such an emphasis on scientific or
technical arguments thus serves to restrict entry to public
debates by imposing requirements for placing issues on the
public agenda (Cobb and Elder).
In the anti-smoking campaign, for example, a group that
might organize to oppose unlimited cigarette smoking may not
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be taken seriously because of the difficulties in
quantifying physical discomfort experienced from secondary
smoke. In debates concerning the regulation of artificial
sweeteners, the value of artificial sweeteners in reducing
the health risk of obesity is a benefit cited by some
proponents of artificial sweeteners that is difficult to
measure. Again, the interests of such groups may be
legitimate, but a process that places a premium on
"technical wrappings" can foster their neglect.
Even if decision makers succeed in uncovering the basis
for discrepant scientific or technical arguments, methods
that attempt to deal with scientific disagreement and
political interests separately do not provide any means
through which the decision maker can resynthesize political
and scientific aspects into one policy. Various political
interests of a group may not be explicit. In fashioning a
policy position that would stand a chance of being accepted,
they may have suppressed certain political interests over
others. The policy position as presented to the decision
maker does not necessarily include any sense of this ranking
of different issues. Lacking this refinement, even a
decision maker genuinely endeavoring to make a decision that
meets the demands of various stakeholders would be unlikely
to make a decision that stakeholders believe is fair.
Finally, these methods foster a hardening of policy
positions. Through their investment of time, effort, and
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other resources in establishing a sound scientific and
technical basis for a policy position, stakeholders become
well-entrenched in the public debate and firmly attached to
their position. An agency must carefully document why a
proposed action is needed and why it is environmentally and
socially acceptable before announcing a proposal publicly.
After an agency like EPA spends 3 to 5 years developing a
set of rules that it believes are scientifically defensible
and acceptable within its own bureaucratic structure, its
"sunk costs" may become too great to allow staff to consider
modifications of any great magnitude. It would be difficult
to imagine the Department of Sanitation deciding to forego
its high technology waste disposal plans after more than 10
years of study. Through this time- and resource-consuming
process, changes in policy alternatives become increasingly
more difficult to justify in economic terms, and as the
personal reputations of individuals involved are put on the
line. For all parties, then, investment in supportive
scientific or technical argumentation increases
inflexibility on policy alternatives.
The Role of the Scientist
Methods commonly used to resolve challenges to the
scientific or technical basis of decision alternatives
attempt to isolate the disputed scientific or technical
points from the broader policy issues. The operating
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assumption underlying this approach is that issues of "fact"
and "value," or "scientific fact" and "policy," are
distinguishable. Conceptually congruent with the logical
empiricist view of science, expert committees are asked to
rule on the "fact" portion of disputed public decisions.
This division of "fact" and "values" creates a major dilemma
for the demarcation of the role of the scientist and raises
obstacles to decision making.
First, although the membership of all committees is not
rigidly prescribed, committees formed specifically to
address disputed scientific points that bear on policy
decisions are usually dominated, if not comprised
exclusively, by technical specialists. Membership of the
three committees comprising EPA's Science Advisory Board
(SAB), for example, is required by statute to be
a body of independent scientists and engineers of
sufficient size and diversity to provide a range
of expertise required to assess the scientific and
technical aspects of environmental issues
(Ashford: 75).
The tendency to appoint technically trained persons to
advisory committees to rule on the "latest and best"
information reflects, again, the presumption that an
appropriate qualification for determining "best" is
technical training. While a "range of expertise" is
considered important, the representation of a range of
political interests apparently is not. This reflects a
presumption that different disciplinary training is an
108
expected and acceptable cause for differing opinions, but
different political interests and values among scientists
are not.
The logical empiricist view of science thus provides
not only the theoretical basis for many conventional methods
for managing scientific and technical information in public
decision making, it also justifies a special place in
decision making for the scientist. To the extent that
determining the accuracy of contending scientific arguments
contributes to the decision choice between two opposing
policy alternatives, the role of the scientist is actually
one of arbiter of public policy. If the political
allegiances of scientists are not made explicit and
scientists are not accountable to the public, then questions
about democratic decision making arise (Dickson).
The appointment of expert technical review committees
also presents difficulties in terms of public credibility.
In the debate preceding regulatory action to reduce airborne
lead, for example, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
prepared a report to guide the Environmental Protection
Agency in standard-setting. The committee's findings were
criticized for its failure to make definitive statements
about the lead issue in contrast to the findings, one year
later, by another group whose report based on essentially
identical data was considerably more alarming. One writer
noted that the NAS committee did not include any of the
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scientists whose work had initially flagged concern about
the adverse health effects of airborne lead, although
industry scientists were included (Boffey). Public awareness
of such differences in "expert" findings and suspicions
about the sympathies of members of such expert committees
diminish the credibility of such efforts and their success
in settling scientific disagreements.
Summary
In this chapter, three hypothetical scenarios were
presented in order to create a common reference point for a
discussion of public decision making and to illustrate
common methods for handling scientific and technical
information and disputes. I argued that although these
methods appear in slightly different form in the three
institutional decision making contexts, they share many
characteristics.
Conventional methods for resolving disagreement
importantly share a theoretical foundation in logical
empiricism that constrains their ability to fully air either
scientific or political arguments. Specifically, they fail
to undercover the basis of disagreement, to gain the trust
and credibility of stakeholders, and to recognize political
interests independently of positions substantiated by
scientific arguments. As a result, administrative decisions
and decisions by elected officials are taken to court, often
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at least partially on the basis of disputed scientific
premises. EPA was sued twice, once by a pro-environmental
group and once by industry, before finally promulgating
regulations to reduce airborne lead that stood. In both
cases, science was an integral part of the legal challenges
(NRDC v. EPA; Ethyl v. EPA). Legal decisions do not
necessarily end disputes, however, since judicial rulings
that appear unfair and arbitrary to the losing party often
are appealed in a higher court.
The value of destabilizing decisions should not be
underestimated. Bouncing issues from one decision making
forum to another serves a political purpose. Certain
parties benefit by delaying action (Reisel; Susskind and
Cruikshank). Preventing forward action on the Brooklyn Navy
Yard mass-burn, waste-to-energy incinerator represented a
positive gain to groups opposing the plant, such as the
Williamsburg community, as long as their garbage continued
to be collected by the City and taken away.
At some stage in many issues, however, changing
circumstances may enhance the desirability for a more stable
decision. If opposition groups perceived an impending waste
disposal crisis in New York City, they might have a more
favorable inclination toward a decision by the Board of
Estimate, inasmuch as an outright rejection of the proposed
facility would force the Department of Sanitation to more
vigorously pursue other alternatives in order to clear the
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streets of a potential health hazard. In the wood stoves
case, the traditional revulsion of industry to government
regulation was assuaged by regulatory activity in several
states. Throwing obstacles into EPA's rulemaking pathway
might incite states that were already initiating regulatory
action to move more quickly. Conversely, passage of federal
regulations that appeared likely to be implemented would
pacify state activity and prevent a multiplicity of state-
level requirements on an industry doing interstate business.
The party most likely to benefit by delaying an EPA
rulemaking decision, in this case, was instead supportive.
The following chapter reconsiders the nature of
scientific knowledge and presents an alternative approach
for handling scientific and technical information in public
decision making. These "consensus-based" methods are
structurally more flexible than many conventional modes of
soliciting public input. They appear more consistent with a
revised concept of the nature of "science" and how it can
contribute to public decision making.
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Notes
1. In a survey by Wenner of 1900 environmental lawsuits in
the 1970s, 855 cases used NEPA as the primary law or to
supplement other arguments.
2. Stated by Barry Commoner during a personal interview,
October 1986.
3. Telephone interview with Richard Colyer, May 1987.
4. King (Colorado) suggested during telephone interview
that his input into EPA's rulemaking effort would have been
severely limited to simply submitting written comments on
the proposed rule. Kowalczyk (Oregon) believed Oregon's
participation would have also taken a formal path of
submitting written comments on the proposed rule, but he
also believed EPA would have been especially receptive to
Oregon's input prior to formal rule proposal because of the
state's leadership on this issue.
5. The standard of judicial review of agency adjudications
and formal rulemaking proceedings is the more stringent
"substantial evidence."
6. Legal Times, April 22, 1985.
7. The selection of citizen advisory committees can vary
substantially. In many cases, spokespersons for highly
active environmental, residents, or business organizations
are specially included. In other cases, appointment may be
based on the official or unofficial status of community
spokespersons, or simply the familiarity of agency personnel
with such individuals. A primary concern of the sponsoring
agency is that the committee appear credible (i.e.,
representative of the visible elements involved in the
decision).
8. A record of such communications and their substantive
content are added to the official, public record of the
decision making procedure.
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Chapter Three
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO HANDLING SCIENCE
An Analytic Alternative for Understanding
Scientific Disagreement
Introduction
In this chapter, I describe three alternative
procedures for handling scientific and technical components
of a public decision. These procedures present ways of
dealing with many of the inadequacies of conventional
processes discussed in the previous chapter. Rather than on
naive aspirations for establishing scientific "fact," these
procedures are premised on an acceptance of the limits of
science, both in terms of its inherent nature as a social
process and its contribution to decision making.
Consequently, they also alter the way in which political
conflict is addressed.
These procedures are based on the experiences of three
cases. In one case, disputed scientific and technical
issues are dealt with by revealing the basis for
disagreement and the different value orientations they
reflected. The second procedure generated a sort of tacit
accord on scientific and technical issues through active
dialogue and adversarial reviews of pertinent information
and analyses. This scientific accord provided a somewhat
flexible but highly credible base from which stakeholders
themselves fashioned policy that accommodated their
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political interests. In the third case, the procedure
failed to dissipate disagreement over technical issues, but
nonetheless succeeded in submerging such disputes. Again,
the parties assented to burying the hatchet of scientific
argumentation because of a common acknowledgement of the
ambiguities of scientific knowledge at that particular
point, which were revealed in part through the alternative
procedure.
Each of these three procedures functioned as a
supplementary step to a conventional decision making
process. They entailed face-to-face interaction among
stakeholders, their legal and scientific advisors, and,
sometimes, the official decision makers or their
representatives. And, each incorporated a consensus-based
method that was directed toward actual or potential
disagreement on scientific or technical aspects of the
decision.
"Consensus" is an ambiguous term. It implies unanimity
and a collective judgment. By "consensus-based method," I
refer to a general class of decision making methods that are
aimed to establish some kind of accord among all parties
concerned. "Consensus," in this case, implies a shared
disposition toward the objective of the procedure (i.e., to
clarify disagreement, write a regulation, reach a
settlement), but does not require an undifferentiated view
of the issues. Consensus suggests acceptance, but not
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necessarily complete agreement.'
Further on, I will elaborate in greater depth on common
features of these procedures. I turn now to a discussion
intended to set a theoretical backdrop for the description
of the three, consensus-based procedures. These points
suggest the suitability of consensus-based approaches
particularly for handling decisions that entail an extensive
consideration of scientific or technical elements (what have
been called "science-intensive" and "technically intensive"
decisions).2 First, the initial appeal of consensus-based
procedures for decision making involving scientific and
technical elements derives in part from its theoretical
compatibility with an alternative to the logical empiricist
view of science. This alternative philosophy of science,
which is elaborated on in the following section, suggests a
different conceptualization of the nature of scientific
knowledge and the character of scientific disputes.
An Alternative Philosophy of Science
If the ideal of science, as depicted by the logical
positivists could be met, public decision making would be
simplified considerably. Debate would occur over the
formulation and selection of policy alternatives (because of
their unique distributive effects), but, as' long as
scientific endeavors were accepted as yielding one truth, a
singular interpretation of reality, disputes over
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appropriate public actions would at least have a common
starting point.
In fact, however, this ideal can not be met.
Scientific efforts will fail to answer many questions,
partly because of the inherent difficulties with what
Weinberg has called, "trans-scientific issues", and also
because, as recent social studies by Albury, Mulkay, and
others have argued, science is not monolithic.3 The
scientific method (including data collection,
experimentation, and theory building), is performed within a
context of value-bound assumptions and choices.
Consequently, scientific inquiry provides neither a singular
way of knowing nor a solitary and absolute image of reality
or truth.
In contrast to logical empiricism, I posit a philosophy
of science that acknowledges the social nature of scientific
efforts and far greater degrees of ambiguity in scientific
work. This "new philosophy of science," began to develop
during the mid- to late-1960s. Writers, such as Thomas
Kuhn, pointed out the importance of paradigms, disciplinary
lenses, and the "problem solving" nature of science. For
example, Kuhn argued that scientists are trained, in a
sense, indoctrinated, to accept a set of assumptions
concerning models of theory and procedure. Even the
determination of what constitutes a "fit" between plotted
experimental data points and the curve suggested by a
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theoretical model is learned (Kuhn, 1982). Scientists work
within this tightly constrained framework on "problems"
until a given "paradigm" reaches a point of intellectual
exhaustion and no longer provides a fruitful map for
resolving unsettling questions (Ben-David). At such points,
a "revolution" occurs, and a new theory of set of theories
replaces the former (Kuhn, 1962). Scientific "truth" has a
much more tentative ring in this context, being far more
contingent on the conditions of observation and the
theoretical framework within which the scientist works.
Science viewed this way, confers entirely new meaning
to disagreements among scientists. Disagreement may
represent a turning point in a single line of scientific
thought, (a "revolution" in Kuhn's language), or two
alternative avenues for seeking truth, (different
"paradigms" or "lenses" for viewing), rather than errors or
faulty logic. Disagreements among scientists may represent
differences in disciplinary training rather than
incompetence. Importantly, scientific disagreement does not
necessarily indicate that one analysis is "correct" and
another "incorrect." Instead, disagreement represents two
different, both incomplete, "slices" of reality. That is,
investigators may be examining different elements of a
"system" or observing the same elements from significantly
different perspectives.
Kuhn's seminal work coincided with a shift within the
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social studies of science. Other examinations of the
activities of contemporary scientists suggest the influence
of factors external to the laboratory on methodological
choices made in the course of laboratory work (Latour;
Knorr-Cetina). Such "external factors" affect the selection
of research topics (Longino) and the communication of
scientific work (Brooks; Mazur). These studies suggested
that factors, such as personal experiential histories,
employers and funding sources, and disciplinary tradition
play a key role in shaping the products of scientific
research, without contradicting the canons of the scientific
method.
Technical Bases of Conflicting Scientific Advice
How exactly do the characteristics of the investigator
and the objectives of an investigation shape the findings of
scientific research? In the past twenty years, considerable
attention has been devoted to understanding why scientists
disagree and how divergent analysis can result from two
equally "scientific" courses of investigation even within a
single disciplinary tradition. A close examination of what
scientists do (e.g., laboratory experiment, analysis based
on statistical data, or a review of existing reports),
suggests that researchers repeatedly confront decision
choices that are not strictly prescribed by their
disciplinary training. The choice is mostly a function of
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personal judgment. Different judgments made at these
critical junctures can produce notably different research
findings. The importance of personal judgment and
discretionary decisions in various kinds of policy analysis
(e.g., environmental impact assessment, risk assessment,
cost-benefit analysis) has been noted by a number of authors
(Bacow; Susskind and Dunlap), while others have performed
similar analyses of laboratory conduct (Knorr-Cetina).
Their findings suggest five reasons why scientists
often proffer very different advice. These factors have
been described more fully elsewhere (Ozawa and Susskind).
They are summarized below.
Differences in research design, include such steps as
the framing of hypotheses, specification of assumptions
(such as time frames, geographical boundaries, and
functional definitions), and data selection (National
Research Council; Mazur). The framing of hypotheses varies
across different disciplines depending on the primary
objectives and perspectives of the field. In predictive
analysis, the specification of assumptions, especially the
projection of future conditions, is critical. Even in
laboratory science, the recording of data is dependent on
functional definitions that may vary from one experiment to
another, or from one laboratory to another. For example,
the detection of "change" in a subject under study is
dependent on the technology available for measuring change
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and the individuals performing the monitoring. Comparable
types of experiments conducted over an interval of years in
fields in which innovations in technological aids are
profuse may result in data in forms that are not comparable.
Differences in the interpretation of data or findings
can arise in cases in which scientists may agree on a given
piece of evidence, but disagree about its significance. In
the anti-smoking case, for example, some scientists may view
statistics on the association of lung cancer and smoking
habits as a strong indication of a causal relationship.
Others may view the same statistics as supporting the
hypothesis that lung cancer and smoking are both indications
of a third condition, which is actually the causal factor
inducing both disease and smoking in individuals.
Interpretative differences arise from dissimilar choices of
theory, or more directly, from contrary value orientations.
Individuals who hold human health as the primary objective
will often have a different calculus on interpretative
issues from persons relatively more concerned with the
stability of productive, economic activities, for example.
Confusing communication refers to the packaging of
scientific information. Scientists, or the messengers who
report scientific work, often employ rhetorical devices in
their attempt to persuade decision makers and potential
supporters of the policy implications of their scientific
studies. For example, in the anti-smoking debate, one of
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the favorite phrases of tobacco supporters for many years
was "there is no evidence to show that smoking causes lung
cancer in humans." Technically speaking, this was true,
since controlled experiments on humans were difficult to
carry out because of ethical and other reasons, and the
experiments on laboratory animals could be criticized for
failing to accurately simulate human habits and living
conditions.
Other confusing communication tactics include the
representation of probabilities or statistical figures in
ways which most favorably dramatize the numbers. For
example, one writer noted that
[Scientists] who favored [nuclear weapons] testing
expressed health dangers in terms of the increased
chance of cancer for an individual exposed to
fallout. Expressed as a fraction, such increases
were minuscule. The critics of testing, however,
often expressed the identical facts in terms of
actual deaths that would occur worldwide within a
period of 50 years. .as a result of current
fallout. Some figures were very high (Brooks,
1980).
While it appeared as though one analysis suggested a low
health risk and the other a high risk, in fact, the
estimates of likely increases in the incidence of human
cancers cited by the two groups and the interpretation of
these figures, were identical. For dramatic purposes,
however, the scientists quite intentionally chose to express
the risk estimates with different reference points (i.e.,
the individual in one case, the population in the other).
The "disagreement" was, hence, purely attributable to
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differences in communication tactics.
Policy prescriptions sometimes are made explicitly
during the reporting of scientific information. Although a
scientist may be asked solely to report on a particular
"scientific" question concerning a given policy issue, the
scientist may be unable to resist including statements about
his "personal" opinion, as the quote in Chapter 1
illustrated. As argued in Chapter 1, this distinction
between "personal opinion," or values, and "scientific
advice," or fact, is somewhat illusionary. While statements
about policy prescriptions, in fact, simply reflect value
orientations that are inherent in the advice anyway, the
explicit statement of policy preference further exacerbates
the perception of disagreement among decision makers and
others listening to the conflicting scientific testimony.
Despite the fact that many decision alternatives may be
consistent with a given identification of scientific and
technical parameters, the expert voicing his own preference
directs attention and, possibly, undue certification to that
position.
Error remains a factor in the presentation of
conflicting scientific information in public decision making
(Wessel). While no studies have been conducted that display
the degree to which error accounts for debate, concern about
fraud in the scientific community is a related issue and one
that has gained notice in recent years.
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This revised formulation of the scientific enterprise
and the nature of scientific disagreement has profound
implications for the use of science in public decision
making. If conflicting scientific evidence or analyses can
be viewed legitimate from a scientific perspective,
understanding the value choices that lead one investigator
to one conclusion and another to a different conclusion from
a similar starting point is important to a decision maker
(and others) wishing to assess the compatibility of
competing scientific arguments with her own values and
policy choices. Rather than simply dismissing science as
"not useful" in informing policy decisions when experts
disagree, decision makers are obligated to explore the
limits and possibilities of alternative scientific evidence
or analysis. Also, if scientists are not politically
neutral and dispassionate, then scientific analysis and the
advice of scientists can not be held up as an authority in
public decision making without an obfuscation of underlying
political contests and the surrender of political power.
Public decision making procedures need adjustment to
account for the biases of the scientist when scientific
information, particularly contradictory analyses, is
presented. If decision makers are able to decipher why
scientists submit conflicting testimony, they will be better
equipped to comprehend the value orientations embodied in
each analysis or report. Doing so, presumably, might
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facilitate a more straightforward recognition and discussion
of the interests and values at stake in the decision.
Decision makers could gain a fuller understanding of
technical factors and might then be better prepared to
address the interests that motivate groups to act.
Consensus-Based Methods for Science-Intensive
Public Decisions
Consensus-based supplements to conventional decision
making are no longer unusual. They have been used in a
variety of policy fields at local, state, and federal levels
of government (Susskind and Cruikshank). A compilation of
environmental disputes involving the application of
consensus-based methods reported 160 cases between 1973 and
1986 (Bingham). In many instances, decisions were
contingent on scientific or technical information that was
ambiguous or disputed. Several federal agencies, including
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, have experimented with
mediated negotiation in rulemaking on issues that frequently
evoke challenges to scientific and technical components.
State governments in Massachusetts, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Hawaii, among others, have institutionalized varying forms
of alternative dispute resolution procedures to deal with a
range of public policy issues.
The enthusiasm for consensus-based approaches stems
from a number of favorable claims. In comparison to
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litigation, consensus-based methods are believed to be more
economical for the parties (McGovern; Mernitz; Wall and
Rude). Many proponents have suggested regulatory
negotiation may be "less costly and more expeditious,"4 as
well as more "effective", and produce "better" regulations,
and, as a process, garner greater political legitimacy
compared to conventional procedures (Harter; Susskind and
McCreary; Susskind and McMahon).
Several writers have speculated on the suitability of
consensus-based procedures especially for science-intensive
decision making (Abrams and Berry; Ozawa and Susskind;
Rushefsky). A consensus-based method is believed to foster
less adversarial uses of scientific information, greater
opportunities for understanding the basis of disagreements,
and higher probabilities of reaching an agreement on
technical issues intimately linked to public decisions. The
flexible structure of consensus-based methods and certain
techniques, such as the assistance of an intervenor,s joint
fact-finding, and collaborative model building, among
others, have been proposed as tools for bringing a group to
a common perception of scientific issues.6 It has been
suggested that constructing a common understanding of
technical points creates a conducive environment in which
participants can then debate more explicitly political
decisions (Bacow and Wheeler; Cormick and Knaster; Susskind
and McCreary).
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Similarities Among Three Consensus-Based Procedures
The ad hoc nature of most consensus-based supplementary
procedures has meant that particular designs and
applications are highly varied. The three consensus-based
procedures studied in this inquiry differ in many respects,
but they also share certain, notable characteristics. I
preface the description and analysis of these procedures
with a summary of these similarities and brief notes about
their relevance to science-intensive decisions. The case
descriptions themselves will add color and texture to these
points.
First, the procedures all included a "third-party"
intervenor who assisted in the preparations leading to the
consensus-based meetings as well as facilitated the
meetings. An intervenor can be helpful simply to keep
discussions moving along, but he can also perform a number
of functions associated with complications specific to
technically intensive decisions. For example, he can
facilitate communications among individuals with varying
levels of expertise in relevant technical areas, help the
parties to avoid rhetorical devices in discussions of
technical points, and serve generally to help coordinate the
presentation of technical material.
Next, the meetings included face-to-face communications
among contending parties and among their respective
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technical advisors. As the cases illustrate, interactive
relations can provide a rich context for the presentation of
scientific matters relevant to a decision. There are
ramifications for the type, format, and quality of
information submitted for review and consideration. Both
contending stakeholders and decision makers benefit from the
opportunity to raise questions and hear answers that may add
precision and depth to their understanding of technical
issues.
Most importantly, the very consensus-oriented character
of these procedures has critical repercussions. The
"consensus" in each case was directed at different elements.
In one case, the group assembled in order to generate an
accord on technical issues of agreement and disagreement and
to elucidate the basis for disagreement. In another case,
the "consensus" was aimed toward the common objective of
developing regulations for controlling particulate emissions
from residential heating devices. In the third case, the
parties shared a desire to reach a legal settlement that
would end public violence and enable the parties to pursue
their separate uses of a public resource, the lakes'
fishery. In all cases, the shared goal of the procedure
provided sufficient impetus to maintain a cooperative and
collaborative spirit, despite considerable underlying
conflict.
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Three Procedures for Science-Intensive Decision Making
In this section, I present descriptions of three cases
in which a consensus-based method was inserted into a
conventional decision making process to illustrate how
consensus-based methods offer alternative ways of handling
scientific and technical information and disputes. These
cases suggest three distinct, alternative procedures.
Indeed, one case shows how understanding the causes of
scientific disagreement can move decision making forward.
Another shows how building a consensus on technical aspects
of a decision can lead to agreement on policy. The third
case portrays a procedure for reaching a policy agreement in
the presence of substantial technical uncertainty.
Importantly, n all three cases, the procedures permitted a
far greater degree of flexibility in dealing with technical
and political uncertainty, as compared to the conventional
"decide-announce-defend" approach.
Procedure 1: Understanding the Basis of Scientific
Disagreement
The New York Academy of Sciences facilitated policy
dialogue represents a rather narrow form of intervention.
The objective, as described by Don Straus, chair of the
Science and Society Committee of the Academy, was not "to
solve or even suggest solutions to how to solve waste
disposal" but to "help representatives of the BOE to walk
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through scientific issues concerned with how to solve solid
waste disposal" (New York Academy of Sciences, 1984b). In
fact, even this seemingly limited objective overstates the
actual accomplishment of the 8-hour, one-day session. The
achievement was modest: simply to trace the basis for the
discrepant risk assessments performed in respect to one
approach to the solid waste disposal issue, namely the
proposed Brooklyn Navy Yard facility. Nonetheless, even
this relatively minor accomplishment otherwise might not
have occurred and the clarification of disputed technical
points carried important implications for the politics of
the overall decision making process.
A Close Look at the Scientific Disagreement
The New York Academy of Sciences policy dialogue was
undertaken as a response to an urgent plea for assistance
from the New York City Department of Sanitation (Konkel).
One month after the Department of Sanitation (DOS) announced
its plan to construct a resource recovery facility at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard site, the Center for the Biology of
Natural Systems (CBNS) issued the first of four reports
condemning the project for exposing the City's residents to
an increased risk of developing cancer. The city's
governing Board of Estimate (BOE) instructed the DOS to
conduct further study, which was embodied in a report by
Fred C. Hart and Associates, Inc. Under what each called a
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"worst-case" scenario, the Hart report estimated an increase
of 5.9 cancer cases per 1 million population exposed over a
70-year lifetime while the CBNS report predicted a range of
29 to 1,430 additional cases of cancer per million
population (Commoner, 1984).
What accounted for this startling, 240-fold
discrepancy? Briefly, the different figures can be traced
to differing opinions on two main factors: (1) predicted
dioxin emission levels, and (2) the effectiveness of
proposed pollution control technologies. These two factors,
in turn, are inextricably bound to a theory of the
mechanisms of dioxin formation in municipal solid waste
(MSW) incinerators.
Differing assumptions about the level of dioxin
emissions is the singular risk assessment variable that goes
the furthest in explaining why the two cancer risk
assessments differed by more than a factor of 240. As is
pointed out in one CBNS report, if the same expected
emission level is factored into each analysis, the Hart and
CBNS risk analyses respectively yield values of 5.9 and 29
additional cancer cases per 1 million population exposed
over a 70-year lifetime. Given the high level of
uncertainty in this type of risk assessment, a less than 5-
fold difference between projections is not considered a
significant variation (Commoner, 1984: IV-18).
Estimating expected levels of dioxin emissions is an
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imprecise task. Although reports on dioxin emissions from
municipal incinerators appeared in the mid-1970s from the
works of European researchers, existing data in 1984 was
still spotty, idiosyncratic, and, as a result, inconclusive.
The Hart report identified data on dioxin emissions from 19
incinerators located around the world. However, monitoring
protocols, the specific identity of the dioxin isomers
tested, the physical state of the dioxin compounds tested,
and numerous other methodological details for each of these
tests varied, making the comparability of performances among
these existing facilities difficult to judge. Moreover,
separating valid from invalid testing results was
impossible.
The different research groups took different approaches
to selecting an appropriate emission estimate for their risk
analyses. From those 19 sets of emissions test data listed
in the appendices of the Hart report, authors of the Hart
report combined two sets of testing data, from the Chicago
Northwest and the Zurich-Josefstrasse facilities for their
risk assessment. They justified their selective use of data
as follows.
After examining all PCDF and PCDD emission data
available in the literature, the emission data
selected as the most representative of the BNYRRF
[Brooklyn Navy Yard resource recovery facility]
are the data from the Chicago, Northwest facility
and Zurich-Josefstrasse facility. Both of these
facilities use a furnace design similar to that
proposed for the BNYRRF. The Chicago Northwest
facility is located in an environment similar to
that of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, i.e., a large U.S.
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metropolitan area; therefore, the waste is more
likely to be similar to New York City waste than
is the European. Furthermore, the sampling of the
Chicago, Northwest facility was performed under
sponsorship of the USEPA, using sampling methods
designed to capture both gaseous and particulate
forms of PCDFs and PCDDs. In addition, stringent
quality assurance controls were used in order to
assure representativeness. The Zurich-
Josefstrasse facility was tested by the Swiss
counterpart to the USEPA. The sampling method
included both gaseous and particulate PCDFs and
PCDDs in the sample, although the method is
different from the USEPA method. Sampling of both
gaseous and solid forms of PCDFs and PCDDs is
important to ensure that the emission data are
complete (Hart: 3-19, 3-20); [emphasis added].
Interestingly, as they note, emissions data from these two
facilities were also among the lowest reported (Hart: 3-
15).
The key words in the Hart report are "data selected as
the most representative." In contrast, CBNS researchers
looked at the available data comprehensively, rather than
exclusively. They interpreted the wide range of test
results as indicating the high variability and unpredictable
nature of dioxin emissions, rather than as resulting from
the varying reliability of measurement techniques in
different cases. They asserted that too little is
understood about the dynamics of dioxin emissions to
confidently judge representativeness and comparability
between plants. To safeguard against such gaps in
knowledge, they utilized both the lowest and the highest
tested emission levels in their risk assessment, (thereby
yielding a range of expected increases in cancer rates, from
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29 to 1,430 additional cases), without attempting to judge
their relative validity (Commoner, 1984: I-9, 10).
In subsequent reports, the CBNS group continued to
refute reasons offered by the Hart group for justifying
their more narrow data selection. In particular, the CBNS
group contested the relevance of design similarities cited
by the Hart group as justification for their data selection.
They argued that the Chicago, Northwest and Zurich-
Josefstrasse facilities are more similar to the proposed BNY
plant than the other facilities for which testing data were
relatively complete, only in that they utilize a Martin
grate (part of the furnace system). Other potentially
important features such as the size of the facility were not
similar. Moreover, they contested the role of the Martin
grate and furnace operating conditions in affecting dioxin
levels. They cited recent testing data from a Tsushima,
Japan incinerator equipped with a Martin grate, which showed
emission levels ten times higher than the Chicago, Northwest
test data despite furnace temperatures of 800 degree
centigrade (Commoner, 1984) and a Canadian study which
indicated that emission rates were not significantly
affected by temperature or other combustion factors
(Commoner, 1984: IV-10).
At the core of the disagreement over the appropriate
data set and the significance of the furnace system were
assumptions about the formation and destruction of dioxin in
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MSW incinerators. There was no challenge to the proposition
that dioxins are destroyed at very high temperatures (800
degrees centigrade or higher). It was uncontested that
under optimum conditions of air turbulence, oxygen
concentration, residence time, and high temperatures,
laboratory experiments have shown about 99% of dioxins
present are destroyed. It was also more or less undisputed
that the furnace design proposed for the BNY plant would be
capable of destroying a significant proportion of the dioxin
in the combustion chamber, although there certainly was room
for disagreement on this issue.
What was contested was whether dioxin is actually
present in the combustion chamber at all. The formation of
dioxin in incinerators is not well understood. In their
effort to knit together the pieces of information obtained
by research thus far, researchers have developed three
alternative hypotheses to explain dioxin formation. The
first is that dioxin compounds are present in the raw refuse
and are volatized during incineration. Since PCDDs and
PCDFs are known to have formed as byproducts and
contaminants of commercial chemical goods commonly found in
municipal refuse (such as polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]),
it is reasonable to assume that municipal wastes may contain
traces of dioxin. In fact, one study did detect PCDFs and
PCDDs in raw wastes, although not in sufficient quantities
to explain tested dioxin emission levels (given the
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generally accepted fact that laboratory experiments have
demonstrated that about 99% of the dioxins present are
destroyed at high temperatures.)
The second hypothesis, one regarded as the conventional
theory, posits that PCDDs and PCDFs are formed from
precursors present in the waste stream. Precursors are
products (such as PCBs and chlorophenols) that contain PCDF
and PCDD materials as contaminants. It is hypothesized that
PCDFs and PCDDs form at temperatures sufficient to decompose
precursors but too low to destroy dioxin. PCDFs and PCDDs
can also volatize directly from precursor materials.
Laboratory experiments have provided data consistent with
this theory, although no studies have yielded conclusive
data (Hart: 3-4). In fact, one experiment indicated that
adding precursor materials to the waste stream did not
significantly increase the PCDF and PCDD concentrations
found adsorbed onto fly ash (Hart: 3-5).
The third theory proposes that PCDDs and PCDFs are
synthesized "de novo" from constituents of materials
commonly present in the waste stream, such as wood products
and plastics. The "de novo synthesis" theory of the
formation of dioxin has been deduced from laboratory
experiments that have shown that no dioxin is emitted when
certain materials are burned separately but is detected when
these and related products are incinerated together.
According to this theory, PCDDs and PCDFs are formed in
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municipal solid waste (MSW) incinerator systems by chemical
reactions between carbon-ring compounds produced by the
incomplete combustion of lignin (a constituent of wood and,
therefore, of paper), and chlorine in the form of
hydrochloric acid. Hydrochloric acid is produced in
incinerators by the combustion of chlorine-containing
plastics (such as polyvinyl chloride, or "vinyl") that are
present in MSW. Ordinary table salt in MSW makes an
unknown, but apparently minor, contribution. Paper is the
major source of lignin in MSW (CBNS: IV-8).
Distinct from the preceding two theories, the "de novo
synthesis" theory further posits that syntheses of PCDDs and
PCDFs do not occur in the incinerator, but at later points
in the waste gas stream. The carbon-ring compounds and
chlorine compounds are freed from their original state
during the combustion process and adsorb onto particles of
fly ash. These constituents of PCDDs and PCDFs then react
under lower temperatures (in the smokestack or other points
beyond the combustion chambers) to form PCDDs and PCDFs. As
in the case of the conventional theory, the results of at
least one experiment appear to contradict this theory (Hart:
3-5).
The authors of the Hart report acknowledged the
ambiguity of existing empirical evidence by'recognizing that
dioxin formation may occur by more than one mechanism. They
argued, however, that,
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Since there is a design temperature
difference between the pollution control
device and the stack of the BNYRRF of only
ten degrees, it is unlikely that condensation
occurs in the stack. Therefore, if PCDF and
PCDD materials are adsorbed before entering
the pollution control device, some portion of
these materials will be trapped in the fabric
filter because the fabric filter is more
efficient at collecting fly ash than the
electrostatic precipitator (Hart: 3-23).
Implicitly, they justified a narrow data set on the
assumption that dioxin is present in the raw waste or
is formed from precursors during the combustion step
and can be destroyed under optimum heat conditions.
They further assumed that any dioxin formed subsequent
to the high temperature chambers is likely to form
before, not in, the stack, and will therefore be
contained by the fabric filter control system.
The CBNS team more adamantly subscribed to only
one theory, the de novo synthesis theory. In their
report they described tests from the Tsushima, Japan
incinerator, which is similar to the proposed plant in
furnace design and equipped with the same pollution
control system. They wrote:
The tests showed that this system failed to
control PCDD/PCDF emissions. Indeed, they
showed that PCDDs and PCDFs were actually
synthesized in the control system; seven
times as much PCDD/PCDF left the control
system (and was emitted through the stack) as
entered it (CBNS: IV-11).
The relevance of the process of dioxin formation
to the BNY proposal is two-fold. First, if PCDDs and
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PCDFs are indeed formed by precursors in the waste
stream as the conventional theory holds, then they
ought to be destroyed if appropriate incineration
conditions are maintained. On the other hand, if the
de novo synthesis theory is true, and synthesis occurs
only after temperatures in the waste gas stream are
sufficiently cooled, then PCDDs and PCDFs would not be
present in the combustion process at all and high
incineration temperatures and other combustion factors
such as air turbulence and oxygen balance could be
expected to have no effect on emission levels. Thus, if
the conventional theory is true, the importance of the
Martin grate in selecting emission level data is
substantiated and a lower risk estimate may be more
accurate. Conversely, if the de novo synthesis theory
is correct, this design feature would be arguably less
significant in relation to data selection, and a higher
risk estimate is warranted.
Theories of dioxin formation also have
implications for evaluating the effectiveness of
pollution control technologies. If PCDD and PCDF
precursors are present as contaminants in single
products, waste separation before incineration would
have no effect on dioxin emission levels. If formation
occurs during combustion, then increasing the
effectiveness of particulate emission control systems
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should reduce dioxin emissions. If dioxin is formed in
accordance with the de novo synthesis theory, "add-on"
air pollution control technologies would be useless
unless a significant proportion of the dioxin formation
occurred before or in the control technology system.
In that case, waste separation prior to incineration
would appear much more promising.
This account of the New York City dispute shows
that discrepancies in the work of reputable scientists
can occur when the scientists hold differing opinions
about factors that cannot be ascertained given the
present state of knowledge. These two groups of
researchers reached different determinations on the
appropriate data set largely because of a lack of
conclusive information on the mechanism of dioxin
formation in MSW incinerators. Without a definitive
theory and armed with contradictory test results from
dissimilar facilities taken under unquantifiably
varying conditions and findings from laboratory studies
whose extrapolation to real world experiences is
questionable, each constructed plausible and persuasive
scientific rationales for critically different data
selections.
Without knowing the relative impact of various
factors on dioxin emissions, some scientists are
willing to make assumptions where others are not.
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Without conclusive evidence to support one theory of
dioxin formation over another, scientists may
intuitively find one argument more compelling than
another. The willingness to make assumptions, the
"intuition" that attracts an individual to one theory
over others, like personal "risk aversity" levels, are
intermediate manifestations of the individual's unique
set of values. When disagreement surfaces, the debate
may heat up to the degree that groups intentionally (or
not) engage in communicative manipulations, such as
using single terms like "worst case" to convey
different meanings.
These kinds of disagreements arise again and again
in science-intensive public disputes, in varied
renditions, as the latter two cases illustrate. In
what ways did the facilitated policy dialogue function
to enlighten the decision makers (in this case, their
staff advisors) on the issue of dioxin emissions and
solid waste incinerators?
Decoding Scientific Disagreements
The "by-invitation-only" facilitated policy
dialogue was set up as one, 8-hour day session to
address three specific issues concerning the proposed
mass-burn incinerator (New York Academy of Sciences,
1984a). Staff from the sponsoring New York Academy of
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Sciences selected these topic areas on the basis of
independent interviews with members of the BOE. The
three issues were: (1) the types of emissions and
their health effects, (2) the sources of emissions in
resource recovery plants, and (3) the control of
emissions. After 30-minute presentations on each topic
from expert panelists, also selected by the Academy
staff in consultation with BOE staff and
representatives of major environmental groups, the
floor was opened to questions from other panelists, BOE
staff, and the general audience.
The isolated opportunity that the one-day session
offered scientists to present their views made the
occasion vulnerable to attempts at "grandstanding." In
some cases, presenters used the forum to defend their
opinions and interpretations of study results. For
example, panelist Walter Shaub, a chemist whose work
had been cited in CBNS reports, was asked to address
the issue of the sources of PCDD and PCDF emissions
from mass-burn plants. He spent much of his 15 minutes
rendering a carefully prepared statement condemning the
"CBNS theory" (the de novo theory) and clarifying what
he believed was the proper interpretation of the
results of his research. His reinterpretation of
historical data cited by CBNS provoked a strong
rebuttal by Commoner during the following question and
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answer period. This interval of the policy dialogue,
which can be characterized as highly antagonistic,
seemed to constitute little more than an opportunity
for the speakers to present orally their own
"adventures in applied probability."7
In contrast, the question and answer period in
other instances helped to clarify exactly what the
experts, in their cautious, scientific language rich
with disclaimers, were actually saying. The dialogue
allowed the audience an opportunity to gain an
appreciation of the contingent nature of prescriptive
advice (an estimate of the effectiveness of emission
reduction technologies) and descriptive scientific
theory (assumptions about the formation and destruction
of dioxins). The mediator assisted in these
interactions between decision maker representatives and
experts by rephrasing questions and responses, and by
reminding speakers of the focus of the discussion. In
some cases, the mediator's attempt to rephrase a
question helped the asker to express it more clearly
himself. In other cases, the mediator's attempt to
repeat a response was corrected by the respondent. All
of these efforts resulted in clarification of the
scientist's view for the non-scientist listener.
Perhaps most importantly, what was achieved was
not only merely the disclosure of the technical basis
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for differing risk assessments, but the disengagement
of two polar opposite policy positions--to build and
not to build the plant--from the scientific issues.
The lay-out of the issues, the question-and-answer
format, and the mediator's vigilance helped to keep
clear the distinction between what is known about
dioxin formation and destruction and pollution control
technologies, and the desirability of different
technologies. Rather than a "black and white" choice
between a plant with high emissions and no plant and no
emissions, a richer landscape of alternatives was drawn
as individuals became inspired to suggest novel ways of
dealing with uncertainty. One suggestion heard was to
require the builders of the mass-burn incinerator to
bear the costs incurred if a plant is shut down for
failure to attain emission levels, for example. This
is an intriguing way to force those most confident of
their assertions to gamble the hardest.
It is also significant that Dr. Barry Commoner,
the leading scientist-spokesperson opposing the
proposed Brooklyn Navy Yard facility and a participant
at the facilitated policy dialogue, sent a letter that
was published in the New York Times three days after
the meeting. Reasserting his belief that DOS estimates
of dioxin emissions were inaccurately understated, he
proposed that a "good way to cut through the
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controversy, which was suggested by a recent action by
California in response to an incinerator issue" (and a
suggestion that was raised at the NYAS policy dialogue)
was to require "the builder to show, by tests on the
completed incinerator, that it does, in fact, emit
dioxin at the low rate that the builder predicts" (New
York Times, January 5, 1985). This statement by
Commoner seems to indicate that the two issues--the
question of the cancer risk posed by dioxin emissions
from the proposed facility and the question of whether
to build the facility or not--were successfully severed
by the discussions at the policy dialogue.
One Step Toward A Decision
The New York City Board of Estimate voted to
approve the comprehensive waste disposal plan on
December 20 1984, only two days after the policy
dialogue (New York Times, December 21, 1984). Public
opposition to the high-tech approach persisted, but in
August 1985, the BOE approved the Brooklyn Navy Yard
proposal as well (New York Times, August 16, 1985).
Members of the Williamsburg community organized a mass
protest march to City Hall and a spokesperson was
quoted as saying, "We will be at the site every single
day, a single bulldozer will not enter that site." (New
York Times, September 6, 1985) Residents subsequently
145
filed a legal suit and construction of the plant has
been delayed.
Disengaging decision alternatives from disputes
over scientific or technical issues is only the first
step in developing a politically acceptable decision.
The facilitated policy dialogue was not designed to
take the discussion beyond the point of clarifying
disagreements between experts. Consequently, although
potentially it reopened the discussion to new
alternatives and the expression of political interests,
the policy dialogue was not directed toward
facilitating either process. It presented
opportunities, but without strong inducements.
The decision alternatives that were added to the
discussion partly as a result of the information that
surfaced at the policy dialogue consisted of add-on air
pollution control technologies and more stringent
monitoring provisions to ensure expected operating
condition are not violated. One might argue also that
advocates of alternatives to mass-burn incineration
gained political ground since legitimization of the
higher risk assessment and the de novo theory of dioxin
formation would have made recycling and other
approaches appear more appealing to decision makers
hoping to allay public fears. While the actual
benefits to advocates of alternative waste disposal
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methods and incinerator designs afforded by the policy
dialogue are difficult to identify absolutely, it
certainly is plausible that the policy dialogue
broadened the consideration of decision alternatives to
include ones more compatible with their political
objectives.
On the other hand, the relatively limited scope of
the policy dialogue, in terms of objectives and
scheduling, did not allow for more revealing
discussions of political interests. The meeting was
focussed entirely on scientific issues. Although this
was useful in disclosing some value choices behind
divergent technical analyses, (e.g., how conservative a
stance to assume in estimating variables), it did not
flush out statements about the motivations of various
groups involved.
For some groups, the political interests that
spurred action were less clear than those of others.
Although the CBNS researchers and the Williamsburg
community sat on the same side in the scientific
dispute, the political interests behind their
involvement were probably quite distinct. The
Williamsburg residents opposed the Brooklyn Navy Yard
plant because it was slotted for a site adjacent to
their neighborhood. Although general public health
risks were certainly of concern to them, it is not
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clear that they would have spoken out against a similar
plant had it been proposed for a location elsewhere in
Brooklyn, in the Bronx, or in another state.
The motivation of the CBNS researchers can be
surmised quite differently. Dr. Commoner has been part
of public opposition to mass-burn incinerators in
several communities outside his own. From his
extensive writings, his involvement and those of his
colleagues at CBNS might be understood as a
manifestation of a commitment toward restructuring a
"wasteful," environmentally assaultive society into a
more ecologically balanced one.8 The fact that Dr.
Commoner advocated recycling, waste sorting, and source
reduction in ieu of mass-burn incineration reinforces
this interpretation of Dr. Commoner's motives. On the
other hand, his involvement may simply be motivated by
a belief in self-determination and a response to a
request for assistance from a community struggling to
gain control of its future.9 In any case, his
political motives were probably more ideologically
oriented than those of the Williamsburg community.
The interests of other groups present at the
policy dialogue can be expected to differ again from
these two groups. However, the policy dialogue did not
encourage a discussion of the concerns and interests
behind the involvement of various groups.
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Consequently, it provided little additional
enlightenment to decision makers aiming to make a
politically acceptable and technically reasonable
decision.
Procedure 2: Building a Technical Consensus'°
The woodburning stoves regulatory negotiation was
a fairly comprehensive attempt to weave technical and
scientific knowledge into the policy making trade-offs
necessary in developing implementable technology-based
pollution control regulations. In contrast to the
facilitated policy dialogue and the Michigan fishing
case, the regulatory negotiation preceded any well-
publicized debate over the issue under consideration,
emission standards for new residential wood combustion
units. The participants held a wide range of concerns
and were variously equipped to deal with scientific,
legal, and regulatory aspects of rulemaking.
Putting the Process in Motion
The Environmental Protection Agency's objective
was to develop rules that were politically palatable,
enforceable, and technically feasible. EPA had
previous experience with the use of negotiation in
rulemaking. The agency, through its Office of Program
Planning and Evaluation, had undertaken a pilot project
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in regulatory negotiation beginning in 1983. By mid-
1985, three of the six demonstration "reg negs" were
completed or underway (Harter, 1986). The EPA process
designers, through consultation with the Standards
Development Branch, were also familiar with the nature
and type of issues that would require consideration,
and the critical limitations of the technical and
scientific knowledge needed to back up decisions.
Although regulations agreed upon by the negotiating
parties were preferable, even without signatures, EPA
would be closer to promulgating appropriate rules at
the end of the negotiation effort.
The agency identified potential and eventual
negotiators and, through a published notice in the
Federal Register, invited other members of the
interested public to attend the first organizational
meeting. An EPA staff person initially intended to
serve as mediator, but the EPA-hired consultant,
originally acting as "convener" eventually took over
all facilitating as well as convening responsibilities.
Meetings were open to the public and statements and
questions from observers were encouraged after
procedural recognition from the facilitator.
Accordingly, the six meetings that took place over a
period of six months were lengthy, but rich with the
engineering, legal, and regulatory knowledge of many
150
individuals as well as intense debate between parties
with competing interests.
As in the New York City waste-to-energy plant
dispute, the science and technology of wood stoves is
not well understood. Emissions vary in accordance with
a number of difficult-to-control factors. User habits,
such as the way one stacks wood, wood type and age,
burn rates, and other such factors, as well as stove
design can cause variations in particulate emission
levels. Although stoves equipped with catalysts are
widely believed to burn more "cleanly," a lack of long-
term data arouses doubt about the overall performance
of catalysts in reducing emission levels. Moreover, it
is suspected that catalysts degrade through use. But,
how quickly degradation occurs and the effect of
different catalyst materials and stove designs on
degradation rates is not known. Finally, the
difference between emission levels occurring during
laboratory testing and actual home-use is also highly
speculative.
The level of technical ambiguity surrounding wood
stove emissions opened the door for analytical
acrobatics and political posturing by the stakeholding
parties. Instead, through the negotiations'the parties
apparently recognized the uncertain nature of the
calculations over which they labored. Sometimes,
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through an iterative process, agreement would be
reached on one number or one method of measurement or
analysis. More often, a sort of "bounded" ambiguity
prevailed. In these cases, the negotiations over "hard
numbers," such as permissible emission levels,
compliance dates, and so on, transpired in a climate in
which negotiators had a common acceptance of the range
of scientifically acceptable estimations. In
determining the package of provisions that comprised
the ultimate regulations, negotiators traded across
issues ("logrolling," in Lewicki and Litterer's
terminology), accepting higher estimates on one
variable that justified one party's preferred policy
choice, in exchange for lower estimates on another
variable which justified another party's preference on
a different provision. What resulted was a mosaic of
rules and regulations which has not been seriously
criticized after publication and which most parties
believe are as scientifically and technically sound as
possible to develop under the prevailing time
constraints.
Reaching A Technical Consensus
This scientific and technical consensus was
accomplished in a number of different ways. Although
EPA staff persons had appropriate technical training
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which was supplemented by hired consultants, the
accelerated rulemaking schedule resulting from the NRDC
lawsuit meant that the agency would be hard pressed to
generate independent scientific and technical data.
By involving many parties in the rulemaking process, it
in effect "externalized" some of the effort and cost of
gathering data. The negotiating parties, notably the
WHA, the independent testing laboratories, and the
states of Oregon and Colorado, which have operational
regulatory programs, volunteered data and technical
analysis on issues of their particular concern as well
as in response to requests by others during meetings.
As a result, the regulatory negotiation format allowed
the group to assemble a massive amount of existing
information rapidly in usable form.
Data and analysis presented by parties with a
strong interest in a particular decision are often
looked upon skeptically by the receivers--be they
decision makers, other interested parties, or
observers. Such information is often viewed as biased,
incomplete, or even inaccurate. In the regulatory
negotiation setting, negotiators, their expert
advisors, and observers were able to freely question
the party presenting the information about assumptions
of the methodology and others details of research
design. When EPA presented an econometric model to
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predict the impact of exempting small manufacturers
from the regulations, for example, skeptical
negotiators were invited to submit alternative input
values, or assumptions, to yield predictions under
varying conditions.
Error in data or analysis could be detected as
group members carefully scrutinized each item
submitted. Even if no flaws or inconsistencies were
uncovered in the cross-examination, the listeners,
experts and non-experts alike, gained a sense of the
data's validity, an understanding of the underlying
assumptions of the analysis, and general significance
of the information simply by the tenor of the
discussion.1l With the stakeholders physically
together, technical arguments were "on trial" to be
judged by the group as a whole, not only by EPA. The
credibility of data, as well as alternative analyses
and interpretations, benefitted immeasurably from the
careful, open, and interactive viewing they received in
the negotiation setting.12
The structure of the negotiation sessions also
allowed for the presentation of contradictory,
inconsistent, and complementary scientific and
technical evidence and arguments in a way that
maximized the opportunity for understanding how and why
they differ. When technical disagreements and
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uncertainties seemed too unwieldy for the mixed group
to handle, subcommittees were appointed (comprising
representatives from each major coalition) to examine
the issue more closely and to come to back to the
larger group with some kind of clarification, if not a
consensus. Because the negotiations were structured so
that all issues were introduced in the earlier sessions
and then "revisited" during the later meetings of final
deliberations and bargaining, participants also had an
opportunity to seek independent reviews and
consultations during the interim (US EPA, 1984).
Participants were encouraged to (and did) submit
additional materials for consideration by the group at
points between the two discussions. Thus, a
considerable amount of debate over the technical
aspects occurred, allowing a full airing of multiple
sides of the issues (alternative interpretation,
inconsistent data, competing theories, etc.).
Also, as in the NYAS policy dialogue, the presence
of both "expert" and "non-experts" in both legal and
regulatory aspects and combustion chemistry and physics
aspects of the wood stoves issues translated into a
language that was relatively clean of rhetoric and
deceptive manipulations. In addition to the fact that
many participants indicated that they were not shy
about revealing ignorance, the facilitator also made
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deliberate efforts to pull in the reins on any speaker
who rambled on in technical jargon or without clear
explanations. It is interesting to note that despite
conspicuous efforts to keep the discussions
comprehensible to all participants, inevitably certain
topics were overly complex for everyone to follow.
Individuals who later admitted the discussions
sometimes went over their heads, did not feel they had
been "snowed," however. Again, it was the strength of
bonding among members of coalitions that apparently
assured such players of the integrity of the
discussions."3
It seemed that the participants were satisfied at
the end of the negotiations with the scientific
validity and technical feasibility of the rules they
collaborated in writing. Participants commented that
political positions (policy options) were always
grounded in what was technically possible. The
inclusion of technically expert persons in each major
coalition meant that individuals with a particular
concern could thrash it out during a caucus and the
coalition members together could develop a proposal to
suggest to the larger negotiating group.
Although there seems to have been a considerable
amount of give-and-take during this regulatory
negotiation including a substantial amount of
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information sharing and debate over methodological
assumptions and technical ambiguities, many
participants also noted that they did not believe that
EPA had relinquished any real control over the
rulemaking procedure. A number of participants
commented that, throughout the negotiations, EPA seemed
to draw certain lines over which they would not cross,
regardless of the technical or political arguments
proffered."4 One person interviewed described the EPA
lead negotiator's attitude on particular issues as
being one of "Don't confuse me with the facts." In
other words, the respondents indicated a certain close-
mindedness on the part of the EPA in regard to hearing
scientific or technical arguments in support of
positions the agency (apparently for political reasons)
was not prepared to back. Negotiators seemed not
seriously discouraged by EPA's behavior, however, and
instead showed a sort of appreciation of the agency's
own bureaucratic and political tightrope (such as OMB's
oversight role in rulemaking, which is to assess the
economic impact of proposed rules as required under
Executive Order 12991).
Managing Science to Forge a Political Consensus
The consensus-based procedure employed in the EPA
rulemaking negotiation was a comprehensive and
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deliberate attempt by EPA to orchestrate the submission
of technical information and the expression of
political interests. While the a gency retained a
considerable degree of control over the process through
its success at unilaterally invoking limits to
discussions and, at times, refusing to entertain
further technical arguments, negotiators nonetheless
expressed a sense of participation in decision making
unusual under conventional proceedings. Discussions on
relevant scientific and technical points were
adversarial and competitive, but not destructive or
unproductive.
Three factors contributed to this treatment of
scientific and technical components of the rule's
development. First, although negotiators freely
submitted technical information and analysis in a way
that might have explicitly supported or challenged
certain policy alternatives, the discussion format of
the negotiations provided opportunities for ample
questioning and clarification. As in the NYAS policy
dialogue, participants developed a more thorough
understanding of the basis for differences in data and
analyses. The group developed a mutual appreciation of
the uncertain nature of both the scientific and
technical premises and the actual effects of various
regulatory actions. Importantly, both scientific and
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regulatory "uncertainty" were accepted as facts of life
given the current state of knowledge. Both types of
"best guess" estimates were accepted as the necessary
basis for policy rather than as an opportunity for
casting doubt on the desirability and suitability of a
proposed action.
Second, the timing of the consensus-based
intervention was significant. Since the negotiations
occurred prior to a complete formulation of the rule by
any party, participants did not begin the procedure
reacting against certain options. That is, because
more or less the entire rule was yet to be developed,
participants recognized the contingent nature of their
initial positions on various provisions of the rule.
The negotiators refrained from explicitly ranking
policy options and, rather, viewed the issues as a
package. A stricter emission standard would be more
reasonable from the manufacturers' perspective if the
compliance date was delayed to coincide with production
cycles, for example. In contrast, if manufacturers
instead had been presented with a fully formulated rule
proposed by EPA, they would have likely launched an
attack on the scientific merits or technical
feasibility of the numerical standards rather than
suggest adjustments to other portions of the rule. The
positions of both EPA and the manufacturers would have
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hardened around specific emission level figures and a
full-blown technical dispute likely would have erupted.
Finally, the negotiators in the wood stove
regulatory negotiation shared a common desire to
generate rules. Each party had their own incentive to
promulgate federal rules, and each negotiator, other
than those from EPA, had a strong interest in the group
developing the rules rather than the agency alone.
This shared goal provided the focus and impetus
necessary to move the group along and away from
protracted, contentious uses of technical
argumentation.
Because other negotiators apparently deferred to
EPA negotiators in the proceedings, an alternative
interpretation of the rulemaking effort might contend
that the agency was, in fact, imposing its view of
scientific and technical parameters on the other
participants and using this dominance to guide the
development of the rules along a relatively narrow
course. After all, EPA led off discussions with
technical reports written by their consultants
according to EPA specifications and circulated written
summaries of the meetings, in effect, etching their
version of discussions into the group's collective
memory. More alarmingly, participants commented on
EPA's refusal to consider additional evidence and
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arguments on certain issues. There are features of the
procedure that suggest that this interpretation is not
likely to be true, however.
First, while EPA may have held a privileged
position in regard to the initial presentation of
technical information, other participants (and
observers) were encouraged to present additional
information or analysis. Participants, especially
negotiators representing the manufacturers, the
independent testing laboratories, and Oregon state,
frequently did submit supplementary data and analysis
on points relevant to their areas of experience and
expertise.
Second, it might also be argued that the degree to
which the agency tended to reject evidence counter to
its own in the negotiation was no greater than its
exercise of discretion in normal rulemaking. In fact,
in the negotiation setting, failure to consider
evidence was openly visible to participants and
performed only at a potential loss of credibility for
the process. Participants could rebel en masse, if
necessary, by withdrawing from the negotiation. Since
the parties soon organized themselves into coalitions,
the displeasure of one party could result in many
parties registering complaint by walking (out). Thus,
the damage EPA would incur by openly refusing to
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consider scientific evidence that contradicted their
own would be considerably greater in a consensual
procedure than under conventional rulemaking
procedures, and the agency might be less likely to
blithely overrule or neglect contrary arguments.
In any case, all participants believed that their
interests were better expressed and met through the
negotiated rulemaking procedure in comparison to
conventional proceedings. As two persons described it,
"Each group got something" and "No one gave away
something they really wanted."15 Similarly, no
negotiator interviewed criticized the scientific or
technical soundness of the rule, although many noted
gaps in information they believe might have helped to
refine the rule. In fact, several participants
described the resulting rules as highly creative and
wise in ways that EPA would have been unable to
duplicate on its own. 16
Procedure Three: Proceeding Despite Uncertainty 7
The mediation effort in the Michigan fishing
rights dispute occurred as a result of a court order
and came at a relatively late stage in the evolution of
the dispute. Unlike the New York City case, it was
unclear how prominent technical issues would become in
the negotiations. Like the wood stoves case, however,
162
key contenders in the legal battle had access to a
sizable scientific and technical arsenal. Any
settlement was likely to hinge critically on the
perceptions of various parties with respect to major
scientific points.
Building Communication Linkages
The principal parties, the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources (DNR), representing commercial and
sports fishers, the three tribes, and the federal
Department of the Interior had been engaged in legal
battle for more than a decade. Relations among the
parties were strained. The tribes felt the DNR only
dealt with them grudgingly, treating them with
increasing respect only as a result of their victories
in the courts (Doherty). A series of attempts had been
made over the years to negotiate a settlement,
including an effort in 1982 that produced an "agreement
in principle" among the key parties. But, the
agreement had fallen apart when attorneys began
drafting and the parties began reviewing the document
(Legal Times).
When the Special Master arrived on the scene, he
was greeted with a number of parties with a long
history of distrust and difficult relations. He was
given instructions from the court to assist the parties
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to reach a negotiated settlement and to manage the
discovery process leading to a court trial, which was
set for April 22, 1985, in the event that negotiations
failed.
Special Master McGovern's strategy was built upon
three elements: (1) fostering a sense of urgency to
settle the dispute, (2) cultivating among the litigants
a desire to have a direct hand in shaping the
settlement and, (3) de-escalating the hostile use of
scientific arguments. Between the months of January to
March 1985, the Special Master met with the attorneys
representing the parties on an accelerated discovery
schedule. At least one attorney recalled billing his
client conservatively for 250 hours per month during
that period, and spending three out of four weeks
obtaining depositions from witnesses for the case.
During this interval, McGovern also called a
meeting inviting all interested parties, the
biologists, and the attorneys, to hear remarks by
participants in a similar case of litigation concerning
a state-tribal fishery dispute in Washington state.
The message of this gathering as received by many of
the listeners was that litigation was a horrendous
affair that should be avoided at all costs.
Finally, McGovern brought together in several
meetings biologists from the key parties (replicating
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almost to a person the TTWG) and a nonpartisan convener
and a fish biologist with modelling expertise from the
state-funded University of Michigan Institute for
Fisheries Research. The purpose of convening the
biologists was to develop a common model for predicting
the impact on the fishery of varied allocation
proposals.
The mediation effort culminated in an intense,
three-and-a- half day negotiation set at a college in
Sault St. Marie in late March 1985. More than 50
persons representing the litigants as well as
interested individuals representing only themselves
attended the negotiations. This sizable group was
divided into two, and a smaller core comprising
representatives of the litigants hammered out an
agreement that eventually became an order of the court.
At the end of a round-the-clock session that extended
some 36-hours, this core group of negotiators posed for
the press cameras standing behind the settlement draft
that bore their signatures.
The benefits from the meetings of the biologists,
the Special Master's focussed attempt to resolve
important technical issues, cannot be appraised in
isolation from the other activities undertaken during
the first three months of 1985. Through the discovery
process, the litigants were gaining an understanding of
165
their opponents' lines of argumentation, on both legal
and technical issues having to do with the fisheries.
Nonetheless, what was achieved by McGovern's attempt to
separate and zero in on the biology of the Great Lakes
fisheries was both a common recognition among the
litigants of the uncertainties of the biologists'
assessments and recommendations, and the concurrent
construction of his own evaluation of the resource,
which was not particularly "expert," but which had the
potential to become authoritative if the negotiators
failed to reach an agreement.
An Unstable Scientific Consensus
Despite the difficulties faced by the policy
makers, biologists working for the major parties had
been working cooperatively for several years. The
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, an international
organization founded in 1956, established lake
committees comprising representatives of all government
agencies holding resource management responsibilities
on each of the Great Lakes. In 1980, the Tripartite
Technical Working Group with biologists from the DNR,
Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S. Department of
Interior), and the tribes' Chippewa-Ottawa Fishery
Management Authority began meeting to compile data and
set annual total allowable catch (TAC) levels on
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certain fish species in portions of Lakes Huron,
Superior, and Michigan within the boundaries of the
state of Michigan. The TACs represented a published
consensus on recommended levels of fish catch by
zones.
It would seem that the TACs published in the
annual Status of the Fishery reports compiled by the
TTWG signalled the end of any adversarial or combative
uses of scientific information or advisors. The TACs
determined the "size of the pie" and biologists had
little to say about whose buckets the fish should fall
into. In fact, however, the reports represented not a
true collaborative scientific finding, but a fragile
compromise that could easily shatter if placed too
close to any discussion on resource allocation. The
matter of who should catch the fish was only thinly
disguised behind more technically drawn arguments
involved in establishing TACs.
Like many so-called "technical issues," the
determination of TACs requires a mix of explicitly
policy decisions and less conspicuous, value-bound,
professional judgments. To begin with, TAC is
dependent on a prior policy decision about the desired
condition of the population under consideration. If
population growth (as opposed to a stable or declining
population size) is desired, a rate of growth must be
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targeted. For example, the federal Fish and Wildlife
Service placed high priority on lake trout
rehabilitation. For this species, they would tend to
favor policies that would foster high population growth
rates, such as a low TAC level, on the presumption that
lower catch levels will reduce overall mortality rates
and increase the probability that the lake trout
population will reproduce. On the other hand, a group
less concerned about lake trout rejuvenation might
favor a much higher TAC, since their concern is short-
term gains associated with catching fish.
Selecting a targeted growth rate for specific fish
populations is clearly a decision guided by values,
interests, and policy objectives. It is only the first
of a series of negotiated points the TTWG members faced
along the path to determining TACs, however. The next
tier of issues concerned assumptions about variables
used to establish TACs given a particular growth rate
target. These variables include such factors as
current population size, population age structure,
individual growth rates, and mortality rates. On these
points, value-bound, professional judgment comes into
play in a more subtle way. Although some of the
factors necessary for determining TAC are less
controversial than others, all are merely estimates,
based on extrapolations from data from sample studies,
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studies of comparable populations, or multi-purpose
record keeping.
The link between these assumptions and the
ultimate TAC determination is quickly apparent. For
example, as mentioned earlier, TAC is dependent on
overall mortality rates. Mortality is defined as two
components, fish catch level and natural mortality.
Fish catch levels are recorded by the Fish and Wildlife
Service based on catch reports submitted by licensed
fishers. The natural mortality factor is less easily
assessed. By convention, biologists have relied on the
observed mortality rates of pristine populations.
The determination of both components of fish
mortality became the subject of debate among biologists
whose "professional judgments" clearly reflected
political values and interest considerations. The
Michigan DNR staff biologists took issue with the fish
catch level component in establishing the mortality
rate of lake trout. While fishermen for centuries have
been chided for telling "fish stories," DNR policy
makers accused tribal fishers of seriously
underreporting their incidental lake trout catches.
The DNR biologists accordingly argued that the FWS
figures should be inflated when determining TACs.
Increasing the catch level component of the
mortality rate used to determine TACs served an obvious
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political purpose. In the lake trout population, the
Michigan DNR argued that the incidental lake trout
caught by gill nets increased overall mortality to
levels that inhibited lake trout reproduction. The DNR
argued that restricting gill nets would reduce lake
trout mortality and foster rejuvenation, without
requiring a lowering of TAC levels that would diminish
recreational fishing opportunities. Since only tribal
fishers use gill nets, and some tribal fishers use gill
nets exclusively, this interpretation of the cause of
high mortality among lake trout populations has obvious
implications for the allocation contest.
The natural mortality rate was open for debate as
well. In this case, the tribes' biologists argued that
the proportion of overall mortality attributed to
natural mortality was underestimated. They argued that
the use of mortality rates of pristine populations was
inappropriate to estimate natural mortality of
populations in environments that have undergone
significant change, such as increased chemical
pollution. The political motive for this line of
argumentation is also fairly obvious: tribal
biologists were attempting to defend the use of gill
nets by shifting some of the onus of high mortality off
the incidental catch component.
Given the intensity of the allocation dispute, it
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is unlikely that the biologists were completely unaware
of the distributional implications of setting high or
low TACs for specific species in particular zones.
Undoubtedly, even while discussing the issues in a
professional manner, they were honing arguments to edge
TACs upward in fishing areas favored by their
respective sponsors. Nonetheless, despite such
politically motivated manipulations, it seemed that as
long as the issue of who is catching the fish was kept
out of the discussion, the biologists were able to
agree on discrete figures for the variables used to
determine TACs.
Appropriating Science
Given the fragility of the apparent consensus, how
did Special Master McGovern deal with the technical
aspects of the dispute? The structure of the
alternative dispute resolution effort put in place by
Special Master McGovern differed distinctively from the
previous two cases in that the fishery biologists were
consciously and deliberately convened at different
times and places from the attorneys or the principals.
McGovern's reasoning for this was simple. First,
although McGovern himself did not mention this,
according to one participant, Judge Enslen believed
that the biologists could talk to one another, whereas
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relations among the principals were overly strained.
It is likely that Judge Enslen communicated his hunch
to McGovern, but whether he did or not, McGovern could
easily see that the biologists had been cooperating for
several years on the TTWG. He thus wanted to take
advantage and not jeopardize that communication link.
According to McGovern, he also ascertained through
conversations with individual biologists that the
biologists qua biologists were disagreeing for two
reasons. First, once there was any significant
uncertainty in the analysis, individuals would go off
in different directions with their own estimates of the
appropriate figure to assume. Secondly, and not
unrelated to the first issue, the policy makers who
hired them were pushing certain policies and looking to
the biologists to provide supportive scientific
rationales. Distancing the biologists from their
employers was therefore critical in McGovern's opinion.
He could not control, of course, communications that
occurred outside of these meetings.
Although the hostilities among the principals were
said to have been mirrored by the biologists to some
degree, McGovern hoped that he could succeed at toning
down the adversarialism and political posturing by the
biologists if they met without their advisees. During
the series of meetings that occurred over about a
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three-month period, McGovern and his assisting
technical facilitator, Francine Rabinowitz, an urban
planning professor and member of an Los Angeles law
firm, continually tried to guide the group to a
consensus on technical issues based on their common
commitment to the fisheries as an ecological resource
and their standards of professionalism. Not
insignificantly, meetings and field trips were
scheduled to encourage the group to lunch, dine, and
travel together. Opportunities to emphasize areas of
agreement were fully exploited, as well as thoughtfully
worded questions intended to "shame the biologists into
recognizing their areas of agreement." "
McGovern attempted to deal with the first issue,
the disagreement among the biologists in estimating
values for various variables, by encouraging the
biologists from the three major parties to collaborate
on building a computer-based population model of the
fisheries of the Great Lakes. His strategy was to help
the biologists identify all the factors they could most
easily agree on, insert these figures into a mutually
acceptable model, and leave the variables of greatest
uncertainty (and hence the most difficult to reach
agreement on) for the policy makers to deal with.
Ultimately, he hoped the model could be used "hands on"
by the parties during negotiation to try out different
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allocation proposals to see who would get how much of
what kind of fish in which part of the lake. For
example, negotiators would be able to compare a
proposal for a straight 50 percent split of all fish
stock to one based on zone assignments, or contrast two
or more different zonal apportionment schemes.
The group failed to develop the model McGovern had
envisioned. According to McGovern, the failure was due
to two major deficiencies: a lack of resources and
skepticism about models generally. His second insight
was perhaps not far off the mark. At least one
biologist representing a key player confided that he
would never have recommended reliance on the model to
his advisees because he disagreed with many of the
model's assumptions.
Although the model fell short of McGovern's
original expectations for it, the exercise served other
important purposes. First, the exercise helped the
biologists to see more clearly the points of strongest
agreement and disagreement and their relative
importance. For example, the degree to which gill nets
increased fish mortality was a point that seemed to be
beyond settlement. Suspecting the difficulty it
presented and the emotional overtones of the debate,
since gill nets were used exclusively by the tribal
fishers, Rabinowitz encouraged the group to leave the
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issue unresolved. The model that was subsequently
constructed was run with "high", "moderate", and "low"
values for the gill net mortality variable. Ultimately
the model proved insensitive to these different levels.
Thus, a point that might have become a lightning rod
for reopening old wounds among the biologists was
adeptly circumvented.
Perhaps more importantly than creating among the
biologists a common frame of reference, the
collaboration of the biologists helped to develop a
technical base of reference for the Special Master.
Given the Special Master's privileged position before
the court, the biologists would be quick to recognize
the influence that the collaborative product might
eventually hold. They would thus be encouraged to
fight strongly for so-called technical judgments
embedded in the model that have clear implications for
their principals. Because the model was correlated
with zones, one might suspect that biologists would
fight especially hard to "win" arguments that would set
technical parameters in zones important to their
principals. Although the modelling effort did not
bring the biologists closer to agreement on technical
and scientific issues, it created an alternative
"authority," that, one might argue, was a sort of
composite. The model tactically served to move the
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parties closer to agreement not by dissolving
disagreement among the scientists, but by creating an
alternative "authority" that would legitimate the
Special Master's allocation recommendation to the
court, should the parties fail to settle.
Restructuring the Use of Science
The consensus-based methods utilized in these
three cases differed from one another in many respects.
The degree of interaction between experts and non-
experts, the duration of the consensus-based procedure,
and the nature and extent of the facilitator's
intervention are just three of many ways in which
techniques differed. Nonetheless, the unifying theme
for distinguishing these methods remains unmistakable.
These procedures aimed to clarify, resolve, or avoid
disputes on key scientific and technical aspects of a
decision, while allowing for the expression of
political conflict to become more salient. Scientific
knowledge and expertise were used to inform decisions,
but without lengthy debates that result from a greater
focus on science. As such, these methods represent
substantial advances over conventional approaches
toward integrating scientific information and
disagreement into politically stable decisions.
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Addressing Criticisms of Conventional Methods
In contrast to the methods reviewed in Chapter 2,
these consensus-based methods assumed that differing
scientific and technical opinions and supporting
evidence can be legitimate, given the existing state of
knowledge. That is, rather than to dismiss all
arguments but one, or attempt to gloss over differences
in scientific or technical judgments, the decision
makers and stakeholders attempted to ascertain the
degree of confidence that could be placed in various
scientific or technical arguments. In the New York
City policy dialogue, this was achieved through intense
periods of questions and answers in the presence of a
formidable line of individuals highly trained in
relevant areas of expertise. In the wood stoves
regulatory negotiation, the basis of divergent views
was revealed by encouraging those with competing views
to explain their interpretations or present alternative
analysis. The flexible format and the longer time
frame in this case allowed parties to seek and generate
additional information and analysis between sessions to
enrich the common knowledge base for all discussants.
Importantly in these two cases, the disclosure of
the basis of scientific disagreement was performed
openly in the presence of contending stakeholders as
well as before representatives of the decision makers.
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Although expert advisors hired by a particular party
might share value biases that would tend to produce
scientific conclusions that advantage their sponsors,
the "mixed" audience format apparently operates to
filter out these biases to some degree, as individuals
struggle to maintain a standard of "professionalism"
among their peers as well as credibility among their
own clients. Thus, although stakeholders' expert
advisors may concentrate on critiquing data or analysis
presented by contending groups, the end result tends to
be less a stand-off than a joint recognition of the
limits of scientific certainty.
Largely because of similar concerns about
professional standards and because consensual methods
appear to generate a stronger concern about clearing
the air of misdirected information among all parties,
scientific disagreements that are founded in illusion
rather than substance were easily decloaked.
"Miscommunication" tactics, such as using the same term
to describe different phenomena as in the use of "worst
case scenario," were readily identified by
stakeholders, expert advisors, decision maker
representatives, or the facilitator.
The recognition of the legitimacy of contending
scientific or technical arguments and the understanding
that differences result from differing value judgments,
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force decision makers and stakeholders alike to
acknowledge the inevitable intrusion of political
influences into scientific disputes. Once it became
clear through the policy dialogue that the CBNS risk
assessments reflected, more than anything else, a far
more conservative orientation toward risk, ignoring
conservative attitudes could be seen as a political
action. At that point, the decision makers could chose
to lose political goodwill from a segment of the
population or attempt to address their concerns. But,
they no longer had the choice to ignore entirely the
political interests behind the movement to stop the
Brooklyn Navy Yard plant.
Recognizing the political nature of scientific
disputes also, in a sense, appears to encourage
participants to state their concerns more explicitly.
A general increase in the understanding of competing
and conflicting interests enriches the discussion.
Groups who initially supported competing decision
alternatives might discover that their interests are
different, but not conflicting. In the wood stoves
case, for example, the traditional rivals were the
clean air advocates and the affected industry. Clean
air advocates wanted a numerical standard that would
result in improved air quality. The wood stove
manufacturers, on the other hand, were most concerned
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about a compliance date that could be accommodated
within existing production schedules. As long as the
standard was attainable with available technology, any
standard requiring modifications in stove design would
require a minimum amount of time to redesign and retool
production lines. Thus, although the interests of the
clean air advocates and the industry were divergent,
they were less in conflict than appeared at first
sight. Without a climate that encourages the
discussion of political interests on this level,
decisions that attempt to integrate such concerns are
far less probable.
Finally, perhaps one of the more salient changes
evident from these examples of consensus-based methods
is the consistent function assigned to scientists and
technical experts. Whereas the degree of discretionary
decision making authority implicitly conferred onto
scientists is unclear in conventional processes that
place undue weight on scientific and technical factors,
the role of scientists is less ambiguous when
scientific and technical components are treated as
guides and aids, not determinants. Consensus-based
methods that are aimed at obtaining approval from all
participants appear simultaneously to bring all
individuals up to a common plane of technical
competency. When experts are aware that they must
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explain the logic of their arguments rather than simply
ride on their reputations to win concurrence, they too
make more serious efforts to educate the stakeholders.
The division between experts and non-experts narrows.
A New Role for Science?
In all three cases examined, science had been, or
potentially would have been, utilized strictly to
support or discredit one policy alternative. Prior to
the policy dialogue, the New York City dispute was a
classic case of two polar opposite policy options
standing head-to-head behind inconsistent technical
analyses. Although the basis for the divergences could
be gleaned from a careful reading of the competing
reports, the facilitated policy dialogue opened
communication between reputable technical specialists
and members of the concerned public, especially staff
from the decision making Board of Estimate offices, and
allowed an opportunity for the experts to elaborate on
the reasons why ambiguities exist. In the course of
their comments, they made clear that much of the cause
of the uncertainty was inherent in the scientific
enterprise, and was not something that could be
corrected or eliminated through additional
investigation or further testing, at least not within a
reasonable amount of time. Thus, the discussions ended
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any possibility of the decision makers deferring a
decision for further study or seeking authoritative
guidance from scientists. It became clear that the
risk assessments represented little more than varying
orientations toward risk. The decision "to build" or
"not to build," similarly reflects differences in a
willingness to accept (or impose) a health risk.
A somewhat different dynamic prevailed in the wood
stoves regulatory negotiation. Parties entered the
negotiations with a fairly strong sense of the relative
scarcity of pertinent scientific data and information.
The "win-win" euphoria that pervades many popular
writings and workshops on negotiation did not lull
stakeholders into assuming that technical arguments did
not matter, however. Stakeholders with access to
technical studies went fully equipped and prepared to
state their arguments in a manner most flattering to
their interests. Nonetheless, unless their evidence
was incontrovertible, the cross-examination by
adversaries reduced many studies to "good guesses"
rather than definitive statements. As such, the fire
power of their technical support systems was
constrained and stakeholders acceded to bargaining over
ranges (of estimates for technical factors)'and across
issues.
Finally, in the Michigan fishing case, the use of
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science was transformed in two, interesting and
distinct ways. First, debate over scientific issues
concerning the biology of the Great Lakes fishery was
almost entirely absent from the final negotiations.
Biologists were not present in the negotiations, except
as consultants to be conferred with during caucusing.
Negotiating representatives of the major stakeholders
simply checked back with their biologists to assess the
catch implications of different allocation proposals.
Apparently, the estimations of catches in different
zones were not sufficiently divergent to evoke debate.
What is meant by "sufficiently divergent?" This
leads to the second point. The stakeholders were
negotiating under intense pressure to settle. The
fishing dispute had been ongoing for years.
Communities were reeling under the animosity between
tribal fishers and non-tribal fishers, with outbreaks
of physical violence, verbal abuse, and overtly racist
media commentaries. A court trial date was
approaching. Each party was aware of serious defects
in their legal arguments. The outcome of a trial was
thus uncertain. Most importantly, the court's
appointment of a special master meant that the court
most likely would rule in accordance with Special
Master McGovern's settlement recommendation.
The role that science came to play in the
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settlement was secondary compared to what might have
occurred in the courtroom. It was not used as a weapon
by the stakeholders. If a weapon in any sense, it was
one in hands of Special Master McGovern who through the
mediation process had gained sufficient understanding
of the technical issues to provide Judge Enslen with a
credible technical base for an allocation decision.
If science under conventional decision making is
deployed as a weapon to persuade decision makers or the
polity to accept a given decision alternative, then
altering the role of science through consensual
approaches will have implications for the ability of
different groups to exert influence over public
decisions. In the following chapter, I consider how
the distribution of political power is affected by the
use of supplementary, consensus-based methods in
decisions presumed to be informed by scientific and
technical information and expertise.
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Notes
1. Susskind and Cruikshank add other important elements of
a "consensus-based" method, which will be discussed in later
analyses. They write:
A consensual approach is achieved when everyone
agrees to live with a particular formulation of a
problem and its solution because everyone knows
the settlement is the best available under the
circumstances, and because it attends to each
party's most important concerns (Susskind and
Cruikshank: 77).
2. Ozawa and Susskind (1985) call disputes that involve
scientific analysis "science-intensive." Brooks (1984)
referred to public policy disagreements in which technical
issues become significant as "technically intensive
disputes". For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms
are interchangeable.
3. These writers contribute to what is called the
"constructivist" view of science. The constructivist view
looks toward the external culture that furnishes
"interpretive resources" that shape scientific knowledge for
political purposes. For further elaboration, see Ditta
Bartels, "Commentary: It's Good Enough for Science, but Is
It Good Enough for Social Action?" Science, Technology, and
Human Values, 10(4): 69-74, 1985.
4. "Efficiency" is methodologically very difficult to
measure. Bingham has noted that the identification of sets
of comparable cases that have been settled either through
consensual or conventional processes is nearly impossible.
Calculating the costs incurred through either process
encounters the same methodological difficulty of cost-
benefit analysis.
5. I will use the term "intervenor" to mean the range of
roles called "convener," "facilitator," or "mediator" in the
negotiation literature.
6. For a more detailed discussion, see Ozawa and Susskind.
7. This phrase was used by Walter Shaub to describe
the events during the policy dialogue (New York Academy
of Sciences, 1984b).
8. See, for example, Commoner's The Closing Circle.
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9. This was a reason given by Dr. Commoner during a
personal interview in October 1986, at the Center for
the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College,
Flushing, New York.
10. Unless otherwise noted, the following description
of the Wood Burning Stoves regulatory negotiation is
based on interviews listed in Appendix 1.
11. Based on comments made by David Doniger during a
telephone interview, May 1987.
12. Based on comments by R.D. Gros Jean during
telephone interview, May 1987.
13. Based on comments by John Charles during
telephone interview, May 1987.
14. William Becker, John Canaday, Donnis Corn, and
David Doniger were among the participants who made
comments along this vein during telephone interviews,
May and June 1987.
15. Statements were given by David Doniger and David
Swankin during interviews, May 1987.
16. Based on comments made by William Becker, John
King, and Harold Garabedian during telephone
interviews, May and June 1987.
17. The description of the Michigan fishing case is
drawn largely from interviews listed in Appendix 1.
18. TACs are as much policy- as science-based,
because their determination is dependent on a targeted
level of population growth. In other words, a
mortality rate of 60% or 70% may both protect a given
population, but the lower rate will be more likely to
result in a higher rate of reproduction and hence
population rejuvenation. Since TAC is simply the catch
level correlated with given mortality rates, a TAC
determination is predicated on agreement on a targeted
rehabilitation rate. Biologists favoring rejuvenation
over human-oriented concerns, such as short-term
economic stability, for example, may support an
assumption of higher rehabilitation targets'and lower
catch levels. Conversely, DNR biologists familiar with
the state's commitment to sports fishing may tend to
endorse slower (though steady) population growth rates
for popular sports species, such as lake trout in
tourism-dependent locales.
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19. Based on telephone interview with Francine
Rabinowitz, July 1987.
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Chapter Four
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES, SCIENCE, AND POWER
Introduction
Consensus-based procedures alter the role of science
and technical expertise in decision making. Do the
transformations of the roles of science depicted in the
previous chapter affect the distribution of political power
in decision making? If so, how? How far do the ripplings
of change travel? Is the redistribution of power restricted
only to groups involved in the technical debate? Are groups
that do not participate in the consensus-based procedure
affected?
To examine the relationships among consensus-based
procedures, science, and power, first consider briefly what
constitutes "power" in public decision making and how
science is variously used in different phases of the
decision making process.
A Definition of "Power"
Public decisions often are appropriately contentious.
Public decisions invariably reallocate material and other
societal resources, symbolically, if not actually. They set
the rules for future distributions. The Michigan fishing
case concerned both the allocation of actual fish to various
groups and the recognition of the rights of each group to
the fishery resource. The high stakes of public decisions
can evoke considerable debate among various segments of the
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polity for numerous reasons.
The responsibility for public decisions rests on the
shoulders of government. Elected officials, administrative
bodies, and the judiciary are vested with formal decision
making authority. The authority to make a decision is not
equivalent to power in decision making, however. A public
decision is the product of a battle among contending actors
to shape the issue (problem) the decision maker faces, as
well as the alternative (solution) he chooses. Thus, while
official decision makers hold the responsibility and
authority, other groups contend for decision making power.
"Power" in public decision making can be conceptualized
broadly as the ability to affect a decision maker's choice.
The decision maker's choice is affected by a number of
factors, including which issues are put before her for
action (agenda setting), how the issue is formulated
(problem formulation), what alternatives are presented for
consideration (identifying alternatives), and the decision
choice itself. Other factors that affect the decision
maker's choice include the political credibility of various
decision alternatives, personalities associated with various
policy positions, the relative political importance of
appeasing groups involved in the debate, institutional
linkages to various policy alternatives, and the decision
maker's own set of values. One way to think about these two
sets of factors is to consider the first set as ways of
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shaping the situation, context, and perception of the issue
itself and the second set as factors external to the issue
that sway the individual decision maker toward one
alternative over others within a given set of choices. Two
writers have made the following distinction between these
two sets of factors:
Power is the capacity of actors (person, groups or
institutions) to fix or to change (completely or
partly) a set of action or choice alternatives for
other actors.
Influence is the capacity of actors to determine
partly the actions or choices of other actors
within the set of action or choice alternatives
available to those actors (R. J. Kokken and F.N.
Stokman: 46).
In this inquiry, I will make no distinction between Kokken
and Stokman's "influence" and "power," but simply consider
them different moments for exercising "political power" in
public decision making.
This conceptualization of political power in decision
making helps to clarify the usefulness of science as a means
for affecting public decisions. Science is used to define
the reality in which "problems" exist, to define the
"problem" itself and its solutions, and to provide the
legitimacy and credibility for decision choices.
In the section below, I examine more closely the use of
science in four general stages of decision making: agenda-
setting, problem formulation, identification of
alternatives, and the decision choice. These stages do not
represent rigidly separate and discrete steps in decision
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making. In fact, conceptually, they sometimes overlap.
Rather, these stages are intended simply to provide an
analytical structure for thinking about the use of science
in different phases of the evolution of a public decision.
These four stages are also not meant to comprehensively
represent public decision making. Indeed, public decisions
can be thought of as originating in the earliest stirrings
of controversy and extending beyond the decision choice
stage, since implementation and (programmatic) evaluation
can change the ultimate effect of the decision on the actual
allocations of resources.
Science in Four Stages of Decision Making
The Use of Science in Agenda-Setting
The first step in decision making is to place issues on
the political "agenda." Borrowing from Cobb and Elder,
there are two types of political agendas. The more
abstract, more general, and broader "systemic agenda" refers
to a set of political controversies that are viewed as
"legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity"
(Cobb and Elder: 14). Ensuring a clean and healthy
environment is an example of an issue that has been placed
on the systemic agenda in the United States. Environmental
quality is not yet on the systemic agenda of many third
world countries. As a result, in the U.S. considerable
legislation is directed toward controlling activities deemed
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environmentally offensive, whereas the idea of inhibiting
business behavior for the sake of environmental quality in
some third world countries is still considered subversive to
a healthy economy.
The second type of political agenda is the
"institutional agenda." The institutional agenda is a set
of "concrete, specific items scheduled for active and
serious consideration of a particular institutional
decision-making body" (Cobb and Elder: 14). A lawsuit, as
in the Great Lakes fishing case, is an example of an issue
on the latter type of agenda. In contrast to issues on the
more general systemic agenda, items on an institutional
agenda are usually tailored for a particular decision making
forum.
An issue is placed on either type of public agenda when
advocates for action succeed in directing sufficient public
attention to the issue to pressure elected officials to
respond. One significant reason for getting issues on the
public agenda is obvious: issues that are not considered
will not be directly addressed. Public decision making
resources will not be invested in issues that do not reach
the public agenda.
There are also more subtle consequences.
The social and political significance of agenda-
building arises in part from the fact that it
serves to structure subsequent policy choices.
However, the stakes involved do not reside solely
in the prospects of future policies. There are
more immediate payoffs involved. These take the
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form of social recognition and the validation of
certain values, interests, and beliefs to the
exclusion of others (Cobb and Elder: 171).
Agenda-setting hence not only helps to direct the future
course of public actions, it also conditions the polity into
accepting certain types of actions as assigned appropriately
to the public domain.
Scientific arguments play important parts in setting
the two types of agendas. The New York City case presents a
particularly revealing illustration of how science can be
used in attempts to place issues on both types of agendas.
The Department of Sanitation relied on technical
assessments and expertise to place the comprehensive waste
disposal plan and the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator
proposal before the Board of Estimate. The dire predictions
made by DOS on diminishing disposal capacity and increasing
disposal needs were based on technical analyses performed by
DOS staff. The predictions were designed to create a sense
of urgency around the City's solid waste disposal situation
in order to attract public concern and incite the BOE to act
favorably.
One group opposing the DOS plans similarly used
technical analysis to support their challenge. They
focussed their attack on a technical assessment of the
adverse health impact of the proposed technology on the
City's residents. While the immediate objective was to
affect the BOE's action on the proposals, this line of
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argumentation also served to arouse public concern about the
desirability of dioxin-emitting (or health-threatening)
technology in general. In this sense, technical
argumentation may be seen as serving an attempt to bring the
question of "safe" technology onto the systemic agenda.
The wood stoves case presents another example of the
use of scientific information to place an issue on the
public (institutional) agenda. In this case, a legal suit
by the Natural Resources Defense Council provided the
political impetus for EPA to initiate federal rulemaking.
In order to pressure EPA to act (and to garner support from
the court), however, the NRDC cited studies indicating that
residential wood stoves produced nearly half of total
nationwide polycyclic organic matter (POM) and identifying
possible adverse health effects of POMs.
Science and Problem Formulation
Issues that arrive on the public agenda do not develop
spontaneously. Just as their placement on the agenda is
usually the product of groups advocating action, so is the
particular form in which they are constructed the result of
conscious and deliberate efforts by stakeholding groups.
From a potentially unlimited assortment of facts about a
condition or situation, a specific set is slected and
interpreted to identify, describe, and explain a "problem"
(Wildavsky). The selection of some facts and the neglect of
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others is usually carefully undertaken with a particular
objective in mind.
The formulation of a problem can be manicured to serve
political purposes in several ways. First, the formulation
of a problem can be undertaken with an explicit aim to
generate sympathy and support from those not directly
involved in policy making. The New York case provides an
example of the politically strategic value of problem
formulation and the use of scientific argument. While
residents adjacent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard site were
opposed to the waste-to-energy plant for a number of reasons
including a sense of being unfairly subjected to a noxious
land use, their alliance with scientists from the Center for
the Biology of Natural Systems presented a new way of
framing the "problem." Rather than simply a locally
unwanted facility, the waste-to-energy plant was transformed
into a cancer-causing health threat to the entire community.
Thus, instead of standing alone in their opposition to the
plant, the analysis of risk posed by dioxin emissions
enabled Williamsburg residents to generate support from the
wider public on the basis of health and environmental
concerns, in part because it was the first move in a
comprehensive plan which would pose similar threats
elsewhere in the City.
On the other hand, initially the DOS astutely attempted
to steer clear of the health issue as much as possible. The
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agency's formulation of the waste disposal issue was built
around the need for technically feasible and efficient solid
waste disposal, not on the need for environmentally benign
technologies.
By keeping the "problem" focussed narrowly, the DOS was
also trying to assert what Gusfield has called its
"ownership" of the problem. Gusfield has packaged a set of
concepts under the term, "ownership." He contends that
"ownership" is attributed to or claimed by certain groups on
the basis of their reputation of expertise in relevant
fields. He states that
At any time in a historical period there is a
recognition that specific public issues are the
legitimate province of specific persons, roles,
and offices that can command public attention,
trust, and influence. They have credibility while
others who attempt to capture public attention do
not. Owners can make claims and assertions. .
They possess authority in the field (Gusfield: 8).
"Disownership" of a public policy issue, once it has been
defined as a "problem" in a particular form, is also a
strategic ploy. Gusfield cites the reluctance of the
alcohol beverage industry to become involved in activities
during the temperance movement as one example. Even today,
he notes, the industry's slogan, "The fault is in the man,
not the bottle," as a rejection of ownership of the alcohol
problem. Similarly, the tobacco industry attempted to
"disown" the smoking problem by trying to refute the claims
that tobacco smoking causes disease and instead framing the
issues in terms of private choice.
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Gusfield also discusses two additional components of
problem formulation: notions of causal responsibility and
political responsibility. He writes that "causal
responsibility--is a matter of belief or cognition, an
assertion about the sequence that factually accounts for the
existence of the problem" (p. 11). Political
responsibility, by contrast, affixes an obligation for
remedial action. For example, in the wood stoves case, the
political responsibility for reducing particulate emissions
from residential wood heating devices was set on the
shoulders of government, namely EPA (as a result of the
Clean Air Act). Causal responsibility was assigned to the
stove manufacturers. Part of the justification for pursuing
this approach to improving air quality was a belief,
substantiated by technical data, that many wood stoves are
designed so that they emit higher levels of pollutants than
desired and, perhaps, than necessary. If scientific
arguments could have been constructed to convince regulators
and the public that emission levels are a direct result of
wood selection (age, type, degree of wetness, etc.) and
stacking rather than stove design, the regulatory approach
might have been redirected.
Finally, the formulation of problems is critical
because the construction of a problem contains implications
for their solutions. As long as the Department of
Sanitation could retain a formulation of the Brooklyn Navy
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Yard dispute as a question of how to dispose of municipal
solid wastes, they not only maintained a position of
expertise but also constrained the consideration of
solutions to waste disposal methods, as opposed to waste
reduction approaches. In the Michigan fishing case, the
disputants similarly struggled to promote their own
formulation of the fishing "problem." To the Department of
Natural Resources, the problem was tribal fishers using
large mesh gill nets in lake trout habitats popular among
sports fishers. The DNR tried to use assessment data and
catch records to show that the tribal fishers' gill nets
were causing high mortality among lake trout, which, in
turn, was both retarding rejuvenation of the population and
reducing the pleasure of recreational fishers. If they
succeeded in portraying the problem this way to the court,
the court would have been led to consider elimination or
severe restrictions on the use of gill net technology as a
reasonable approach to solving at least part of the
"problem" concerning the fishery.
Identifying Alternatives
As mentioned earlier, the identification of alternative
solutions is largely dictated by the formulation of the
"problem" (Gusfield). The way one poses a question often
implies the appropriate answer, or set of answers. Posed as
a "solid waste disposal problem," for example, the array of
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alternative actions available to the City of New York
include remedies, such as building a new "waste disposal"
facility, encouraging recycling fforts, etc. The
presumption that solid wastes are! a "given" tends to
foreclose policy actions that mi:jht focus instead on
discouraging the creation of "wastes," such as regulation to
limit non-reusable packaging materials, for example.
Within the bounds set by the formulation of the
"problem," however, usually a number of alternative actions
are possible. The National Environmental Policy Act
requires a consideration of alternative actions in
environmental impact statements for projects proposed to
meet specific objectives. Alternatives not identified, like
issues not put on the public agenda, cannot be intentionally
acted upon. The identification of alternatives is thus a
highly political act, since it predetermines what decision
outcomes are possible.
In public decisions on issues that concern the
environment, health, and new technologies, scientific and
technical expertise is often necessary for successfully
identifying alternatives beyond the "no action" category. A
basic concern of decision makers is that alternatives be
technically feasible. The technical feasibility of reducing
dioxin emissions was of paramount importance in the New York
City case. If emissions could not be controlled, then the
decision alternatives would be limited to constructing the
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Brooklyn Navy Yard facility and accepting additional cancer
risks approximated on the basis of the higher recorded
emission levels from existing facilities, or abandoning the
project altogether. On the other hand, if technical experts
could argue (as they did) that emission reductions are
possible by the installation of air pollution control
technologies, then potentially a range of new decision
alternatives would be identified--alternatives in technology
as well as increments of cancer risks.
The Decision Choice
Among the array of problem formulations and
corresponding alternative actions, for every issue on the
institutional agenda the decision maker will make one
choice. That choice is the outcome of the politics of the
entire decision making process. Nonetheless, at a certain
point in every decision making process that culminates in a
decision, the articulated choices will be limited. At this
point, different groups will attempt to persuade the
decision maker to select Alternative "A" rather than
Alternative "B," or "B" rather than "C."
The ways in which influence at this level is sought are
multiple and complex. Often parties attempt to influence
the decision maker's behavior by linking unrelated
contemporary issues--political horsetrading. This approach
is not insignificant. In the New York City case, a
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disgruntled opponent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard project
contended that certain BOE members voted to approve the
project because they needed the endorsement of Mayor Koch,
who vocally supported the proposal.' Similarly, one
historian has suggested that the federal government's
commitment to resolving the fishing dispute in the Great
Lakes stemmed from President Reagan's 1980 presidential
campaign promise to alleviate the "problem" of tribal
fishers entering areas popular among sports fishers
(Doherty).
Nonetheless, while scientific arguments may not be
decisive factors, they often make decisions politically more
attractive for decision makers who want to appease competing
groups. Decision makers are strongly motivated to avoid
decisions that are likely to offend a valued political
constituency. Evidence that demonstrates the scientific
reasonableness of a particular alternative may provide just
the justification needed by a decision maker to defend that
choice to his constituents. Science is thus put to work by
policy advocates to persuade the decision maker of the
political wisdom of opting for one alternative over another.
The wood stoves case provides another example. Wood
stoves that incorporate a catalyst device are popularly
believed to burn more "cleanly," (i.e., emit fewer
particulates), and more efficiently than stoves not equipped
with catalysts. Given the favorable reputation of catalyst
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stoves, and in the absence of contrary data, EPA might have
opened itself to considerable criticism had it proposed wood
stove regulations that did not single out catalyst-equipped
stoves as "best demonstrated technology" (BDT).
There are several political reasons why EPA might have
wanted to avoid regulations that restricted BDT to catalyst
stove designs, however. Foremost, manufacturers of non-
catalyst designs would have been severely disadvantaged vis-
a-vis catalyst design stove manufacturers. Especially under
a pro-business Administration, EPA probably would not want
the regulations to seriously disrupt the industry in such a
way. In addition, non-catalyst stove design manufacturers
also argued that commitment to a single technology would
eliminate an entire branch of innovation and would impair
the development of more effective technology in the long
run. Advocates of consumer rights and alternative energy
technologies were also critical of a policy that would
eliminate consumer choice or reduce intra-industry
competition, that might eventually result in retail price
increases.
Fortunately for EPA, a study in-progress reported data
that appeared to confirm earlier hints that catalyst devices
are often improperly used by owners, (resulting in higher
emissions), and degrade through use over time. The
availability of even only preliminary data was enough to
discourage catalyst manufacturers, the manufacturers of
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catalyst-equipped wood stoves, and clean air advocates from
lobbying against the "two-tracked" regulatory approach EPA
ultimately proposed. Scientific data was hence instrumental
in persuading EPA (and other negotiators) that a two-tracked
regulatory approach was scientifically defensible and,
hence, politically feasible.
The broad analytic framework laid out in the preceding
section highlights the moments in public decision making
when power can be exerted to affect a decision and how
scientific arguments can be manipulated toward this end. I
turn now to an examination of how scientific information and
argument in the three consensus-based procedures described
in the last chapter affected the possibilities for
influencing decision making and for whom.
Effects on the Distribution of Power
Empowerment through Opportunity
In the New York City dispute over the proposal to
construct a waste-to-energy MSW incinerator, the debate
polarized around highly visible and vocal disagreement on
the health risk posed by the project. The technical
discourse focussed on the evaluation of the risk: both the
estimate of its magnitude and its acceptability. The
facilitated policy dialogue helped to clarify to
representatives of stakeholding groups and the decision
makers the basis for the disparate risk assessments as well
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as the limits of scientific knowledge concerning the
creation and destruction of cancer-causing dioxins in MSW
incinerators. How did this clarification of scientific
disagreement potentially and actually alter the decision
making process? Was the distribution of political power in
this case significantly affected?
The agenda appears to have remained more or less as the
DOS first framed the question to the BOE. That is, the
issue considered by the BOE even after the policy dialogue
was whether or not to approve the comprehensive waste
disposal plan, which relied on waste-to-energy incineration,
and the Brooklyn Navy Yard plant in particular. It appears,
however, that clarifying the scientific disagreement
diminished the preoccupation with disputed scientific
elements and created windows of opportunity for the
expression of additional viewpoints, which resulted in a
somewhat modified formulation of the "problem" and
additional decision alternatives.
Generally, this case suggests that groups unable to
express their political interests through an agenda framed
by a highly visible technical debate gain an opportunity to
be heard by the decision makers when the technical debate
fades out of the foreground. - This is not to say that groups
are suddenly magically empowered to draw the attention of
the decision makers. Diminishing one avenue of influence
simply means that the use of other tactics ascends. Thus,
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whether or not groups take advantage of the opportunity
depends on their abilities to exploit other channels of
influence. Nonetheless, clarifying the scientific
disagreement that polarizes discussions around particular
decision alternatives likely creates greater receptivity of
the decision makers to other viewpoints and provides an
opening that otherwise might not exist for less dominant,
stakeholding groups.
In this case, the failure of scientists to invalidate
the higher risk assessment potentially enlarged the list of
decision alternatives considered by the decision makers and
others. One might argue that without a clear field for
approving the BNY facility, the decision makers grew more
attentive to advocates of other solid waste disposal
methods. Although proponents of alternatives, such as
recycling and source reduction, were expressing their views
publicly through the newspapers and, one may presume,
privately with the decision makers, the BOE members had
little incentive to listen or accommodate their interests as
long as the DOS recommendations were perceived as feasible.2
That is, why worry about small-scale waste management
approaches if the massive, high-tech solution was approved?
Moreover, the sophisticated technical debate held the
public's attention to two simple alternatives: build or
block.
However, when decision makers were made to feel
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sufficiently uncomfortable with the DOS proposal, in part as
a result of the policy dialogue that affirmed the
possibility of a high health risk, one could expect that the
decision makers would have begun to think in terms of
mitigation and ways to allay public fears of the high-tech
solution. Supplementary disposal methods would reduce the
tonnage of waste going into the incinerators, and the amount
of dioxin coming out, and might thus newly appeal as an
intermediate, "compromise" course.
Finally, the facilitated policy dialogue reduced the
discretion of the decision makers to choose between
Alternative "A" and Alternative "B". The discussions of key
scientific issues precluded a dismissal of a either risk
assessment as "erroneous." Importantly, the higher estimate
developed by the CBNS team could not be ignored. Decision
makers who may have been inclined to go along with the City
agency's recommendation, on the basis of other factors,
could no longer claim the waste-to-energy design represented
safe, "proven technology." BOE members casting a vote in
favor of the proposal thus became, in a sense, more
accountable for their action and were forced to deal with
the concerns of groups opposed to the imposition of
possible, additional cancer risks on the city's residents.
In a sense, once the opposing position was politically
validated, (by the lack of invalidation of the supporting
scientific evidence), the political costs to the decision
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makers of ignoring the interests behind them increased
substantially.
The proposal for the BNY facility that was approved by
the BOE in the summer of 1985 included stricter monitoring
provisions (to avert human and mechanical failures) and was
coupled with a commitment by the DOS to more vigorously
pursue recycling as a method of reducing municipal solid
waste.3 The extent to which the policy dialogue itself
contributed to this change can not be determined, but the
decision choice evidently was broadened beyond the prior
"build or block" framework. Interestingly, the state of
New York issued a report in 1987 that recommends steps to
reduce municipal solid wastes by 50% over the next decade
(New York Times, January 7, 1987). The report also
recommends continued reliance on incinerators.
Despite the modifications to the BNY proposal,
opposition to the plant continued, which suggests the still
incomplete accommodation of contesting political interests.
State hearings for necessary permits were delayed more than
a year by a lawsuit. As of November 1987, the project still
needed permits from the state and federal EPA, and city
officials doubted that the BNY plant will be operating
before 1992 (New York Times, November 15, 1987).
Empowering the Underdogs
The wood stoves regulatory negotiation represented a
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rather extensive effort to generate new federal regulations.
Technical aspects of multiple issues were extensively
examined and debated, eventually evolving into a range of
mutually acceptable approximations that then served as the
basis for the rules. The institutional nature of rulemaking
and the peculiar ascent of wood stove emissions onto EPA's
agenda (through the NRDC lawsuit)4 largely defined the
problem before negotiations began. But, the consensual
approach to the use of scientific information and analysis
seemed to enhance the abilities of certain stakeholding
groups to influence one another and EPA, especially during
latter stages of the decision making process. There are
several ways in which this occurred.
To begin with, the structure of the consensus-based
procedure allowed entry to many resource-poor stakeholders
who ordinarily might not have gained the attention of EPA.
Rather than requiring technical competence or scientific
information to be a ticket to effective participation in the
rulemaking procedure (as is often true under conventional
proceedings), the regulatory negotiation format based
participation on the perception (of the agency initially and
of the preliminary group of negotiators later) of which
groups were likely to be most directly affected by the
rules. This list of "stakeholders" is distinct from a list
of those interested parties having technical competency.
For example, the consumer's group and a state energy office
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were two groups included in the regulatory negotiation that
did not possess training in relevant fields of engineering,
combustion physics, or environmental regulation. Under
conventional notice and comment proceedings, the technical
naivete reflected in the comments of these groups might have
led the agency to dismiss their concerns as incongruent with
factors the agency believed were technically more feasible
or necessary. Through participation in the consensus-based
process, these two technically ill-prepared groups were able
to put their imprint on the formulation of the emission
rules and see to it that issues of direct concern to them
were addressed.
Second, the regulatory negotiation enhanced the
technical competency of many participants by providing an
opportunity for coalitions of groups with common or non-
conflicting interests to emerge and share technical
expertise. A representative of a state-level environmental
group stated that he depended heavily on the technical
expertise of other members in a coalition of environmental
and state air protection groups that he joined during the
negotiation. Individuals aired specific interests during
caucusing and coalition members together developed policy
proposals that were grounded in what was technically
possible and sound (Charles). Consequently; the interests
of a group that was not independently well-equipped to
handle technical aspects of the rulemaking were securely
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packaged with scientifically sound and, hence, politically
persuasive arguments.
The opportunity to form coalitions for sharing
resources is especially helpful for groups that
traditionally lack resources, such as public interest
groups. In the wood stoves case, the "environmental
coalition" relied extensively on the technical expertise of
the representative from the state of Oregon and the legal
and regulatory expertise of the representative from the
Natural Resources Defense Council. While neither of these
groups has abundant resources, together they formed a strong
knowledge base from which they and other members in the
coalition could benefit.
The shared sense of "mission" among members of the
coalitions allowed for a sharing of technical and legal
expertise within a bubble of trust. Importantly, this same
level of trust did not seem to extend beyond the coalitions
into the full negotiating group. Negotiators, or technical
advisors who accompanied them, volunteered relevant
scientific or technical information either through writing
or orally, but data and analyses were received skeptically.
Experts were subject to intense cross-examination by
competent persons from contending groups during plenary
sessions in which technical components of the regulatory
action were discussed. This high level of skepticism within
the group as a whole, however, seemed to serve constructive
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purposes. The process of debate appeared to educate the
non-experts in the group (and elevate their status in the
discussions by improving their abilities to express
political interests in technically acceptable formats). It
also strengthened the conviction of the group overall that
their ultimate, operating consensus on "facts" was sound.
When the technical presentations and subsequent debate
failed to settle controversy to the satisfaction of the
group as a whole, sometimes the issue would be tabled for
further study by a smaller sub-group of the negotiators.
These task forces usually included members from the two
major coalitions and the EPA, thus keeping intact the web of
trust, interdependence, and credibility. At other times,
according to interviewees, the EPA representatives made a
summary judgment on a given technical issue.
A summary judgment by any party is seriously contrary
to the spirit of a consensual approach. The fact that the
other negotiators deferred to the agency signifies the power
held by EPA. One way to assess the implications of this
event is to recall that under a conventional rulemaking
procedure, the agency would have the same discretion to
ignore certain technical arguments. The consensus-based
procedure simply failed to offer any improvement. There is
another way of looking at the situation, however. In a more
adversarial context, a persuasive technical argument could
also be used to generate public pressure to force a
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different response from the agency. When participants yield
to EPA's refusal to further consider additional technical
arguments in a consensus-based procedure, the agency
effectively gains power.
Interestingly, in the wood stove case, while several
parties expressed dismay and disappointment in EPA's
behavior in those specific instances, no party was
sufficiently disillusioned to pull out of the negotiation
process altogether. Why this was so is difficult to
determine on the basis of the information gathered. The
reaction of these parties may signify a number of things.
It could reflect a pragmatic acceptance of the bounds of the
agency's own political constraints, the fact that no group
recognized personal stakes in the implications of the
particular technical issues at the time, or the fact that
the negotiators were truly "coopted" by the process and
believed the agency's actions were proper and just. In any
case, this is an issue worth further analysis in future
research.
Finally, one financially weak negotiator, the
consumer's group representative, was granted funds from the
regulatory negotiation resource pool to contract an economic
analysis and to hire an engineering consultant. During an
interview, the consumer's group negotiator said that he held
the economic analysis "in his back pocket" in case he felt
it necessary to present alternative arguments to EPA's
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economic analysis.' It was never shared with the rest of
the negotiating group. The engineering consultant was
available to all participants, but only the consumer's group
representative consulted with him. Although these actions
sound close to the "hired gun" phenomena common under
conventional procedures, in this case, the additional
capability gained by this one group seemed to function more
as a boost to the negotiator's self-confidence than as an
overt weapon to win "points" in the negotiations.
Empowerment for the Future
In the Michigan fishing dispute, the consensual method
directed by Special Master McGovern differed importantly
from the previous two examples. Unlike the facilitated
policy dialogue and the negotiated rulemaking, McGovern's
strategy was to attain settlement by separating stakeholders
(and their legal representatives) from their expert advisors
(the biologists). The overall approach was also somewhat
elitist, with regard to the groups granted participation
status. McGovern "bifurcated" the final, three-and-a-half
day negotiation session and divided the assembly of
interested parties into two groups. The "inner circle" of
negotiators that dealt with "more critical matters" was
patterned closely after the list of formal litigants
(McGovern). Similarly, the working group of biologists he
earlier convened comprised expert advisors from only the
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three major groups.
The handling of the scientific components of the
Michigan case did not appear to illuminate paths toward
settlement. It did not empower groups that were not already
influential in the case by virtue of their legal standing.
It also did not visibly redistribute power within the "inner
circle" of negotiators.
The separation of biologists from the stakeholders and
their legal representatives was intended to "de-politicize"
the scientific basis of the decisions. A common model
predicting fish population in various zones of the lake, if
constructed in a truly consensual manner, might have been a
powerful asset for bargaining over "who gets what."
Unfortunately, the model proved to be both overly complex
and controversial. Despite the efforts of the
facilitators,6 the biologists did not reach sufficient
agreement on critical factors, and the resulting model did
not have either the technical capacity nor the political
credibility to operate as McGovern had initially intended.
The biologists returned to their respective advisees with
little tangible evidence of a change in their understanding
of the lakes' fishery.
The collaborative modelling effort also failed to
extend entry into decision making to outside groups or to
bring in additional scientific or technical information.
Notably absent were representatives from the sports fishers'
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or the commercial fishers' organizations. The sports
fishers believed, apparently correctly, that the state
shared their interest in maintaining a healthy recreational
fishery. Lack of participation in the technical discussions
was not perceived by them to threaten their welfare. In
fact, their interests were protected by the DNR during the
negotiations.
In contrast, the commercial fishers did not fare as
well. Indeed, if any one group ended up with the short
straw in the deal, it was the commercial fishers. An
attorney for the commercial fishers' organization expressed
his doubt that scientific or technical arguments on behalf
of his clients would have had any impact, however. 7 He also
stated that, had he been asked, he would have advised his
clients to save their money rather than to pay for an expert
consultant or studies that might have supported their
claims. He believed the combined political strength of the
federal government and the state of Michigan were too
overpowering for the commercial fishers to successfully
challenge. Thus, even if McGovern had invited them, it is
debatable whether the commercial fishers would have joined
the technical collaboration, at least not without any
financial assistance.
Finally, the treatment of the technical issues did not
appear to significantly affect the relative abilities of
members of the "inner circle" of negotiators to influence
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the decision. The three Native American Indian tribes had
joined forces in the litigation. Their interests were
distinct on several dimensions, however, and it appears that
the tribes did not air out their different concerns and
priorities before the negotiations. As a result, important
concerns were forfeited. Of the three tribes, the
numerically largest tribe appears to have been the most
satisfied with the agreement. The members of the Bay Mills
tribe were sufficiently dissatisfied with the agreement to
instruct their attorney to file a suit against the
negotiated agreement, which he did, and lost (McGovern).
According to the attorney for the Grand Traverse Band, the
southern tribe felt that their interests were sacrificed by
the two tribes to the north. The attorney also said that he
believed the biologist who ostensibly represented all three
tribes as the head biologist of the joint Chippewa-Ottawa
Fishery Management Council, was actually preferentially
loyal to the Sault St. Marie tribe. 8 If this was true, the
"lumping" of the three tribes' representation on the
scientific issues may have been a critical oversight from
the perspective of the two, numerically smaller tribes.
Without access to alternative expertise, and without even
the opportunity to hear the tribes' biologist in action
amongst biologists from the rival groups, such suspicions
could be neither confirmed nor laid to rest.
If "power" were measured by the ability of groups to
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win tangible gains through the decision, it would be
especially difficult to deduce a change in the distribution
of power among the various parties as a result of the
treatment of scientific information and argumentation in
this consensus-based procedure. The negotiated agreement,
or the "decision outcome," is difficult to compare against
an imaginary "what-the-judge-would-have-ruled" because
several new items were added to the negotiation agenda.9
Adding items to the negotiation agenda effectively
reformulated the "problem" and expanded the list of
alternative solutions. But, a direct relationship between
the agenda revisions and the less contentious use of science
is not clear.
On the other hand, if power is defined as the ability
to influence future agendas for decision making, the
negotiated outcome may have significant consequences for the
distribution of power. One might argue that the
negotiations succeeded in achieving an agreement mainly
because the pie was enlarged. Issues concerning fish
planting locations, fishing gear technology, technical
assistance, and hard cash were added to the original
allocation dispute. However, the pie was enlarged in a way
that appears to strengthen the position of the tribes in
future skirmishes over the fishery, which will undoubtedly
arise during the 15-year life of the agreement, and in the
renegotiation of the agreement scheduled for the year 2000.
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In addition to the quantity of fish allocated implicitly
through the assignment of fishing rights in certain zones,
the tribes gained exclusive rights to fish in certain areas,
technical assistance, and more than $1.5 million dollars
from the federal government and the state of Michigan for
use toward improving their fishery management and developing
and implementing an economic development program (United
States v. Michigan). In all cases, enhanced fishery
management capabilities will certainly add to the tribes'
ability to marshall technical data supporting their
political claims in the future.
Conclusion
Consensus-based procedures move science-intensive
debates toward resolution by playing down scientific and
technical disagreement.
In the New York City case, initially the project
sponsor and the major opposition group used risk assessments
to attempt to persuade decision makers and the public of the
reasonableness of their preferred policy decision. The
policy dialogue clarified the basis of scientific
disagreement, with neither contending sets of analysis
declared "winner." The consequent understanding of the
creation and destruction of dioxins in municipal solid waste
incinerators that was impressed on the decision maker
representatives and others was one that included both a
218
sense of the uncertain nature of what is known, as well as
the effect of different value orientations of the
investigators on their advice. The use of scientific
information was transformed. From a weapon to win political
support, it became a tool to inform decision makers and the
public of the implications of different political value
orientations.
It is commonly feared that when "science" is
deemphasized in discussions, brute force and political arm
twisting by the more powerful actors take over and guide
decision making. This analysis of three consensus-based
procedures leads to contrary conclusions.
A less contentious use of science in public decision
making can open the debate to voices and concerns of groups
not commonly endowed with technical expertise or the
financial resources to acquire it. When the dust settles
around a feisty brawl over technical aspects of a decision,
the resulting quiet may allow voices not speaking in
technical dialects to be heard. Whether the decision maker
or the public or other policy actors listen to these voices
and whether these voices are even strong enough to speak is
a separate matter. The opportunity is nonetheless evident.
Consensus-based procedures can also increase the access
to information and expertise of all participating
stakeholders through joint sessions with technical
specialists and non-technical stakeholder representatives.
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Opportunities to form coalitions also improve technical
understanding and competency, which in turn enhance the
ability of resource-poor groups to state their concerns in
ways that appear congruent with technical parameters and
that are hence more persuasive to decision makers and
others.
Consensus-based procedures that result in educating
participants about technical aspects also provide greater
(knowledge) equity for the future. Sometimes, too, while
the treatment of science in a negotiation may not directly
or immediately redistribute decision making power by
enhancing a group's technical competency at the moment,
conditions in a settlement can be inserted to provide for a
strengthening of technical resources for future decision
making contests.
The underlying presumption in this discussion is that
scientific information, knowledge, and expertise are a
source of power in decision making by virtue of the
authority popularly awarded to science. They are used to
identify and define a problem and its solutions, and to
persuade potential political allies and decision makers to
support and choose among alternative actions.
The three cases studied here suggest different ways in
which consensus-based procedures can result in a
redistribution of power among the players in science-
intensive public decision making. The degree and type of
220
"power" that was affected ranged from mere "opportunity" to
speak, to a shared grip on scientific information and
technical tools. There were no consistent patterns in the
use of science and its implications for decision making
power except that, contrary to popular expectations, a
consensual approach did not mean the monopoly of scientific
information and analysis by one group. As a result, a less
contentious role for science suggests a greater sharing of
decision making influence.
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Notes
1. Based on a personal interview with Barry Commoner at
the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Flushing, New
York in October 1986.
2. In an 80-page report, the Environmental Defense Fund
claimed New York City could recycle 40% of its solid wastes
by 1992 at far lower economic cost than incinerators (New
York Times, August 4, 1985).
3. The DOS has implemented a program to recycle 15% of the
City's municipal solid waste by 1990.
4. Their out-of-court agreement stipulated that EPA would
address PM10 and POM emissions through regulating wood
stoves under New Source Performance Standards of the Clean
Air Act.
5. Personal interview with David Swankin, Consumer
Federation of America, May 1987.
6. Special Master McGovern was assisted by Francine
Rabinowitz in the facilitation of the modelling effort.
Rabinowitz is a professor in urban planning at UCLA and has
extensive experience with statistical modelling. A
biologist from the State of Michigan funded Institute of
Fisheries at the University of Michigan provided "non-
partisan" expertise, particularly in fishery modelling.
7. Conveyed in a telephone interview with Nino Green,
August 1987.
8. Telephone interview with William Rastetter, August 19,
1987.
9. Fish planting locations, technical assistance, hard
cash, ongoing technical studies to reexamine the
effectiveness of TACs as a management tool, and a time limit
on the agreement are examples of issues that were added to
the negotiation agenda.
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Chapter Five
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Miscast Roles for Science in Public Decision Making
From putting a man on the moon to beginning human life
in a test tube, to the ultimate feat of rendering the planet
uninhabitable to most life forms, the tremendous potential
for human action made possible by the accumulation of
scientific knowledge is staggering. Whether one agrees with
the uses to which this knowledge has been applied or not,
knowledge gained through "the scientific method" has
tangible, material results. It is unquestionable that the
body of scientific knowledge and the methods by which it has
been obtained can make a substantial contribution toward
understanding our world and the alternative futures before
us. Few of us would welcome public (and private) decision
making that ignores completely the advice of those with
scientific expertise and knowledge.
As argued in Chapter 1, however, science currently is
put to multiple uses. Lawmakers and other architects of
public decision making procedures ostensibly have written
references to the scientific basis of a decision into the
criteria for decision making as a means of attempting to
ensure the political accountability of decision makers.
Requiring a "rational" basis is intended to counterbalance
more overtly "political" pressures for a decision. In a
period of American history in which the scientific community
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appeared to offer an alternative perspective to the self-
interested preferences of private industry manipulating a
"captured" agency, the "rational" approach seemed
appropriate.
We have since found that disciplinary and other
divisions of scientific knowledge can provide more than one
"rational" interpretation of reality, however. One question
can be answered in several ways, each equally valid from a
scientific viewpoint, often as a result of our incomplete
understanding of an objective reality. Moreover, scientific
methodology represents a method for gathering information
that is dependent on theory. Scientific theories guide the
recognition, organization, and interpretation of events.
Scientific knowledge, at any point in time, consists of a
multitude of theories that give variable meaning to data.
The selection of theory represents another of several,
additional ways in which the paths for accumulating
scientific knowledge can diverge. It is also one of many
factors critical to the construction of scientific knowledge
that is sensitive to the influence of political paradigms.
Scientific inquiry is a social activity. Knowledge so
produced is not beyond "politics." The reasonableness of a
decision from a scientific perspective is not acceptable as
an indication of nonpartisanship. It is insufficient as a
statement about accountability.
Multiple interpretations of facts, subscription to
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varying theories, and other differences of research design
lead to divergent scientific conclusions about what is and
what can be (under various assumptions about physical
conditions). Groups advocating competing policy
alternatives and decision makers defending their decisions
preferentially cite supportive scientific arguments. As a
result, "symbolic" uses of science, to legitimate decisions
and decision alternatives in order to generate political
support and acquiescence, have come to dominate the
functions commonly served by scientific advising in public
decision making.
Debate on scientific aspects of a decision divert
attention from underlying political conflicts. Moreover,
because the relative ability of different stakeholding
groups and decision makers to take advantage of scientific
arguments is unequal, the focus on scientific aspects serves
to advantage groups with greater access to the scientific
establishment. Contenders may attempt to focus attention on
scientific aspects of an issue as a means of limiting
participation and the agenda of issues subject to
discussion.
Scientific knowledge has been mistakenly identified as
a tool for ending dissent. As the New York City case
demonstrated, resolving scientific disputes does not resolve
political conflict. Settling the disagreement over risk
levels by clarifying the basis of the uncertainty did not
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end the dispute over the mass-burn incinerator because it is
political interest, not scientific disagreement, that fuel
opposition in the first place. Whatever the risk from
dioxin emissions, the Williamsburg community, for example,
is one group that would likely continue to oppose the
incinerator for a number of plausible reasons, ranging from
the undesirability of an incinerator in the neighborhood, to
concerns about the City's lack of respectfulness toward the
community.
The tentative nature of scientific knowledge prevents
its success as a means of insuring accountability or ending
dissent in public decision making. These are false hopes
that have been inappropriately attributed to the role of
scientific knowledge. The resulting contentious uses of
science by groups striving to dominate public decision
making have imposed serious, though not easily quantified,
costs on society. Protracted disputes, reversals of
decisions, and inconsistent policies often result. Instead
of decisions that represent a synthesis of political
contests and scientific knowledge, the politics of decision
making are obscured, certain stakeholders are excluded from
participation, and decision makers are sometimes required to
act without a reasonably sound understanding of pertinent
scientific information.
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Recasting Science Through Consensus-Based Procedures
Science is not limited to its former roles in public
decision making. The examples of consensus-based procedures
examined in this study suggest less contentious roles for
science. Scientific information can inform stakeholders and
decision makers of the feasibility and desirability of
decision alternatives without being used explicitly as a
tool to persuade others. It can be used to mark the bounds
for discussions of political interests, but boundaries
delineated through a consensual process that accommodate
divergent viewpoints are less a means of controlling
discourse than are those set by the imposition of one
scientific interpretation.
As a result of less contentious uses of science, a
narrowly framed technical debate can be opened to a
discussion of political interests. Participation is not
restricted by expertise. Decision making participants can
devote their attention to a consideration of conflicting,
competing, and compatible political interests rather than
struggling to establish one representation of the technical
premises of the decision. Resources can be directed more
pointedly toward addressing the political competition and
conflict that motivates controversy. Stakeholders and
decision makers both gain a richer understanding of the
issues and interests involved. And, stakeholders and
decision makers recapture the subtle, unauthorized, decision
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making power technical experts wield through their mastery
of technical argumentation.
These three cases illustrate three different
procedures. The chart in Figure 3 on the following page
summarizes the objectives, key features, primary techniques,
degree of consensus, transformation of the role of science,
and the impact on decision making of each consensus-based
procedure as argued in the previous chapters. In all cases,
science was transformed from a potentially destructive
weapon into a more benign tool to guide decision making led
by political considerations.
The wood stoves rulemaking case illustrates one example
of a more constructive use of scientific knowledge. The
group spent a considerable amount of time and resources on
developing the technical basis of the rule. While groups
undoubtedly submitted arguments they hoped would reinforce
policy decisions they preferred, the overriding, collective
objective of the technical discussions was to establish a
reasonable estimate of the technical parameters of the
problem. The explicit understanding among the group--that
details of the regulations would not be finalized until the
rule was considered in its entirety--enabled the parties to
give up obstinate battling on technical points that were
unresolvable within the existing time frame for developing
regulations. The group was able to operate in this manner
because they shared an acceptance of the uncertain nature of
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air quality regulation (in terms of both the physics of wood
stove combustion and the effect of regulatory controls) and
a mutual respect for each group's political stake in the
rule.
In the Michigan fishing case, far less consensus on
technical aspects of the dispute was attained. Agreement on
a comprehensive picture of the fishery, (the number of fish
in a specific zone of the lake, the impact of large mesh
gill nets, and so on), was shown to be unnecessary in order
for the parties to reach an accord on dividing up the
fishery resource. Instead, scientific knowledge was utilized
by each party to reassure it that the conditions specified
in the negotiated decision were sufficient to enable it to
satisfy its own objectives. There were effectively three
different maps of the existing fishery and three different
visions of its future evolution. The negotiating group
spent less time trying to persuade one another of the
"correctness" of their model of the biology of the fishery
or the technical merits of their positions, and concentrated
instead on simply procuring an agreement that met their
party's needs and desires. Such an approach toward using
scientific knowledge and expertise is consistent with a
conceptualization of scientific work as a politics-bound
effort to define and understand reality.
These cases demonstrate that scientific argumentation
can be set aside and technical disputes need not be resolved
230
before politically acceptable decisions can be made. In
both cases, the urgency to make a decision and a common goal
of participating fully in the decision making process were
factors that encouraged stakeholders to cooperate and focus
on dealing with political differences.
Of the three cases, the facilitated policy dialogue on
the proposed mass-burn incinerator was designed most
purposely to establish a consensus on a comprehensive view
of scientific issues relevant to the proposal. In a sense,
the NYAS sponsors were attempting to develop "one vision of
reality." The consensus that was intended, however, was not
one that rallied behind one risk assessment rather than
another, but one which consisted of an understanding of the
basis of variations in risk assessment, which are
scientifically, equally plausible in the face of incomplete
knowledge.
The facilitated policy dialogue clarified not only
scientific aspects of the proposal, but also the sensitivity
of scientific interpretations to political interests.
Asking the question, "How do discrepant assessments arise?"
leads to the question, "Why do discrepant assessments
arise?" By confirming the legitimacy of a range of risk
assessments, the process indirectly also elevated the status
of corresponding political interests. In the New York case,
the higher risk assessments reflected a more conservative
approach to accepting (and imposing) risk. In effect, a
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consensual procedure can open the door for a discussion of
political interests.
Variability in technical analysis is used by groups to
strengthen their case against a particular policy
alternative or decision. However, the level of political
conflict is not only a function of the variability in
technical analysis. On the contrary, political conflict is
the source of the passion for technical disputes. If the
variation in risk assessments by the CBNS researchers and
the Hart team had been 24-fold and not 240-fold, it is
likely that the dispute would not have escalated on the
technical front, but the Williamsburg community, as argued
previously, would undoubtedly have continued their vehement
opposition to the Brooklyn Navy Yard project site.
Thus, while these cases show that politically
acceptable decisions can be made without resolving
disagreements on scientific or technical points, resolving
disagreements on scientific elements will not settle
political conflict.
Importantly, subordinating scientific aspects to
political concerns in policy debates through the use of
consensual procedures does not mean that the value of
scientific knowledge is belittled. If any group assesses
the implications of a decision alternative s seriously
adverse, that group has the option of vetoing the choice.
If their objections are ignored by others, they can withdraw
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from the process entirely. A consensus-based procedure
cannot advance with dissent. Thus, in a sense, consensual
procedures accommodate a full range of alternative
interpretations of reality and the future. The consensual
nature of decision making also will prevent decisions that
have a chance of resulting in consequences to which any one
group objects. Accordingly, decisions may tend to be
conservative from a scientific perspective.
Procedures that give prominence to political elements
are likely to raise objections by those concerned about
opportunism on the part of participants. That is, how can
we be sure that consensual procedures will not produce
decisions that accommodate political needs at the expense of
scientific soundness? As long as scientists and persons
with relevant technical expertise are included in the
consensual procedure, their advice is not likely to go
unheeded. Even if non-technically trained stakeholder
representatives favor a decision alternative on the basis of
political criteria, strong dissent by technical experts will
likely squelch it.
Moreover, a consensual procedure potentially offers
greater insurance against scientifically unwise decisions
than conventional, adversarial processes. In a consensual
procedure, participating scientists have more incentive to
act collegially. The consequent peer pressure to behave in
accordance with the norms of the scientific community rather
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than in response to external pressures, (such as pressure
from financial sponsors), can serve to embolden individual
scientists to speak out even if doing so might invalidate a
technical argument that supports their sponsor's preferred
policy alternative. In effect, a consensus-based procedure
can offer protection to "whistle blowers" and enhance the
integrity of the technical basis of decisions.
Viability of Consensus-based Procedures
Indeed, the cases studied in this inquiry suggest that
consensus-based methods of decision making can offer
opportunities for a more thorough and less contentious,
though not less skeptical, review of scientific and
technical components of a decision. Clearly, however,
certain groups will perceive a loss of decision making
influence and power. If industry has the upper hand with
regard to access to data, analysis, and expertise, why would
industry agree to participate in a process in which they may
lose some of their advantage? If government bodies have the
authority to make decisions with only perfunctory
requirements for public consultation, why would agencies and
elected decision makers wish to complicate matters by
involving other parties? If environmental advocacy groups
make national headlines when they file a legal suit against
a federal agency, why would they want to quietly expend
their precious time and resources on relatively colorless
234
negotiations? If scientists have a direct line to the
decision maker, why would they want to join a process in
which their voice becomes only one among many?
Each group clearly has something to lose by negotiating
with competitors and agreeing to accept anything less than
100 per cent of their demands. Consensual approaches
generally present a certain loss of control over decision
making for all parties. The still largely ad hoc nature of
the design and application of these methods means that each
experience is unique. The peculiar mix of issues,
interests, and individual negotiators may give rise to
unexpected alliances and even reshape the agenda.
Coalitions shift the balance of resources. Unpredictable
factors, such as negotiator personalities and rapport among
negotiators, the intervenor's style and range of services,
and so on, exert differing pressures on individual
negotiators that are still not well understood and not
easily predicted. Facilitation techniques achieve intended
objectives sometimes and fail at others. In short, decision
making that is redirected by a consensus-based method
remains a largely uncharted course. There is therefore
considerable risk for all participants to engage in
consensual approaches.
On the other hand, there are also definite gains for
each of the various prospective participants, especially
with regard to scientific and technical components. What
235
are the incentives for various actors to promote and
participate in consensual approaches? I speculate on
benefits and incentives in the sections below. Figure 4, on
the following page, summarizes the advantages and
disadvantages of conventional and consensus-based methods
for comparison. While scientists do not represent a
separate category of actors in public disputes, (since their
involvement is usually predicated on an alignment with a
stakeholding group or decision makers), this discussion
invites a consideration of their involvement in consensual
procedures as well. Altering the role of science means the
role of scientists will also change. Accordingly, below I
include a discussion of the incentives for scientists to
participate in consensual procedures.
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Incentives to Decision Makers
For decision makers, consensus-based procedures offer
several advantages with respect to the scientific and
technical premises of decisions and the political
legitimacy, control, and credibility of decision making.
First consensual approaches offer an obvious advantage in
regard to the consideration of scientific and technical
information. The process sets up incentives, like
conventional procedures, for various stakeholders to
volunteer relevant data and analysis. Massive amounts of
information and expertise can be assembled quickly and at
relatively little direct cost to the decision maker. Unlike
conventional procedures, however, the interactive and
iterative process enable the decision maker to set and
enforce a standard format for the presentation of
information. Obfuscatory language can be eliminated. As a
result, decision makers are more likely to receive technical
information in a form they find intelligible. Subsequent
decision choices are less likely to be based on faulty
scientific or technical premises.
Second, by definition, when consensus-based methods
yield products, they are products that are politically
acceptable. Unless stakeholders are satisfied, no agreement
will be reached. Importantly, consensual approaches are not
based on completely fulfilling the demands of stakeholders,
per se. In the best of cases, while perhaps no one is
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entirely satisfied with the all elements of the decision, a
sufficient number of concerns is dealt with in an adequate
manner so that the "threshold" for a group s approval is
passed. However, approval from a particular group may
result not from a minimal level of satisfaction with regard
to the group's initial "wish list" of concerns, but from the
group's assessment that the negotiated outcome is superior
to the likely outcome under conventional decision making.
In any case, however, the group s accord, although not a
guarantee, increases the probability that the decision will
not be challenged later.
Moreover, the decision maker's net can be cast more
widely to catch a greater spectrum of issues and interests.
In conventional procedures, issues and interests
overshadowed by well-articulated disputes over scientific
aspects of decisions are often neglected. As a result,
substantial segments of the stakeholding community are
effectively disenfranchised. The subsequent dissent and
disillusionment of such groups is potentially destabilizing
both in terms of implementation of the decision itself and
the decision maker's own political base. Defining
participation by the recognition of political interests
rather than technical competence, consensus-based methods
offer decision makers a means of receiving a broader array
of viewpoints and an opportunity to accommodate these
concerns in their decision choice. A consensual approach
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thus may be politically expedient for decision makers on a
number of dimensions.
Third, amid the shifting foci of influence in
consensus-based methods decision makers reap a clear gain
vis-a-vis scientists and technical experts. Consensus-based
methods that enable participants to better comprehend
scientific and technical aspects of decisions recover a
certain degree of control over the identification and choice
of alternatives that has become the domain of those most
fluent in the technical complexities. As decision makers
develop a stronger understanding of technical arguments,
they will be able to devise new alternatives that are
consistent with technical knowledge, their perception and
ranking of competing interests, and their personal concerns.
Scientists and technical experts remain as "advisors" but
are appropriately restrained.
Finally, consensual approaches that involve
stakeholders and scientists yield decisions that are likely
to be more credible to both participants in the process and
outsiders. The interests of stakeholders are not
subordinated to the declarations of scientists or technical
experts, but neither are political concerns placated at the
expense of scientific or technical soundness. By being a
part of the decision maker's education regarding the
interests of stakeholders and scientific arguments,
stakeholders and scientists both gain a fuller appreciation
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of the decision maker's task and the ultimate decision.
Again, credible decisions are critical to the political
futures of decision makers, especially those wishing to
cultivate a reputation for fair and wise decisions.
Incentives for Stakeholders
Consensus-based methods also offer attractive
opportunities to stakeholders in public decisions, although
the benefits may be less clear-cut than for decision makers.
To begin with, the "voluntary" character of consensus-based
processes is less consistent and more controversial. For
example, a court order to negotiate a settlement is not
truly a voluntary circumstance, given the potentially high
cost of appearing uncooperative before the judge, who would
otherwise render the decision. The decision maker's choice
to pursue a consensual approach is also usually a carefully
circumscribed event. As in the EPA wood stoves case, the
decision maker can retain a large degree of discretion by
setting the initial agenda and marking the boundaries of
negotiable items. Nonetheless, a decision maker's
invitation to engage in a consensus-based procedure should
not be blithely declined.
Consensus-based methods offer a different set of
advantages to stakeholders depending on their position in
the public discussion. Stakeholders who are not part of the
technical debate and who have concerns not entertained by
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the advocates of positions linked to the technical debates
represent one subgroup. To the extent that their concerns
and interests may be inadvertently overlooked (and not
intentionally ignored) by decision makers, consensus-based
methods may open up the range of issues and decision
alternatives considered and addressed in the decision.
Again, importantly, the ticket for entry into a consensus-
based process is not technical expertise but the
identification of political interests at stake.
At the same time, resource-poor stakeholders also gain
access to information and expertise otherwise unavailable to
them. Merely by attending sessions in which contending
scientific and technical arguments or information are
presented will elucidate points not otherwise
comprehensible. Opportunities for direct questioning of
technical presenters provide direct access to technical
"tutors." Possibilities in consensual procedures for
joining coalitions also enlarge the resource base of
stakeholders. In many ways, resource-poor stakeholders can
improve their understanding of technical points and thus
enhance their ability to devise decision alternatives that
meet their own political objectives and are consistent with
technical knowledge.
Finally, the very act of participating in the
deliberations that lead to a decision can be educational,
especially to groups that are traditionally more distant
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from the decision making locus. The discussions that occur
in a consensual procedure will convey not only technical
information to negotiators, but also insights into the rank
order of concerns of the decision maker and competing
stakeholding groups. The knowledge gained can be used to
shape proposals that are more likely to be accepted by
others, as well as knowledge that can be constructively
applied in future confrontations. The opportunities for
gathering such information are more limited for groups with
fewer resources and are thus especially valuable to such
groups.
In light of the apparently clear gains for
traditionally resource-poor groups to engage in consensus-
based methods, what incentives exist for traditionally
dominant groups, such as business and industry? Why should
they share technical information and expertise that they
might manipulate to their advantage under conventional
procedures?
A popular image of business and industry is that they
typically hold deep bank accounts that can be tapped to fund
self-serving technical studies and expert testimonies. They
often do, in fact, have direct and exclusive access to a
vast vault of information and expertise. Even manufacturers
in small industries, like the wood stove producers, have on
the payroll persons with engineering expertise to assist in
the research and development of their products. Bluntly, it
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is their business to gather technical data about their
product. Leading manufacturers of large industries, like
the petrochemical industry, have proprietary data concerning
the chemical substances utilized in their production
processes. They also keep health records on employees and,
in many cases, have in their hands rare data on the health
conditions of employees exposed to various chemicals. In
terms of access to data and expertise, the ability of
industry often exceeds even that of regulating agencies like
EPA and OSHA.
In fact, not all firms are as resource-rich as those
appearing on the "Fortune 500" list. Moreover, the concerns
of different firms within an industry are usually not the
same. Partly as a result of the stereotyped image of "big
business" and "corporate giants," however, the scientific
arguments of business and industry involved in contested
public decisions are often taken lightly by others simply
because they are presumed to purposely withhold and distort
information to abet the firm or industry's single-minded,
avaricious mission to prosper. In true stereotypical
fashion, the subtleties of the firm or industry's
multifaceted and diverse needs are often blurred, and lost
to decision makers considering competing political claims.
Furthermore, under conventional decision making,
corporations (and others) compete on an "all or nothing"
basis. Accordingly, one's scientific arguments are either
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"right" or "wrong." Winning on the scientific front,
however, does not mean winning the battle. As the South
Terminal v. EPA case cited in Chapter 1 illustrates, in
judicial challenges to administrative decisions, a court
will rule in favor of the plaintiff only if the analysis of
the agency is found to be clearly in error. Even then,
however, a ruling in favor of the plaintiff at most means
only remanding the decision back to the agency for further
review. Corporate stakeholders can expend considerable time
and money on legal challenges for dubious gains.
In contrast, in consensus-based procedures industry
spokespersons and representatives from individual firms gain
an opportunity to differentiate their interests and concerns
from stereotyped images. Consensus-based procedures enhance
the credibility of scientific and technical information they
contribute, if it is accepted by the negotiating group.
Also through the process, they gain a sense of what the
ultimate decision will look like. In the business world
where "time is money," companies often assign high value to
predictability in the regulatory environment. Put simply,
corporate competitors may do well to trade lesser gains for
greater certainty. It appears that consensus-based methods
offer distinct advantages even to the "giants" in the public
arena.
Finally, participating in a consensus-based procedure
that aims to produce a technically sound decision that meets
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the interests of the decision maker as well as other
participants will help to build a positive, public image for
business and industry stakeholders. Rather than project
images of self-interested bullies who attempt to "buy off"
or manipulate decision makers, or who launch an expensive
court challenge if an unfavored decision alternative is
chosen, business and industry groups that participate in a
consensual process will appear reasonable and public-
spirited.
Incentives for Scientists
Scientists in public disputes are usually not
independent stakeholders. More often, they are drawn into
public debates as advisors to other stakeholders or the
decision maker(s). When they enter on their own accord, and
do not quickly ally with one of the contending groups, then
one may presume they hold a separate interest in the
decision in question. In such a case, they can be
considered a "stakeholder," but one whose incentives to
participate in a consensus-based supplement are distinct
from those of other stakeholding groups. In any case, as a
party to a dispute or as an advisor, scientists can either
balk or buy into a proposal to undertake a consensual
procedure, and it is important to consider he incentives to
participate for scientists.
Scientists may initially feel reluctant to join a
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process in which they fear they will lose some control over
the interpretation of their work. Consensus-based
procedures that aim to involve all policy actors
(stakeholders, decision makers, and scientists) in
establishing the technical basis of public decisions may
appear to force a "compromise" of scientific methodology by
opening it to political bargaining among non-scientist
stakeholders. The three cases examined in the previous
chapters illustrate, however, that scientists are not
pressured into supporting opinions with which they do not
agree. In fact, in several ways scientists can more easily
maintain their chosen roles as "seekers of truth" (rather
than "advocates of policy") in consensus-based procedures.
First, consensus-based procedures encourage a thorough
examination and, often, further analysis of scientific
evidence. As discussed earlier, at any given point,
scientific knowledge on a specific question is partial and
incomplete. The evidence and arguments put forth by a
particular scientist (or group of scientists) represent just
one piece of a larger puzzle. In adversarial procedures,
scientists are asked to defend their work. A consensual
procedure, in contrast, asks scientists with different views
to debate the relative validity and significance of their
work toward a common objective, to determine what they can
agree on. This shared goal potentially creates a rich
opportunity for scientists to synthesize divergent data into
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a new theory or a composite understanding of the issue in
question. Integrating new data into existing theories or
modifying theories to account for new information is an
important element of the ideal of how scientific inquiry
advances the state of knowledge.
Moreover, under conventional, adversarial procedures
scientists frequently feel bound (formally through payroll
links or informally through their strong, public association
with particular policy alternatives) to their original
arguments. A consensual procedure that separates political
stakes from scientific contests affords scientists greater
flexibility to "change their minds," if new information
persuades them to do so. In this sense, a consensual
procedure frees individual scientists to act more as the
"ideal scientist," especially those who are called into a
public debate by their employer or research sponsor.
Third, consensus-based procedures educate non-expert
policy actors to develop appropriate expectations about the
capability of scientific expertise in public decision
making. Observing scientists debate and defend conflicting
viewpoints can be highly instructive to non-expert policy
actors. Even while their understanding of substantive
details may remain somewhat vague, they are able to gain a
"feel" for the complexity of the issue, and the limits to
current knowledge. When stakeholders and decision makers
learn to appreciate the multiple perspectives possible in
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viewing a particular issue, and the value of each
perspective, they are less likely to demand consistency or
uniformity in opinion from scientific advisors. Non-expert
policy actors (and the public in general) will be less
inclined to demand single "answers" that scientists are not
able to provide at the moment. At the same time, scientists
will be able to demonstrate their conviction about what they
do know. As a result, non-expert policy actors are less
likely to believe the scientists are acting out of political
self-interest, and the general credibility of science as an
institution will be protected.
Finally, while credibility is important, alone it is
insufficient to ensure that the advice of scientists will be
heeded by the other policy actors. In consensual
procedures, the participation of scientists in the
formulation of policy alternatives gives scientists a direct
hand in helping to shape the ultimate decision. In this
way, they can help to make certain that the decision is
consistent with the current state of scientific knowledge.
Moreover, they can guide decision makers toward initiating
actions that will help to fill gaps in the current state of
knowledge (by including monitoring provisions, further data
collection, or continuing analysis as part of decisions on
controversial projects in which scientific uncertainty
impedes a more precise understanding of the consequences of
decision alternatives, for example).
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Should Consensual Procedures Be Used?
Public decisions imply a redistribution of resources
(be they material, economic, or political in nature). In a
highly diversified society that is culturally pluralistic,
economically stratified, and politically conflictual, such
redistributions are inevitably contentious. Decision making
that does not address political concerns will ultimately
fail to endure. Inasmuch as public decisions represent even
only a tactical truce among contending groups battling over
resources, preserving the preeminence of political interests
in public decision making is critical.
Under existing institutional structures, science is
often used as a weapon to dominate public decisions.
Scientific and technical resources are not distributed
evenly throughout society. Highly educated individuals have
greater access than those with fewer formal credentials.
Much scientific activity is sponsored, directed, and held in
private hands. This has implications for both who has
current access to information and expertise, as well as how
the agenda for scientific research has evolved, and how the
base of scientific knowledge has developed. Even "public"
science, funded by government, is heavily skewed toward
fields and project areas with potential military
applications. As a result, the scientific base for
production-oriented technologies, for example, is far more
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sophisticated than our understanding of the coincidental,
environmental effects of such technologies.
Public decision making procedures that foster
adversarial uses of scientific argumentation can be
suspected of systematically favoring certain groups.
Decision making methods that deemphasize the persuasive
power of scientific argumentation or lower the barriers to
entry that scientific disputes sometimes constitute
represent a step toward equalizing the opportunity for
groups to compete for public resources. If equality of
opportunity in public decision making is valued, defusing
scientific "weapons" may be a second, critical element of
public decision making procedures.
My findings suggest that consensus-based procedures can
result in favorable transformations in the role of science
in public decision making. Specifically, scientific
knowledge can be used to help stakeholders and decision
makers appraise the scientific soundness and political
desirability of decision alternatives from their own
perspective, rather than as a weapon that obfuscates the
politics of decision making. This less adversarial role
will move decision making toward scientifically sound
decisions without sacrificing democratic goals.
In addition, consensual procedures not only facilitate
an understanding of scientific factors and a clarification
of technical disagreement, they also encourage discussion of
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the political interests behind public debates. A far more
integrative discussion of science and politics, and the
politics of scientific arguments, results.
A consensus-based procedure by definition must be
voluntary. For groups contending in contests over public
decisions, consensus-based procedures ought to be viewed as
one of a package of tactical options available. The choice
of political tactics in science-intensive decision making
depends on a group's scientific and technical resources, as
well as political and contextual factors. Before agreeing
to participate in a consensus-based procedure, each
prospective participant ought to consider three critical
factors: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of a
consensus-based approach given a group s resources, (2) a
comparison of likely outcomes under all decision making path
options, and (3) the compatibility of the objective of a
consensus-based procedure with the political objectives of
the stakeholder's involvement in the particular controversy.
First, a decision to engage in a consensus-based
procedure ought to begin with an analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages consensus-based approaches offer.
Resource-poor groups fight an uphill battle regardless of
the front on which confrontation occurs. Such groups, which
frequently lack access to technical information and
expertise, can be severely handicapped when a debate is
focused on technical aspects. Conversely, resource-rich
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adversaries possess substantial advantage with regard to
persuading decision makers and the public of the scientific
soundness of their preferred policy positions. In
these situations, consensus-based procedures that offer a
sharing of technical information and expertise can
constitute a tactical coup for resource-poor groups.
In comparison to resource-poor groups, resource-rich
groups stand in relative advantage under both consensus-
based and conventional decision making. The measure of
whether such a group should participate in a consensus-based
procedure is not only whether its preferred policy will
prevail over those of resource-poor adversaries, but how the
group will obtain its objectives and at what cost. A land
developer who negotiates with abutting land owners and other
community representatives is likely to encounter less
resistance at later points in the processing of permit
applications and construction than one who wins the first
battle in a feisty courtroom. A developer who gains
approval for a project after the concerns of the community
have been aired and addressed by appropriate alterations to
a project's design is also likely to continue to reap
valuable rewards in the future resulting from a positive
community reputation.
Decision makers appear to have much to gain and little
to lose by suggesting consensus-based supplements in
decision making that involves complex scientific and
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technical issues. Enhancement of the political
acceptability, credibility, scientific and technical
soundness, and technical feasibility of consensually-derived
decisions are not inconsequential benefits. The highest
cost may actually boil down to the concentrated dedication
of time required of decision makers themselves, or credible
representatives.
The second factor that ought to be considered before
agreeing to participate in a consensus-based procedure is an
analysis of the likely outcomes under all decision making
process options. In negotiation jargon, this amounts to
assessing one's BATNA, or "best alternative to a negotiated
agreement."' The expected outcome of a conventional
procedure is less predictable at some times than at others.
Nonetheless, some contextual factors are sufficiently well-
understood to send strong signals.
In a political climate led by a federal administration
that believes the highest priority should be to protect the
environment, for example, environmental advocates may
believe their interests will be better promoted under
conventional administrative and judicial patterns of
decision making, where government retains considerable
discretion. Under such conditions, there is little urgency
to pursue alternative paths. On the other hand, under an
anti-environmental leadership that has set out to castrate
existing programs and dismember federal environmental
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policies, a strategy to pursue incremental, rather than
radical gains, may be preferable to environmental advocates,
and a consensus-based procedure may be one means of doing
so.
Pursuing a procedure that is supplementary to
conventional decision making also means that conventional
decision making options may change as a result. The
calculation of the expected outcome of a conventional
decision making process that has been disrupted by a
consensus-based procedure that did not produce an agreement
is complicated and somewhat uncertain. It is still unclear
how a court would look upon a legal challenge initiated by a
party who withdraws from earlier negotiations, especially in
a multi-party dispute in which other parties wish to
continue negotiations. Part of the risk of agreeing to
participate in a consensus-based procedure, then, is the
impact a failed attempt may have on the outcome of the
conventional decision making process. In the Michigan
fishing case, the Bay Mills tribe subsequently withdrew
their support of the negotiated agreement and a court trial
was conducted on the merits of the negotiated agreement.
The judge ruled against the tribe's legal challenge.
The final factor that each party ought to consider is
an obvious one, but one that is easily overlooked. Whether
or not a group ought to enter a consensus-based procedure is
a function of the political objective of that group's
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involvement in a particular debate. That is, sometimes a
group may deliberately exploit scientific uncertainty in
order to draw public attention to a particular issue or
decision. A consensual procedure that will clarify the
basis of disagreement, even if it illuminates differences in
political interests or values in the process, may not serve
as effectively to capture the public's imagination,
interest, support, and sympathy as other methods of
political activism, such as street demonstrations or lengthy
court battles that center on advocacy uses of science. As
an aid for political mobilization, the symbolic usefulness
of disputing sometimes outweighs the benefits of finding a
resolution.
Also, consensus-based procedures presume a desire for
forward movement. If delaying a decision is a primary
objective of a group, then engaging in a consensus-based
procedure only to draw out the decision making process is
likely only to aggravate other participants who eventually
realize the group s real motives. An uncooperative group,
or one that ultimately sabotages a consensus-based effort by
premeditatedly withdrawing, is likely to suffer some kind of
backlash. If delaying a decision serves the best interest
of a group, the group probably ought to avoid consensus-
based procedures altogether.
If, however, a group wants a decision to be made, or
believes one is imminent, an invitation to join a consensus-
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based procedure can represent an unequalled opportunity to
shape that decision. In particular, a less contentious use
of science developed through a consensual process enables
groups not otherwise well-equipped to battle on the turf of
experts to compete for control of public resources. For a
technologically sophisticated society overall, consensus-
based procedures may be just the key needed to open the door
to scientifically-wise, participatory decision making.
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Notes
1. See Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes.
(Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1981).
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Appendix 1
INTERVIEWS
NEW YORK CITY MSW INCINERATOR CASE
Personal Interview
Barry Commoner, Director, Center for the Biology of Natural
Systems, Queens College, Flashing, New York, October,
1986.
Telephone Interview
Marc David Block, New York Academy of Sciences, several
during September 1986.
EPA WOOD STOVES REGULATORY NEGOTIATION
Telephone Interviews
Robert Ajax, Environmental Protection Agency, Chief of
Standards Development Branch, Air Office,
May 21, 1987.
William Becker, State and Territorial Air Pollution Program
Administrators (STAPPA) and Association of Local Air
Pollution Control Officials (ALAPCO), May 12, 1987.
Larry Canaday, Woodcutters Manufacturing, June 12, 1987.
John Charles, Oregon Environmental Council, May 1987.
Richard Colyer, Environmental Protection Agency, Standards
Development Branch, May 7, 1987.
Donnis Corn, a-b Fabricators, Inc., May 18, 1987.
David Doniger, Natural Resources Defense Council, May 1987.
Harold Garabedian, State of Vermont, Air Pollution Control
Program, Agency of Environmental Conservation, June 2,
1987.
R.D. Gros Jean, Corning Glass, May 12, 1987.
Brad Hollomon, New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority, May 12, 1987.
Jim King, State of Colorado, Department of Health, May 13,
1987.
John Kowalczyk, State of Oregon, Department of Environmental
Quality, May 11, 1987.
Neil Martin, Brugger Exports, Ltd., June 1, 1987.
David Menotti, Wood Heating Alliance, May 5, 1987.
Jay W. Shelton, Shelton Research, Inc., May 11, 1987.
Personal Interviews
Doreen Cantor, Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement
and Compliance Division, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1987.
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Philip Harter, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1987.
David Swankin, Consumer s Federation of America, Washington,
D.C., May 1, 1987.
MICHIGAN FISHING DISPUTE
Telephone Interviews
Richard Clark, Institute for Fisheries Research, August 27,
1987.
Robert Doherty, professor of history, University of
Pittsburgh, September 1, 1987.
William Eger, biologist, Chippewa-Ottawa Fishery Management
Authority, August 14, 1987.
Daniel Green, attorney for Sault St. Marie tribe of Chippewa
Indians, August 12, 1987.
Nino Green, attorney for non-tribal commercial fishers,
August 17, 1987.
Bruce Greene, attorney for Bay Mills Indian Community,
August 13, 17, and 19, 1987.
Wilbur Hartman, biologist, U.S. Department of Interior,
August 21, 1987.
Richard Hatch, Great Lakes Fishery Laboratory, Fish and
Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of Interior,
August 20, 1987.
Francis McGovern, professor, University of Alabama, July
1987.
Francine Rabinowitz, July 20, 1987.
William Rastetter, attorney for Grand Traverse Band of
Chippewa-Ottawa Indians, August 19, 1987.
Stephen Schultz, attorney, Grand Traverse Area Sport Fishing
Association, Michigan Charterboat Association, Michigan
Steelhead and Salmon Fisherman's Association,
August 13, 1987.
Mariana Shulstad, Department of Interior, August 17, 1987.
Ronald Skoog, former director of Michigan Department of
Natural Resources, September 21, 1987.
Peter Stekettee, attorney, Michigan United Conservation
Clubs, August 14, 1987.
Elizabeth Valentine, former Michigan Assitant Attorney
General, August 14, 1987.
Asa Wright, biologist, Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, Fisheries Division, August 20, 1987.
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Appendix 2
PARTICIPANTS IN EPA WBS NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Negotiators/Affiliation
1. Robert Ajax, U.S. EPA
2. William Becker, STAPPA/ALAPCO*
3. Larry Canaday, Woodcutters Mfg.
4. John Charles, Oregon Environmental Council
5. Donnis Corn, a-b Fabricators, Inc.
6. David Doniger, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
7. Harold Garabedian, Vermont Air Pollution Control
Program
8. Robert Geiter, Applied Ceramics
9. R.D. Gros Jean, Corning Glass Works
10. Brad Holloman, New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority and New York State Energy
Office
11. Jim King, Colorado Department of Health
12. John Kowalczyk, Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality
13. Neil Martin, Brugger Exports, Ltd.
14. David Menotti, Wood Heating Alliance
15. Jay W. Shelton, Shelton Research, Inc.
16. David Swankin, Consumer Federation of America
Facilitator
Phil Harter, Esq., Consultant to EPA
Executive Secretary
Chris Kirtz, U.S. EPA
Observers
Wayne Leiss, Office of Management and Budget
George J. Lippert, U.S. Forest Service
Jean Vernet, U.S. Department of Energy
*State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators
and Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials
Source: Federal Reqister, Vol. 52, No. 32, February 18,
1987.
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